Ordinary democracy : reading resistances to debt after the global financial crisis with Stanley Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy. by Tooker, Lauren
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/99847/
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Lauren Tooker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ordinary Democracy  
 
 
Reading Resistances to Debt after the Global Financial Crisis 
with Stanley Cavell’s Ordinary Language Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of           
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies 
University of Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies 
March 2017 
 
Thèse présentée en vue de l’obtention du grade académique de 
Docteur en Sciences politiques et sociales (Université libre de Bruxelles) 
Docteur en Etudes politiques et internationales (University of Warwick) 
Sous la direction de Madame/Monsieur les Professeurs 
Firouzeh NAHAVANDI (ULB) 
Lena RETHEL (Warwick) 
Matthew WATSON (Warwick)
  
	ii 
Contents 
 
List of Illustrations .............................................................................................. iv	
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. v	
Declarations ......................................................................................................... ix	
Abstract ................................................................................................................. x	
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1	
1. Problem: from foreclosed futures to new debt ecologies in IPE ....................... 3	
2. Contribution and questions: a Cavellian account of ordinary democratic 
subjectivity for IPE ................................................................................................ 7	
3. Research process: the practice and ethics of studying debt resistances ........... 10	
4. Structure: chapter arguments and overview ..................................................... 16	
PART ONE: From Everyday Politics to Ordinary Democracy 
Chapter One: Images of Debt Politics .............................................................. 22	
1. Captivity to pictures and practices of civic freedom ....................................... 24	
2. An everyday image of debt politics ................................................................. 32	
3. An ordinary image of debt politics .................................................................. 44	
Concluding remarks ............................................................................................. 54	
Chapter Two: How To Do Agency with the Ordinary ................................... 56	
1. Examining ordinary ethics ............................................................................... 58	
2. Understanding ordinary action ......................................................................... 64	
3. Scrutinising ordinary language usage .............................................................. 71	
4. Reanimating ordinary words ............................................................................ 80	
Concluding remarks ............................................................................................. 86	
Chapter Three: Stanley Cavell and Ordinary Democratic Subjectivity ...... 89	
1. Cavell’s claim to community ........................................................................... 92	
2. Cavell’s ordinary exemplar ............................................................................ 102	
3. Cavell’s passionate utterance ......................................................................... 109	
4. A Cavellian grammar of democratic subjectivity .......................................... 115	
Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 119	
	iii 
PART TWO: Cavellian Readings of Resistances to Debt 
Chapter Four: Avoiding Debt ......................................................................... 122	
1. Cavell on becoming an ordinary exemplar .................................................... 125	
2. Exemplary debt avoidance and cultures of financial capability .................... 139	
3. From financial capability to self-reliance in debt avoidance ......................... 149	
4. Rethinking everyday financial literacies in IPE ............................................. 161	
Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 164	
Chapter Five: Auditing Debt .......................................................................... 167	
1. Cavell on issuing a passionate utterance ........................................................ 170	
2. Passionate debt auditing and cultures of financial transparency ................... 182	
3. From transparency to responsiveness in debt auditing .................................. 197	
4. Rethinking everyday financial performativities in IPE ................................. 205	
Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 208	
Chapter Six: Refusing Debt ............................................................................ 211	
1. Cavell on making a claim to community ....................................................... 214	
2. Communal debt refusal and cultures of financial liability ............................. 224	
3. From liability to responsibility in debt refusal ............................................... 238	
4. Rethinking everyday financial moral economies in IPE ................................ 250	
Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 253	
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 257	
1. Comparison: family resemblances among resistances ................................... 259	
2. Summation: narrating main findings and contribution .................................. 265	
3. Implications: rethinking ethics, performativity, and critique in IPE ............. 268	
4. New directions: avenues for further research ................................................ 273	
Concluding remarks ........................................................................................... 277	
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 279	
Appendix: List of Interviewees ....................................................................... 329	
  
	iv 
List of Illustrations 
Figure 1: Molly Crabapple, ‘The Rolling Jubilee: We Owe You Nothing’ ...... 242 
Figure 2: Joe Alterio, ‘The Rolling Jubilee: A Bailout By the People For the 
People’ ............................................................................................................... 242	
 
 
 
  
	v 
Acknowledgements 
 
It is difficult to begin without borrowing… 
– Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, Life in the Woods (2004) 
 
In an example tucked away in a footnote, the ordinary language philosopher J. L. 
Austin explores the moral consequences of describing the shooting of his 
neighbour’s donkey as an ‘accident’ versus describing this act as a ‘mistake’. For 
many scholars of International Political Economy, the idea of hitching a ride with 
an ordinary language philosopher (let alone with a lesser-known one like Stanley 
Cavell) would seem about as promising as acquiring the services of Austin’s 
neighbour’s deceased donkey. How fortunate I am, therefore, to have had 
supervisors who have treated this project as something entirely other than dead 
on departure.  
At the University of Warwick, Lena Rethel has ridden side-saddle with me 
throughout the project. Lena has a wonderful and quite uncanny ability to grasp 
the essence of my thinking, as well as the knots within my arguments, well 
before I do. This project has been vastly improved by Lena’s incisive intellectual 
commentary and unflappable practical advice, not to mention her gentle pushes 
to, in her words, ‘get a few more people on the bus’ (even as she respected my 
desire to travel by donkey). Thank you, Lena. 
Also at Warwick, Matthew Watson leapt on board when I doubted the donkey 
had been alive to begin with and proceeded to spur me on with characteristic 
enthusiasm and generosity of feedback. Mat’s ability to see the best in every 
person and every project (not to mention my haiku!) is unsurpassed. Mat 
	vi 
provides the angle according to which I measure not only where one can and 
ought to go in scholarly life, but also the best way to get there. This project has 
been enriched by Mat’s guidance and support. Thank you, Mat. 
Riding in convoy, Firouzeh Nahavandi at the Université libre de Bruxelles has 
offered substantial support and acutely helpful engagements with my work. 
Writing a PhD for two different institutions and academic cultures is far from 
straightforward; I am fortunate that Firouzeh smoothed my path at the ULB with 
aplomb. Firouzeh gave me the courage to trust my instincts and set aside those 
parts of the project that just wouldn’t fit in the pannier bag. I also owe her a great 
deal for pushing me to find what she describes as the ‘sauce’ that holds the 
‘spaghetti’ of any research project together. Un grand merci à vous, Firouzeh. 
My targeting of these supervisors has proved neither an accident nor a mistake. 
Mercifully, unlike Austin’s neighbour’s donkey, they have lived to tell the tale. 
I have many other people to thank for helping me to see the journey through, so I 
hope the reader will indulge me as I try to account for my debts in full. I moved 
to the United Kingdom from Auckland in Aotearoa New Zealand. Auckland is 
built on a narrow volcanic isthmus; it feels as though the sea is never more than a 
few minutes away. Perhaps it was inevitable that I would find the English 
Midlands something of an adjustment! I owe a great deal to James Brassett for 
getting me off the plane and onto the PhD boat (no donkeys were in sight at that 
stage). James showed me how to roll with the tacks when shipwreck—or at least 
being knocked overboard by the boom—seemed certain. He taught me that in 
PhD life, the ebbs, flows, and threat of the sea floor are nowhere near as perilous 
as they seem (particularly in the landlocked Midlands). I hope we’ll find our sea 
legs again in the future. 
	vii 
Warwick’s community in Politics and International Studies (PAIS) has been an 
outstanding source of intellectual stimulation and social shenanigans. Davinia 
Hoggarth deserves a special mention for her friendship during this project: I’ll 
never forget our capers as the caped duo of Dale Street! Toby Pforr provided 
invaluable logistical support at the end. My thanks also go to other members of 
PAIS, past and present: André, Ben R., Chris C., Chris H., Chris R., Erzsébet, 
Jakub, João, Julia, Mike, Nick T., Richard, and Rogan, as well as to members of 
the redoubtable IPE cluster. 
Beyond PAIS, I thank Gurminder Bhambra for the provocation of her critical 
spirit. Outside Warwick (sort of!), Katie Blair’s friendship has made regular 
sorties to Birmingham both a joy and a necessity. At the University of Alberta, 
Rob Aitken is an exemplar of the political economy I aspire to do and 
conversations with him proved decisive to the commitments of this thesis. At the 
University of Essex, Simon Haisell showed it was possible to write a PhD 
companionably across great distances, as we found ourselves dotted around the 
globe. Simon, thanks for helping me to slay the zombie black sheep! In 
Auckland, Xanthe Butler, Andrea Frires, Janna Hamilton, and Kate Morrison 
reminded me that life must be lived somewhere other than inside a thesis. 
My family have supported me in countless crucial ways over many years of 
study. They have also borne my absence with grace. Thank you, Mum, David, 
and Milan; Dad, Sarah, Emma, and Alex; Mike and Jess; and Amanda and Irene.  
A number of bodies provided scholarships and funding that made the researching 
and writing of this thesis possible. I gratefully acknowledge: the European 
Commission, which employed me as Erasmus Mundus Doctoral Fellow in 
Globalisation, the EU and Multilateralism (GEM) and therefore allowed me to 
	viii 
work full-time on my research; the Social Science Research Council in the 
United States, whose Dissertation Proposal Development Fellowship funded 
fieldwork and participation in international workshops; the University of 
Warwick’s Humanities Research Centre, whose Warwick Transatlantic 
Fellowship funded fieldwork and enabled me to be Visiting Scholar at the New 
School for Social Research, NYC, under the generous mentorship of Professor 
Janet Roitman; the British International Studies Association, whose Founder’s 
Fund Award provided valuable resources in the final months; and the Yvonne A. 
M. Smith Charitable Trust, whose scholarship was instrumental in allowing me 
to extend my fieldwork plans and make the most of international conferences. I 
also thank the GEM PhD School in Brussels for important administrative support 
during my programme. 
To those who have shared their insights with me and whose labours I discuss in 
this thesis, I offer my profound thanks for and appreciation of your efforts. That I 
cannot name you individually, for reasons of confidentiality, does not lessen the 
depth of feeling in this acknowledgement. 
This thesis is for Nick, to whom I owe a debt beyond measure. It would never 
have come to be without his unswerving belief in me. Thank you for sharing our 
life together with yet another thesis. This is the last one, I promise! 
‘It is difficult to begin without borrowing’, Henry David Thoreau remarks at the 
beginning of Walden, a book underpinned by a sense of the need to acknowledge 
one’s debts to others in order to pursue an independent path in life and thought. 
Thoreau rather understates the difficulty here. Without these debts, without this 
borrowing, it would be impossible to begin at all.  
	ix 
Declarations 
 
This thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at 
another university. 
Parts of the discussion of Strike Debt in Chapter Six are forthcoming, in 
modified form, in the following article: 
Tooker, L. and C. Clarke (forthcoming) ‘Experiments in Relational 
Finance: Harnessing the Social in Everyday Debt and Credit’, Theory, 
Culture & Society 
 
 
  
	x 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines resistances to debt in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) in order to 
develop a novel account of democratic subjectivity for International Political 
Economy (IPE) based on Stanley Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy.  
The global financial crisis has transformed debt into a topic of heated public 
debate, giving rise to new social movements as well as individual political 
resistances. However, IPE scholars have yet to substantively conceptualise this 
new democratic politics of debt, despite considerable research on the problems of 
debt-based models of economic citizenship. I trace this blind spot to the pictures 
of agency animating the field, before developing a novel conceptual account of 
democratic subjectivity in finance based on an original application of Stanley 
Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy in IPE. I then use this account to show 
how ordinary democratic subjects are opposing debt-based economic citizenship 
in the UK and the US. To this end, I offer a comparative examination of three 
prominent tactics of debt resistance: avoiding debt, auditing debt, and refusing 
debt. I explore the first tactic, avoiding debt, by analysing popular debt-free 
living manuals and autobiographies. I study the second tactic, auditing debt, 
through participant observation with a London-based activist group called Debt 
Resistance UK. I examine the third tactic, refusing debt, based on interviews 
with Strike Debt, a US movement that has used peer-to-peer debt cancellation to 
incite debt refusal. My central argument is that although contemporary debt 
resistances are marked by conventional cultural-economic imaginaries, such as 
financial capability, transparency, and liability, debt’s ‘ordinary democrats’ are 
reconstructing debt relations as a site of democratic selfhood and community in 
finance. In an era marked by an increasingly top-down, managerial politics of 
finance, I conclude, people’s resistances to debt represent important practices of 
civic freedom that improve the prospects for democratic financial governance.  
  
	 1 
Introduction 
 
We live at a time when more and more people are feeling the crushing weight of 
debt, even as they follow models of liberal economic citizenship to the letter. 
Since 2007, the foreclosure crisis in the US has cost 14 million people their 
homes, causing widespread homelessness, municipal bankruptcy, and massive 
intergenerational wealth loss (Stout, 2016: 82). The disproportionate effect of the 
crisis on African-Americans has led some to label debt an ‘economic hate crime’ 
(Brown, 2013: 809; Hunt, 2003). In England, the trebling of tuition fees and 
conversion of maintenance grants into loans means undergraduate students from 
the poorest backgrounds will now graduate with the largest student loan debts 
(Kirby, 2016: 26). Some students have turned to high-cost short-term consumer 
credit to bridge the gap (Hall and Sampson, 2014). In this they are joined by 
many others: in 2011-12, Britons took out approximately 8 million new payday 
loans, valued at around £2 billion in total, to make ends meet (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2013: 9). In the afterlives of the global financial crisis, many people 
find their lives amortised by debt and their futures in foreclosure. 
Political economists have adroitly shown how rising personal and household debt 
levels are symptomatic of broader structural changes, as real wages stagnate, 
governments cut social provisioning, and people are expected to underwrite their 
present and future wellbeing with consumer credit and the debt-based 
accumulation of assets (see, for example, Montgomerie, 2006a; Langley, 2008a; 
Crouch, 2009; Roberts, 2013). Financial institutions have profited from these 
developments by finding novel ways to turn debt into an income stream and a 
tradable commodity (Pryke and Allen, 2000; Bryan and Rafferty, 2006). It is 
	 2 
hardly surprising that, for some commentators, the debtor now figures as the 
paradigmatic subject of neoliberalism, within a broader lineage of unequal 
debtor-creditor relations that can be traced back at least 5,000 years (Lazzarato, 
2012, 2015; Graeber, 2012). The ostensible promise within liberal economic 
commentary and policy of a ‘democratisation of finance’ (Friedman, 1999; 
Shiller, 2003), via the expansion of everyday access to capital, has evaporated 
(Erturk et al., 2007; Langley, 2008a), even as debt’s promissory notes endure. 
And yet, debt has not entirely swallowed democracy. Faced with the increasing 
extension of debt-based finance into their daily lives, people are devising a range 
of creative democratic political tactics to resist indebtedness. This thesis 
examines the rise of resistances to debt in the afterlives of the global financial 
crisis in the UK and the US in order to show how ordinary democratic subjects 
are emerging in opposition to debt-based economic citizenship. My central 
argument is that although resistances to debt in these countries are marked by 
conventional cultural-economic imaginaries, such as financial capability, 
transparency, and liability, debt’s ‘ordinary democrats’ are reconstructing debt 
relations as a site of democratic selfhood and community in finance.  
In making this argument, I redress the relative inattention to resistance in the 
literature on debt in International Political Economy (IPE). To better understand 
resistances to debt, I develop a novel account of ordinary democratic subjectivity 
in finance for IPE based on the as-yet untapped philosophy of Stanley Cavell. 
The American philosopher Cavell examines democratic subjectivity as a 
‘complex ethical position’ from which people strive to redeem and rebuild an 
imperfect democracy from within (Griggs et al., 2014: 27). Cavell’s work 
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captures both what I will call the ‘perfectionist’ spirit of contemporary debt 
resistances and the potential of these resistances to reconstitute the highly 
imperfect democratic governance of financialised societies like those of the UK 
and the US. 
The remainder of this Introduction is structured in four sections. First, I position 
my argument within the IPE literature by showing that the field’s proliferating 
work on everyday debt has largely side-stepped practices of ordinary democracy. 
While IPE scholars have explained the emergence and shortcomings of a debt-
based model of economic citizenship to excellent effect, they have yet to 
substantively engage with resistances to this model. Second, I outline the 
contribution I make to IPE in introducing Cavell’s understanding of ordinary 
democratic subjectivity to the field, linking this contribution to my underlying 
research questions. Third, I discuss what led me to study resistances to debt, as 
well as the research process I used to do so and the ethical quandaries I 
encountered. Finally, I outline the arguments of each chapter to give a roadmap 
for the thesis as a whole. 
1. Problem: from foreclosed futures to new debt ecologies in IPE 
The burgeoning literature on indebtedness in political economy broadly 
conceived reflects debt’s status as a pressing social and political concern. A 
search of the international library search engine WorldCat reveals that the 
number of texts with ‘debt’ in the title and ‘political economy’ as a keyword 
swelled from 380 in the period from 1997-2006 to 1,072 in 2007-2016. Even 
allowing for the inevitable delay between writing and publication, the growth of 
interest in debt is unmistakable. In the field of IPE, this growth has gone hand-in-
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hand with a greater breadth in the literature, particularly with regards to everyday 
debt politics. Recent IPE scholarship on the everyday dimensions of debt has 
broadened an earlier generation of work that focused primarily on sovereign debt 
in the context of debt, currency, and financial crises in Asia and the global South 
(Aggarwal, 1996; Biersteker, 1993; Frieden, 1991; Strange, 1998).  
Contemporary IPE work on the everyday politics of debt examines the dynamics 
of sub-prime lending and debt-driven housing bubbles (Montgomerie, 2006a; 
Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Watson, 2009; Brassett et al., 2010; Langley, 
2008b, 2010; Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2014), as well as the gendered, 
racialised, and class-based political economy of personal debt and political 
austerity (Roberts, 2013, 2014; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). Scholars 
have critically analysed the promotion of debt as a livelihood strategy and plank 
of asset-based welfare, and the related aggressive expansion of consumer credit, 
microcredit, and fringe lending industries (Montgomerie, 2006b; Aitken, 2006, 
2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2015a; Taylor, 2012, 2013; Soederberg, 2013, 2014; 
Langley, 2009a, 2009b).  They have also shown how everyday debt politics are 
linked to broader narratives of crisis (Brassett and Clarke, 2012; Blyth, 2013; 
Stanley, 2014; Langley, 2015).  
A key contribution of these varied analyses has been to detail the emergence of a 
form of what I call debt-based economic citizenship. In short, this is a practice 
and ideal of liberal economic citizenship in which people are expected to secure 
the basics of wellbeing, such as shelter, food, education, and health, by going 
into debt. Within a regime of debt-based economic citizenship, indebtedness is 
simultaneously normalised and pathologised depending on the identity of the 
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debtor. For instance, middle-class debtors are seen as virtuous investors, while 
low-income families (and especially sole-parent ones headed by women) are 
seen to be undeserving, financially irresponsible, and in need of moral reform 
(Watson, 2009; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016).  
In light of this brief survey of the breadth of IPE work on debt, my claim that 
IPE offers a limited view of everyday debt politics will appear perverse, perhaps 
even mistaken. But consider the following vignettes. In 2015, at the height of 
negotiations over Greece’s access to Eurozone bailout funds, a German couple 
walked into a town hall in Nafplio, Greece and handed over €875, the amount 
they had calculated each German citizen owed in reparations for the Second 
World War (Agence France-Presse, 2015). They could not pay more, the couple 
said, because they were retirees of modest means. In Chile a year earlier, a young 
artist sneaked into the vault of a private, for-profit university and stole student 
tuition fee contracts worth an estimated US$500 million. He burned the 
contracts, rendering the debts uncollectable, and described his actions as an ‘act 
of love’ (Franklin, 2014; ‘Chilean Robin Hood?’, 2014). In a more collective 
vein, as a result of the foreclosure crisis in the US, there is a growing online 
counter-public of underwater mortgage-holders, in which individuals and 
households are supporting each other to walk away from their debts (Stout, 
2016). 
These vignettes move us beyond the simultaneously spectacular and dispiriting 
headline figures of debt by illustrating a push-back against indebtedness by 
people in everyday life. While these instances of ordinary agency relating to debt 
differ in their goals, tactics, and oppositional quality, they encapsulate both 
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changing popular understandings of debt obligations in the wake of the 2007-8 
crash and the emergence of the debtor as a political subject. As Andrew Ross 
(2014: 180) argues, ‘debt activism has been one of the most striking 
manifestations of anti-capitalist sentiment in the years since the 2008 financial 
crash.’ These examples speak less of the homogeneous force of debt-based 
economic citizenship than of the complexity of what economic geographer Chris 
Harker (2017) calls ‘debt ecologies’.  
Drawing on the economic geography literature on money and finance, Harker 
(2017: 2) uses the metaphor of ecology to capture the variegated nature of 
contemporary debt politics and to enable a ‘more-than-economic’ understanding 
of debt (see also Leyshon et al., 2004; Lai, 2016; Langley and Leyshon, 2017 on 
financial ecologies). Exploring debt ecologies in the Palestinian context, Harker 
(2017: 9) underscores that ‘debts are never just financial’ but instead are 
entangled with multiple forms of non-financialised obligation, including 
mutuality and sharing but also obligations that are colonial and imperial in 
nature. Although Harker uses the concept of debt ecologies to think spatially 
about indebtedness, the idea provides a useful metaphor with which to 
understand post-crisis everyday debt politics, including in the UK and the US. If 
the global financial crisis has turned out to be a ‘status quo’ one (Helleiner, 
2014), the monoculture of regulatory responses to the crisis contrasts strongly 
with the ecological diversity of people’s rejoinders and resistances to debt. 
Given this explosion in popular activities around debt, it is surprising that IPE 
scholars have yet to substantively conceptualise resistances to debt, 
notwithstanding several important suggestive analyses (Langley, 2008a: ch. 9; 
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Aitken, 2015b; Clarke, 2016: 131–9; Stanley et al., 2016). While IPE work on 
the everyday politics of debt does much to illuminate the workings of debt-based 
economic citizenship, it tends to show us only one side of the ledger. To borrow 
the language of the political theorist James Tully (2008), most IPE scholars 
emphasise ‘practices of governance’ in debt politics rather than ‘practices of 
civic freedom’. This emphasis persists despite exemplary Foucauldian studies of 
finance and economy in IPE that emphasise the relationship between power and 
resistance (see, for example, de Goede, 2005; Amoore, 2006; Langley, 2008a; 
Aitken, 2007; Vestergaard, 2009). The problem to which this thesis responds can 
therefore be stated as follows: IPE scholarship has yet to account for people’s 
democratic agency within the new debt ecologies spawned by the global 
financial crisis. Debt resistance represents something of a blind spot in the field. 
2. Contribution and questions: a Cavellian account of ordinary democratic 
subjectivity for IPE 
Given this problem statement, my claim to originality and contribution to the 
literature can be formulated as follows:  
I develop a novel account of ordinary democratic subjectivity in finance 
for IPE based on Stanley Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy.  
This contribution is significant because it allows me to remedy the relative 
inattention in the field to debt resistances and therefore to better account for 
contemporary debt ecologies. This contribution is original because it introduces 
the philosophy of Stanley Cavell into IPE. Specifically, Cavell’s arguments 
represent a novel conceptual resource, in IPE, with which to understand the 
prospects for ordinary democracy in finance.  
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To explore and test the relevance of Cavell’s thinking to IPE, I have built my 
study around the following underlying research questions:  
How are people resisting debt in the afterlives of the global financial crisis 
in the UK and the US? In what ways, and to what extent, can Cavell’s 
understanding of ordinary democracy account for these resistances? 
The very novelty of my contribution means my choice of Cavell and of ordinary 
language philosophy more broadly needs explanation. Ordinary language 
philosophy is a movement established by J. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
in the middle third of the twentieth century and subsequently extended by the 
second-generation ordinary language philosopher Stanley Cavell. Austin and 
Wittgenstein advocated returning to ordinary language usage to dissolve the 
misunderstandings they felt had arisen as philosophers sought ever-greater 
logical rigour and abstraction from the everyday in philosophy. Ordinary 
language philosophers argue that many apparently profound philosophical 
problems arise from insufficient attention to how we ordinarily use words in 
context, or, as Wittgenstein (1953 [1999]: §§ 21-23) puts it, within their diverse 
‘language-games’. Because, as Austin (1962) famously demonstrated, to say 
something is also to do something, ordinary language philosophy foregrounds 
ordinary agency: it reveals the ethical and political things we do with words. 
Methodologically, ordinary language philosophy asks us to study examples of 
(linguistic) agency in context and to take the ordinary, particular case seriously. 
Within IPE, Austin’s work has become a mainstay of burgeoning debates about 
financial performativity (see the Austinian analyses of, for example, Brassett and 
Clarke, 2012; Clarke, 2012; MacKenzie, 2006), while Wittgenstein has been 
	 9 
used to examine people’s everyday socialisation into dominant economic ideas 
(Pforr, 2015). However, the work of Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s follower 
Stanley Cavell has yet to be tapped in the field. Aside from a brief discussion of 
Cavell’s idea of ‘moral perfectionism’ as an alternative to the liberal market 
concept of justice rooted in property and exchange (Turpin, 2011: 114–8), 
Cavell’s arguments have yet to be applied to the broad study of political 
economy, much less to the particular subject field of IPE.  
At first glance, this neglect appears completely warranted. Cavell does not offer 
a theory of political economy, power, or resistance. Indeed, he does not have 
much to say about the economy at all, much less about neoliberalism or 
financialisation. Cavell’s accounts of language, ethics, and democracy are deeply 
philosophical in nature and are often illustrated with rather specialised references 
to literature and popular culture. Nevertheless, there are useful connections to be 
made between Cavell’s work and emerging directions of research in IPE. As an 
ordinary language philosopher, Cavell studies the ‘ordinary’, speech act theory, 
and popular culture, which are themes that overlap with feminist, everyday, and 
cultural political economy approaches to IPE. Moreover, Cavell’s extensive 
discussions of ethics align him not only with moral economists and students of 
classical political economy (for example, Watson, 2005; Sayer, 2011; Stanley, 
2014; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016; Clarke, 2016), but also with those 
interested in tracing the ethical contours of IPE more broadly (Brassett and 
Holmes, 2010). For those looking for a normative basis for political-economic 
critique, Cavell offers an account of injustice rooted in an exploration of people’s 
everyday failures to acknowledge others, while also outlining a form of response 
	 10 
to ethical and political failures in the form of what he terms ‘moral 
perfectionism’. 
Finally, and most importantly, Cavell offers IPE a new take on democratic 
subjectivity. Cavell uses Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s strategies of ordinary 
language analysis to propose an account of what I call ‘ordinary democracy’, 
and, in particular, an account of ordinary democratic subjectivity. I use the term 
ordinary democracy as an overarching label for a range of concepts in Cavell’s 
work, which I will examine in more detail in Part One of the thesis. In essence, 
the ordinary democrat is, for Cavell (1990), a ‘perfectionist’, although in 
Cavell’s work this word is without its usual negative undertones. A Cavellian 
perfectionist is someone who is spurred to action by democracy’s 
disappointments but who does not accede to cynicism or hopelessness. The 
perfectionist works to rebuild an imperfect democracy from inside. In discussing 
ordinary democratic subjectivity, Cavell starts from the democratic individual, 
but his work also yields an account of democratic intersubjectivity and 
collectivity. Applied to IPE, Cavell’s conception of ordinary democracy allows 
us to account for how and why people are striving to change the radically 
imperfect democracy of financialised societies from within. This approach is 
highly relevant in a post-financial crisis context where debt acts as a significant 
constraint on equality and justice, and people are no longer content to leave the 
question of change to either governments or markets. 
 3. Research process: the practice and ethics of studying debt resistances 
The perfectionist quality of democratic debt resistances was what drew me to 
study them, although I only found the Cavellian name for this quality later on. 
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The perfectionism of these resistances contrasted strongly with the logics of 
power and domination usually emphasised in IPE, and yet it was also, I soon 
realised, irreparably bound up with these dynamics. At the same time, the 
tumultuous afterlives of the global financial crisis provided an unparalleled 
opportunity to study democratic resistance and agency in finance. I had 
originally set out to study the ethics and politics of North-South sovereign debt 
policy based on a single country case study, but practical politics soon 
outstripped my initial proposal. Occupy movements were erupting around the 
globe. Governments in Greece and Spain came and went because of popular 
agitation around debt and related issues. New activist groups working on debt 
were springing up in the UK, where I was based. British non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) were shifting their gaze back toward home because many 
of the debt problems they had worked on in the global South were now emerging 
in the North. The democratic energies around debt seemed under-studied and 
impossible to ignore, particularly given the growing emphasis on debt-based 
economic citizenship in my subject field, IPE.  
In particular, I was struck by the range of ways people were responding to rising 
debt levels in the afterlives of the financial crisis. Reflecting this range, each of 
the substantive studies of resistance I develop in this thesis exposes a type or 
tactic of debt resistance. These tactics are: avoiding debt, auditing debt, and 
refusing debt. I developed this classification over the course of several years 
spent studying debt resistances in the UK and the US. The choice of these two 
countries was motivated partly by pragmatic reasons, including language 
competency and the fact that long-term participant observation, which I use for 
one of my cases, was only financially viable in the UK. I also wanted to work 
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within one broad debt ecology so that I could understand what my cases might 
share. The UK and the US share an economic culture that, in very broad terms, 
emphasises values such as individual economic freedom and is marked by 
lineages of liberal economic reform, ongoing neoliberal restructuring, and 
processes of financialisation. Most importantly, these countries represent key 
laboratories of debt-based economic citizenship today. 
The time-sensitive nature of the developments I set out to study meant I had to 
adopt a pragmatic approach to case selection so that I could make the most of 
opportunities to study the new groups emerging around me. In London, a small 
activist group formed in mid-2013 because of a conference organised by an NGO 
called Jubilee Debt Campaign. I joined the group, which went on to become 
known as Debt Resistance UK. While focused on a range of activities, Debt 
Resistance UK has become well known for its debt auditing work focused on 
private bank lending to local authorities. Specifically, this debt auditing work 
aims to draw out the implications for ordinary people of the mis-selling of 
financial derivatives, as local authorities cut services to cover debt servicing. I 
discuss this auditing work in Chapter Five, drawing on long-term participant 
observation of and ongoing involvement in the group. I include a more detailed 
discussion of the methods I used for this study in that same chapter. 
In mid-2012, a social movement called Strike Debt formed in New York City as 
an offshoot of Occupy Wall Street. Strike Debt soon hit the headlines for 
promoting debt refusal via a novel peer-to-peer debt cancellation initiative called 
the Rolling Jubilee. To understand the group’s claims and the practical politics of 
debt refusal, I spent between March and May of 2015 in New York City and the 
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San Francisco Bay Area conducting semi-structured interviews with present and 
past members. The timing was fortunate because I was able to interview a 
significant proportion of group members before Strike Debt became inactive 
(partly because of political disagreements) and was superseded by another group 
called the Debt Collective. Chapter Six discusses how Strike Debt’s activities 
constitute a tactic of debt refusal. The detail of how I conducted my research is 
included in that chapter. 
The third tactic that I cover, avoiding debt, suggested itself in the course of my 
interactions in 2014 with a group in the English Midlands called Zero-Credit, a 
self-described cooperative of people with first-hand experience of personal debt 
problems. Unfortunately, as happens with many voluntary and civil society 
groups, Zero-Credit stopped being active, although its energetic founder 
continues to work on debt issues. The group’s demise put an end to my work on 
this case. Taking inspiration from the fact that Zero-Credit had started life as a 
book of the same title that its founder had self-published (Bryn-Jones, 2008), I 
turned my attention to popular debt-free living literature, including debt advice 
manuals and debt-free living autobiographies. Once again, the methods and 
evidence I used to study debt avoidance are outlined in the relevant chapter, 
namely Chapter Four. In examining debt avoidance, it struck me as important to 
acknowledge that individuals are also involved in political resistances, and hence 
to encompass both individual and collective resistances in the substantive 
chapters of the thesis. 
I have found that conducting research with activists and social movements gives 
rise to ethical quandaries that go beyond the somewhat formalistic ethics covered 
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by institutional research procedures. Ethics is more than a tick-box approach: it is 
an embodied practice requiring ongoing reflection (Maeckelbergh, 2016: 211). It 
proved relatively easy to apply the key elements of formal research ethics in the 
course of my research. The ongoing nature of my relations with members of 
Debt Resistance UK and my continued connections to former members of Strike 
Debt have allowed me to apply a high standard of ongoing rather than one-off 
informed consent. I also took care to minimise my use of paper-based data in 
favour of encrypted digital data, in recognition of the fact that people involved in 
activism and social movements can be harmed if even seemingly innocuous 
information is shared (Maeckelbergh, 2016: 214).  
Perhaps the most challenging matters of ethical research practice relate not to the 
securing of consent or to the security of data but to an ethics of exchange and an 
ethics of analysis. In this first area, there is a trend within academia to emphasise 
giving direct aid to those with whom one conducts research. However, as Gillan 
and Pickerill (2012: 136–7) note, this ‘ethics of immediate reciprocation’ is not 
without problems, as it can lead to an instrumentalised, tit-for-tat reciprocity 
rather than the development of genuine long-term relationships. Most 
importantly, as the authors observe, ‘the main issue with immediate reciprocity is 
that problems of objectification do not disappear through participation’ (Gillan 
and Pickerill, 2012: 136, citing Roseneil, 1993). This problem suggests an ethics 
of analysis is also required. 
Researchers working with social movements and activists often bring a 
sympathetic position to their accounts of their interlocutors’ activities (Gillan and 
Pickerill, 2012: 138), and I am no exception in this regard. As a result of this 
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position, I faced moments of uncertainty in the research and writing of this thesis 
regarding which parts of people’s ideas and work I should discuss. I feared that 
my arguments, if critical, might reflect poorly on my interlocutors, particularly if 
these arguments did not sit easily with a group’s broader stated purpose. 
However, I came to see that activists and social movement participants often 
demonstrate a reflexivity that at least matches and often exceeds that of the 
researcher, thinking as they do in deeply political and moral terms about the 
world in which they live. This reflexivity became in itself a reason to apply an 
evaluative lens to my interlocutors’ work, for to do so mirrored my participants’ 
own practices. Moreover, an approach wherein one limits one’s arguments to 
actors’ self-interpretations is insufficient because it fails to contextualise these 
interpretations and to consider the political context of identity and agency 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 64; Griggs et al., 2014: 13). I have therefore taken 
my interlocutors’ deep concern with politics and their interest in self-analysis as 
an invitation to highlight the potential and the limitations of their work in a 
sensitive way. 
One key way in which I did this was by using my interlocutors’ own ethico-
political frameworks to evaluate their work (Maeckelbergh, 2016). To give an 
example, activist debt auditing work is based on a commitment to transparency, 
suggesting an immanent ethic with which to analyse activists’ practices. That is: 
to what extent does activism measure up to conventional standards of 
transparency? And if it does not, what might this tell us about those very 
standards, as well as the activists’ work? In Chapter Five I discuss this particular 
question further, but I introduce it here to give a sense of how I have used the 
frameworks of my research participants as a guide to my analysis. To conclude: 
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although an ethics of analysis is an important consideration in all research, it 
seems particularly crucial in social movement research. This is because, in my 
experience, activists adopt an ethos of openness, solidarity, and care for others 
that results in the opposite of the type of guarded research conversation one has 
in business or high finance settings, where knowledge is treated as proprietary 
and ‘rivalrous’.  
4. Structure: chapter arguments and overview 
This thesis is structured in two parts. Part One is conceptual in nature and 
comprises Chapters One, Two, and Three. These chapters outline, respectively, 
the warrant for the thesis, its ordinary language philosophy methodology, and its 
Cavellian conceptual framework. Part Two of the thesis comprises three 
substantive studies as exemplars of debt resistance. I call these ‘substantive 
studies’ rather than empirical case studies because each study further develops an 
element of my Cavellian conceptual framework in substantive dialogue with the 
debt resistance activities of my interlocutors. In other words, I have read my 
concepts and exemplars reciprocally. Chapters Four, Five, and Six thus 
investigate my chosen three tactics of debt resistance in light of Cavell’s 
arguments about ordinary democracy. 
In Chapter One, I create the warrant for the thesis by examining the literature on 
debt in IPE. I sketch and distinguish between two images of non-elite debt 
politics: the first is an ‘everyday’ image (built on Hobson and Seabrooke’s 
[2007b] influential distinction between ‘regulatory’ and ‘everyday’ IPE); the 
second I call an ‘ordinary’ image. The everyday image is well established. It 
looks at the drivers of growing personal and household indebtedness, as well as 
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the implications of debt-based economic citizenship in everyday life. I compose 
the second, ordinary image by bringing together several otherwise isolated 
cultural political economy analyses of debt, credit and finance.  
Specifically, I argue that an ordinary image of debt politics emphasises ordinary 
agency, treats debt as a more-than-economic category, and considers people as 
exemplars to think with, rather than as examples of broader financial logics. It 
therefore provides a counterpoint to the everyday image, which tends to 
emphasise the disciplinary force of debt and does not substantively examine debt 
resistances. While I make a case for the ordinary image, I do not hold that other 
images of debt politics are wrong or mistaken; rather, different images show us a 
different aspect of debt politics. I frame this argument with the ideas of the later 
Wittgenstein on theory, concepts, and perception. Wittgenstein, alongside J. L. 
Austin, had a profound influence on Cavell. 
In turn, Austin’s ideas provide the basis of my discussion of the ‘ordinary’ in 
Chapter Two. In this chapter, I set about turning the sketch of the ordinary that I 
made in the first chapter into a more developed methodology by turning to 
Austinian ordinary language philosophy. Austin’s speech act theory has 
underpinned a wealth of work in financial performativity studies and so his 
arguments are relatively well known in IPE. However, in focusing on Austin’s 
concept of performativity, IPE scholars have overlooked four core dimensions of 
the broader ordinary language philosophy project: examining ordinary ethics, 
understanding ordinary action, scrutinising ordinary language usage, and 
reanimating ordinary words. My central argument in this chapter is that a wider 
reading of the Austinian project can lay the foundations for studying and 
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appreciating ordinary agency. This discussion also allows me to introduce Austin 
as the second key figure of first-generation ordinary language philosophy who 
influenced Cavell, meaning the reader will be familiar with the arguments of 
first-generation ordinary language philosophy before encountering Cavell’s 
second-generation work in Chapter Three. I finish the chapter by discussing the 
methodological practices that Cavell develops from Austin’s and, to a lesser 
extent, Wittgenstein’s procedures.  
In Chapter Three, I move from ordinary language philosophy as a broad set of 
ideas and methodological precepts to the specifics of Cavellian theory. I develop 
a conceptual framework for understanding ordinary democratic subjectivity by 
taking three concepts that are developed chronologically across Cavell’s career: 
the ‘claim to community’, which emerges in Cavell’s early readings of Austin 
and Wittgenstein; the ‘ordinary exemplar’, which is based on Cavell’s mid-career 
work on the American Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry 
David Thoreau; and the ‘passionate utterance’, which Cavell develops late in his 
career as an extension of Austin’s notion of the performative utterance. My key 
claim in this chapter is that these three concepts form a perfectionist ‘grammar’ 
of democratic personhood or subjectivity, one that specifies a form of ordinary 
democratic ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we’. While this conceptual framework will 
necessarily sound quite abstract at this stage, I put it to work in Part Two of the 
thesis to probe the usefulness of Cavell’s ideas for understanding the democratic 
potential of resistances to debt. 
In the second part of the thesis, I turn to my chosen three tactics of debt 
resistance. Because I outlined these tactics in the discussion of my cases above, I 
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will provide only a summary of them here. In Chapter Four, I examine the tactic 
of avoiding debt, based on analysis of popular debt-free living literature. My 
main contention in this chapter is that avoiding debt can be a political practice of 
resistance that develops democratic selfhood (or the ordinary democratic ‘I’). 
While debt avoidance is often promoted in a way that accords with neoliberal 
models of financial capability, it can also be used to experiment with non-
financialised ways of living and to develop a sense of independence from 
society’s norms. Some protagonists of debt-free living challenge systems of work 
and finance that fail to yield substantive freedom for them, while also 
exemplifying this non-conformity for others. I use Cavell’s concept of the 
‘ordinary exemplar’ to show when and how this difference becomes possible. 
In Chapter Five, I explore the tactic of auditing debt, based on participant 
observation of Debt Resistance UK’s work. Using Cavell’s concept of the 
passionate utterance, I argue that Debt Resistance UK is enmeshed within the 
conventional financial imaginaries of transparency implied by auditing, but also 
that the group’s work at times exceeds these imaginaries and develops 
substantive democratic responsiveness (or a responsive democratic exchange 
between the ‘I’ and the ‘you’). Drawing on both ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ 
work by the group (Goffman, 1956), I argue that ordinary democratic exchange 
about finance is best achieved by working in a passionate rather than a 
performative register of speech, or with what Cavell calls the ‘passionate 
utterance’. 
In Chapter Six, I examine the tactic of refusing debt as it has been developed by 
Strike Debt. I use Cavell’s concept of the ‘claim to community’ to illuminate 
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how Strike Debt managed to create a community of debtors (the ordinary 
democratic ‘we’) through its imaginative peer-to-peer debt cancellation initiative, 
but also how and why political disagreement emerged within the group. This 
emphasis on disagreement is key to perfectionist understandings of democracy. It 
is essential rather than incidental to Cavell’s grammar of democratic subjectivity 
that any claim to community can fail. Indeed, I argue that internal criticism 
within Strike Debt of the group’s examples of debt refusal shows that community 
is never anything more than a claim. 
Finally, in the Conclusion I draw together, in a comparative vein, the connections 
and distinctions between my three substantive studies. I then revisit the 
contribution I make to the IPE literature with my Cavellian account of 
democratic subjectivity, before outlining the implications of my findings for 
broader debates in the field about ethics, performativity, and critique, as well as 
suggesting avenues for further research and ongoing ‘perfectionist’ conversation 
about finance in IPE. The overall interest of such conversation is to show us how 
the radically imperfect democracy of financialised society might yield to a better 
version of its current self. The inequalities and injustices of contemporary debt-
based economic citizenship are not inevitable, according to my studies of debt’s 
ordinary democrats.  
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Part One  
 
 
From Everyday Politics to Ordinary Democracy 
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Chapter One: Images of Debt Politics 
 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside of it, for it lay in 
our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. 
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1999)  
 
 
In International Political Economy, the everyday politics of debt tends to be 
understood in terms of the disciplinary power and ideological triumph of a debt-
based model of economic citizenship. Scholars of IPE have been quick to 
demonstrate the shortcomings of this model. They have shown how the adoption 
of debt-based economic citizenship in countries such as the UK and the US has 
been driven by economic restructuring, retrenchment of social welfare provision, 
and the extension of finance into daily life. Nevertheless, IPE scholars’ 
engagements with everyday debt politics lag behind a key practical development: 
the novel and diverse responses of debtors to financial crisis and austerity. In this 
chapter, I diagnose the reasons behind this relative neglect within IPE of debtor 
agency and outline the makings of a contrasting ‘ordinary’ image of debt politics 
that foregrounds democratic agency. I argue for a type of IPE that treats people 
as exemplars to think with rather than as examples of broader political-economic 
logics, and one that acknowledges how the non-financial dimensions of debt can 
act as a spur to political activity. In this ordinary image, a range of democratic 
subjects in debt politics become visible and their alternative ethics and politics 
plausible. 
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I make this argument across three sections. In section one, I introduce some ideas 
from the work of Wittgenstein to frame my argument. As I noted in the 
Introduction, Wittgenstein (together with Austin) profoundly influenced Cavell, 
so understanding Cavell’s arguments requires grasping Wittgenstein’s ideas as 
well. As I shall demonstrate, Wittgenstein’s ideas about theory, concepts, and 
perception are also independently useful as tools with which to diagnose the 
limitations and possibilities of the IPE literature on the everyday politics of debt.  
I examine this literature in the remainder of the chapter, dividing IPE work on 
the politics of personal and household debt into two images for heuristic 
purposes: an ‘everyday’ image and what I call an emerging ‘ordinary’ image. In 
section two I start from the influential distinction made by John Hobson and 
Leonard Seabrooke (2007a) between a ‘regulatory’ IPE that focuses on systemic 
developments and elite actors, and an ‘everyday’ IPE more concerned with how 
people’s everyday activities and beliefs make up the global political economy. 
While regulatory IPE scholarship on debt largely elides the everyday politics of 
debt, some historical materialist and social constructivist work considers the 
domestic underpinnings and implications of international debt.  
I then examine feminist, everyday, and cultural political economy approaches to 
IPE as the basis for the dominant ‘everyday’ image of debt politics. I show how 
this varied work critically traces debt-based economic citizenship as a key form 
of liberal financial ‘belonging’ around the world, including in the UK and the 
US. A major contribution of this literature has been to study the extent of and 
reasons behind the expansion of personal and household indebtedness. The 
literature also outlines how gendered, racialised, and classed subjects of debt 
	 24 
become ‘adversely incorporated’ (Aitken, 2015a: ch. 6) into global financial 
networks. Writing on themes ranging from everyday financial literacies to the 
moral economies of austerity, scholars have shown how debt disciplines people 
and how this discipline is linked to structural pressures and changes in the global 
political economy. 
However, on the whole this everyday debt politics literature stops short of 
substantively investigating how people are resisting debt-based economic 
citizenship, some suggestive analyses notwithstanding (Langley, 2008a: ch. 9; 
Aitken, 2015b; Clarke, 2016: 131–9; Stanley et al., 2016). For this reason, in 
section three I sketch a second, emerging ‘ordinary’ image of debt politics based 
on a cultural political economy approach to IPE. Scholars working within this 
ordinary image dwell on the detail of people’s lives and actions, instead of 
working from more generalised descriptions of everyday debt dynamics. They do 
so to reveal ‘counterpoints’ (Aitken, 2008) to the ethical and political 
commitments and vocabularies of debt-based economic citizenship. Specifically, 
this ordinary image is based on a commitment to use particular lived examples of 
debt relations to rework the more generic portraits of agency, obligation, and 
even the concept of ‘debt’ itself, that are seen in the everyday image of debt 
politics. 
1. Captivity to pictures and practices of civic freedom 
In this section, I show how the later Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy 
offers a way to diagnose the workings of the everyday image of debt politics. 
The ideas of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy are contained in the Blue and Brown 
Books (Wittgenstein, 1969) and Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 
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[1953] 1999). In these works, Wittgenstein examines the pictures of theory, 
concepts, and perception that generate philosophical problems. Instead of 
seeking to solve these problems on their own terms, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: 
pt. I, § 133, § 122, emphasis in original) aims to make the problems ‘completely 
disappear’ by offering a new way of looking at them, or what he calls a 
‘perspicuous representation.’ Specifically, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 
122, original emphasis omitted) seeks to get a ‘clear view’ of the problem by re-
presenting it in such a way as to enable us to make new connections and 
distinctions. As he says, ‘[a] perspicuous representation produces just that 
understanding which consists of “seeing connexions”’ (Wittgenstein, [1953] 
1999: pt. I, § 122). This renewal in ways of seeing is crucial because:  
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—
because it is always before one’s eyes.)….—And this means: we fail to 
be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. 
(Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. I, § 129) 
Wittgenstein offers three key diagnoses of the ways in which we fail to notice 
what is ‘most striking and most powerful’. These diagnoses are of: 1) the 
‘craving for generality’ in theorising; 2) the presumption of the ‘crystalline 
purity’ of concepts; and 3) ‘aspect-blindness,’ or an inability to perceive the 
different aspects of an object and hence to see the object from multiple points of 
view. In essence, Wittgenstein questions the unifying drive that often underpins 
understandings of theory, concepts, and perception. I outline each diagnosis in 
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turn, so that I can put these diagnoses to work in the remainder of the chapter, as 
well as across the thesis as a whole. 
1) Craving for generality 
The first tendency Wittgenstein (1969: 17–8) denounces is the ‘craving for 
generality’, or the tendency to subsume the particular under a universal. The 
craving for generality involves a ‘contemptuous attitude towards the particular 
case’ or ‘contempt for what seems the less general case’ (Wittgenstein, 1969: 18, 
19). Instead of thinking about things comparatively in terms of their differences 
and resemblances, we subsume individual things and experiences under a general 
concept, which leads us away from what each instance might tell us in its 
specificity. We seek to understand the particular by passing through a universal 
and thus ‘dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped 
[us] to understand the usage of the general term’ (Wittgenstein, 1969: 19–20).  
To counter the craving for generality, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 107) 
orders us ‘[b]ack to the rough ground!’ of the ordinary, and especially ordinary 
language usage. The craving for generality is expressed most clearly in the quest 
for natural laws in science, but it also surfaces in the humanities and social 
sciences, as when philosophy turns to metaphysics, or economics reduces human 
behaviour to self-interest. In IPE, for example, the craving for generality 
becomes evident in analyses that reduce people’s actions and behaviours to the 
broad rubric of neoliberalism. I call the craving for generality a form of excessive 
generalisation. 
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2) Crystalline purity of concepts 
One habit related to the craving for generality involves assuming that concepts 
have or need a pure and singular form. For instance, in seeking a crystalline 
purity to the concept ‘resistance’, one might seek to define the one thing that all 
resistances to debt must have (a deliberate oppositional attitude, for example). 
However, with this presumption of crystalline conceptual purity, we forget that 
concepts need not have sharp boundaries. Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 71) 
illustrates this fact with the concept ‘game’, which he calls ‘a concept with 
blurred edges’. When we look at the various things we call ‘games’, Wittgenstein 
([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 66) asserts, ‘we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing’ rather than finding one thing that is common to 
all games. The concept of ‘game’ draws together many criss-crossing, twisting 
fibres. Here ‘the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one 
fibre [sic] runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres’ 
(Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. I, § 67).  
Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 67) thus notes that concepts need not always 
be precise; sometimes it is more useful to think of them as made up of a series of 
‘family resemblances’. While at times we will want to give someone precise GPS 
coordinates (because we have buried something that needs to be retrieved), at 
other times we will simply point in a general direction and tell the person to 
stand roughly over there (because we want to take a photo of them, for instance). 
I call this neglect of the diverse ways we use concepts, and hence the idea that 
we always need a concept with an essence and clear boundaries, essentialism. 
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3) Aspect-blindness 
The third form of thinking that troubles Wittgenstein is a tendency to see one 
aspect of an object and to assume that this aspect represents the whole of the 
thing, meaning that we fail to notice a different aspect. Wittgenstein ([1953] 
1999: pt. II, § xi, 213) calls this problem ‘aspect-blindness’. He famously uses 
the ‘duck-rabbit’ image, a figure from Gestalt psychology that can be seen as 
either a duck or a rabbit, as an example of seeing aspects (Wittgenstein, [1953] 
1999: pt. II, § xi, 194). At first glance, you might see a duck; looking again, 
perhaps you will see a rabbit. You might become struck by the fact you can see 
both of these figures, in alternation (in which case you experience an ‘aspect 
change’). 
Importantly, with an aspect change, one’s attitude and practical relationship to 
the object also changes. You might eat the duck for dinner but keep the rabbit as 
a pet (Pin-Fat, 2016). Applying this insight to a different object, ‘debt,’ one 
might first see a financial obligation to render monies owed (the dominant 
‘aspect’ of debt in IPE), but one might subsequently perceive debt to be a series 
of non-financialised obligations to ongoing exchange (as when I say, ‘I owe you 
one’; this is the aspect that has traditionally interested social anthropologists). 
Wittgenstein calls the fact of being differently struck by something the ‘dawning’ 
of an aspect, and the inability to be so struck ‘aspect-blindness’. I will call the 
inability to be struck by the more-than-economic dimensions of the practice and 
concept of debt, economism. 
What remains to be considered is the political significance of Wittgenstein’s 
diagnoses, as I will put them to work in this thesis (on Wittgensteinian thinking 
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as political, see the contributions to Heyes, 2003; Heyes, 2007; Tully, 1995, 
2008;). This significance lies in the fact that Wittgenstein’s diagnoses are 
simultaneously diagnoses of a type of unfreedom. David Owen (2003) calls this 
unfreedom ‘aspectival captivity’. According to Owen (2003: 82), Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy draws our attention to ‘a certain class of nonphysical constraints on 
our capacity for self-government,’ while also providing a way to dissolve these 
constraints through ‘perspicuous representation.’ Owen (2003: 85) suggests that 
being held captive to a picture entails both being bound by it but also spell-bound 
by it, in thrall to it and enthralled by it.  
At this point it is important to avoid falling into the trap of assuming that we can 
do without pictures altogether. We need background pictures to render our lives 
intelligible (Heyes, 2007: 18). A world without pictures is neither desirable nor 
possible. Indeed, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 115) argues that we cannot 
get outside of our pictures because they lie in our language, which seems to 
repeat them to us over and over. A more appropriate aim is to try to become 
aware of pictures and what they do for us. For this reason, Owen (2003: 83) 
argues that we should assess the value of a given picture based on its 
contribution to our sense of our capacity for agency. Here Owen (2003: 83) is 
referring to the capacity of a picture ‘to orient our practical judgments such that 
we can go on in the world, that is, experience ourselves as agents.’ 
In turn, we can challenge pictures by re-orienting them to foreground what 
political theorist James Tully (2008: 4) calls ‘practices of civic freedom.’ For 
Tully, who combines Wittgenstein’s ideas with Foucault’s understanding of 
power, practices of freedom are produced within relationships of power and 
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governance. Practices of civic freedom encompass a range of ways in which 
people contest what they find oppressive and unjust about governance (Tully, 
2008: 4). Tully (2008: 23–4) highlights three such modes of contestation: 
following the rules of the (language) game but ‘acting otherwise’ within them to 
create subtle modifications; working within existing rules and institutions to 
explicitly renegotiate them; or refusing to be governed and thus sparking 
confrontation and revolt. 
Together, Tully’s ‘practices of civic freedom’ and Wittgensteinian notions of 
pictures and aspectival captivity provide a basis for diagnosing IPE’s images of 
debt. Using this theoretical scaffolding, we might wish to determine the extent to 
which a given image of debt contributes to our sense (and here I use ‘our’ to 
refer to both IPE scholars and people more broadly) of capacity for self-direction 
and freedom within the global political economy, while still acknowledging the 
very real constraints on agency. While I emphasise practices of freedom here, 
following the arguments of my interlocutors (whose resistances I study later in 
the thesis), I do not presume that only actions directed toward the achievement of 
values such as freedom and empowerment constitute ‘agency’; nor do I assume 
that these values are universally desired and held (Mahmood, 2005; Laidlaw, 
2010: 144). I am also aware of the significant challenge to humanistic accounts 
of agency in finance posed by ‘social studies of finance’, as well as critiques that 
suggest these studies overly relegate human agency (see, for example, Callon, 
1998; Beunza and Stark, 2004; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2006; 
MacKenzie et al., 2007; cf. Miller, 2002; Miyazaki and Riles, 2005; Marres and 
McGoey, 2012).  
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To conclude this first section, I am now in a position to restate the particular 
problem that I identified in the thesis Introduction, namely that IPE scholarship 
on debt has yet to substantively conceptualise ordinary agency and ordinary 
democratic subjectivity in debt politics. The problem that drives this thesis is a 
practical one set in a disciplinary context, namely the lack of attention by the 
majority of IPE scholars to the novel responses of debtors to crisis and austerity. 
Using the lens offered by Wittgensteinian thinking, I suggest that, in broad terms, 
but with some important exceptions that I will consider below, IPE scholars are 
held ‘captive’ by one ‘aspect’ of debt-based economic citizenship, namely its 
power as a ‘practice of governance’. This aspectival captivity manifests as a 
blindness to the ordinary agencies of debtors (their ‘practices of freedom’). This 
captivity is a normative and practical problem as much as an intellectual one. For 
if IPE scholars are unable to ‘see’ the exercise of ordinary agency in finance, we 
cannot expand, support, and critically evaluate the actions of ordinary democrats. 
We risk becoming blind to practices of civic freedom. 
I should note that invoking aspectival captivity is not the same as making a false 
consciousness argument. I am not saying that IPE scholars who emphasise 
practices of discipline and governance in debt politics hold false beliefs about the 
world (this would be an argument of ‘ideological captivity’ [Owen, 2003: 88–9]). 
Instead, my point, based on Owen’s argument, is that loosening the grip of a 
dominant picture helps us to evaluate that picture and to entertain the possibility 
that things might be or become different. To be sure, unlike Wittgenstein’s 
approach to philosophical problems, getting clear on a political-economic 
problem like debt-based economic citizenship does not make the problem 
disappear entirely. Becoming able to see and think differently (for example, 
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becoming able to see ordinary agencies in debt politics) does not in itself abolish 
material unfreedoms and oppressions. 
Nevertheless, this change of aspect does help us to understand, not only how 
indebted obligations might be performed differently, but also that these 
obligations are already being performed differently in everyday life. When we 
gaze at the duck-rabbit and a new aspect dawns (so that we see both the duck and 
the rabbit in turn), the image itself has not changed; we have. Our practical 
relation to the world around us shifts. When we become aware of a disjuncture 
between our way of understanding the world, on the one hand, and what could be 
called our ‘cares and commitments,’ on the other hand, then ethical and political 
change (or ‘a novel picture’) can result (Owen, 2003: 84–5; Heyes, 2007: 20). 
Specifically, by acknowledging how an emphasis on structures of domination 
and oppression can lead to a failure to perceive ordinary agency, critical IPE 
scholars can better pursue a commitment to emancipation and freedom. In light 
of this Wittgensteinian argument, I turn in the remainder of the chapter to review 
two contrasting IPE images of debt politics. I begin my discussion of the first, 
‘everyday’ image by noting the distinction between ‘regulatory’ and ‘everyday’ 
approaches to IPE. 
2. An everyday image of debt politics 
The distinction made by Hobson and Seabrooke (2007a) between ‘regulatory’ 
and ‘everyday’ IPE has become a convenient shorthand for the differences 
between an IPE concerned with global governance actors, top-down politics, and 
systemic developments, on the one hand, and an IPE that reads the global 
economy as constituted by people’s everyday activities, beliefs, and values, on 
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the other hand. This distinction applies to IPE scholarship on debt. Regulatory 
IPE scholarship, as well as some work in International Relations (IR), has 
focused on a number of international debt dynamics and developments. These 
include: the developing-country debt crises of the 1980s (see, for example, 
Lipson, 1981; Biersteker, 1993; Aggarwal, 1996; Frieden, 1988, 1991; Strange, 
1998; Soederberg, 2004, 2006); debt, currency, and financial crises in Asia and 
Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s (for example, Beeson et al., 2003; 
Nesvetailova, 2007; Datz, 2009); the international movement to cancel the 
sovereign debts of the most heavily indebted poor countries around the turn of 
the millennium (for example, Donnelly, 2002, 2007; Yanacopulos, 2004; Mayo, 
2005a, 2005b; Reitan, 2007; Busby, 2007; Broome, 2009a); and, more recently, 
sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone (for example, Paudyn, 2013; Howarth and 
Quaglia, 2015; Moschella, 2016). 
Within this varied work, certain historical materialist, structural realist, and 
social constructivist scholars have studied international debt with reference to 
everyday themes (see, among others, Strange, 1998; Soederberg, 2004, 2006, 
2014; Broome, 2009a; Di Muzio and Robbins, 2016). For instance, Susan 
Strange (1998: ch. 6), writing in the 1990s, opened up the unequal distributional 
effects of debt crises by looking not just at elite political intrigues but also at the 
implications for the poor of the ad hoc governance of international debt. 
Similarly, Susanne Soederberg (2006: 101) has studied debt as something that is 
‘composed of human relationships (and thus power relations),’ but that ‘takes on 
a “fetishized” appearance in the impersonal or legalistic relationship between 
debtor and creditor.’ For this reason, Soederberg (2004, 2006, 2014) has moved 
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between ‘regulatory’ and ‘everyday’ historical materialist approaches to 
indebtedness. 
Nevertheless, regulatory work on debt has tended to give in to the ‘craving for 
generality’ by subsuming everyday actors and actions under broad theories, 
whether these are theories of ‘debt as [capitalist] power’ (Di Muzio and Robbins, 
2016), or of social change as built on ideational power and norms. For example, 
social constructivists interested have studied everyday actors such as NGOs, but 
primarily as examples of how soft power operates at the international level to 
influence regulatory actors such as governments and multilateral institutions to 
offer debt relief (Busby, 2007; Broome, 2009a). The point of particular cases, 
when they are used by regulatory historical materialists and social 
constructivists, is to illustrate general IR and IPE theories. The individual 
experiences of particular debtor countries are subsumed under a general concept, 
such as global capitalist power or transnational norms. Most importantly, 
regulatory work on debt politics tends to fail to examine debt as a feature of 
everyday life and politics, although social constructivist scholarship arguably 
comes closest to an everyday approach to the politics of debt. 
Beyond regulatory approaches to IPE, there is a move afoot to ‘broaden the 
horizons of economy’ (Roelvink, 2009) by examining subjects, sites, and 
practices beyond the usual elite suspects of governments, central banks, 
international financial institutions, and financial traders. Scholars taking an 
everyday approach to the global political economy focus on the everyday politics 
of labour and work (Amoore, 2002; Elias, 2004; Davies and Ryner, 2006; 
Davies, 2010), housing (Montgomerie, 2006a; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; 
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Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2014), mass investment and popular saving and 
borrowing (Harmes, 2001; Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2008a), monetary union and 
financial and debt crisis (Broome, 2009b; Rethel, 2012; Brassett and Clarke, 
2012; Stanley, 2014; Clarke, 2016), and the gendered political economy of the 
household and social reproduction (Montgomerie, 2006a; LeBaron, 2010; 
Roberts, 2013, 2016; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a, 2016b). 
These studies are informed by a broad range of approaches. For this reason, I 
refer to feminist, everyday, and cultural political economy approaches to IPE, 
rather than using the ‘everyday IPE’ label that has become associated with the 
particular project laid out by Hobson and Seabrooke (2007b) in the Introduction 
to their book Everyday Politics of the World Economy. This distinction between 
‘everyday IPE’ and a broader range of approaches is important because the study 
of the everyday in IPE has a long lineage. As Genevieve LeBaron (2010) and 
Juanita Elias and Adrienne Roberts (2016) have argued, the narrower ‘everyday 
IPE’ project has failed to acknowledge the extent to which it is preceded and 
underpinned by longstanding feminist explorations of gendered social relations 
and experiences of the global political economy (for formative statements, see 
Sen and Grown, 1988; Waring, 1988; Marchand and Runyan, 2000; Peterson, 
2003; Hoskyns and Rai, 2007; Bakker and Silvey, 2008). The everyday IPE 
project is also prefigured by postcolonial and area studies engagements with 
political economy, especially in Southeast Asia (Elias and Rethel, 2016: 10), as 
well as by classical political economy’s interest in the relationship between the 
individual and market society (Watson, 2012a).  
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These varied turns to the everyday in IPE undermine the depiction of a global 
political economy driven solely by elites by showing how everyday practices, 
beliefs, values, and subjectivities are central to the making of markets and ‘the 
economy’. Early constructivist and poststructuralist IPE scholarship paved the 
way for an appreciation of the everyday cultural and social politics of finance 
(Best, 2005; de Goede, 2005; Seabrooke, 2006). Seabrooke (2006: 1), for 
instance, begins his examination of the domestic social sources of financial 
power with the observation that ‘credit and money are social constructions and 
can be generated only if we believe in their legitimacy, or we believe that others 
will honor their promises to lend or to pay their debts.’ In her poststructuralist 
account of the politics of ambiguity in finance, Jacqueline Best (2005: 5) 
similarly argues that attending to the social, intersubjective character of meaning 
‘is particularly appropriate for the investigation of financial phenomena, since 
financial values are dependent on beliefs. A green piece of paper with words and 
numbers on it is worth a dollar only because we all agree to accept it as a dollar.’ 
Financial practices are thus rooted in the social beliefs held by individuals and 
groups. 
Subsequent to this work, scholarship on the everyday politics of debt has 
expanded rapidly. This new body of scholarship explains the growth in personal 
and household debt as a result of the increasing financialisation of the economy, 
the shrinking of social provision and the retrenchment of the welfare state 
(Montgomerie, 2006b, 2009; Langley, 2009a; Soederberg, 2014). Welfare in 
countries such as the UK and the US is increasingly secured through the private 
accumulation of assets and this has led to high levels of consumer borrowing and 
secured and unsecured debt (Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2008a; Finlayson, 2008, 
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2009; Montgomerie, 2009, 2013). This work on the everyday politics of debt 
reveals the new subjectivities implicated in rising personal indebtedness and a 
shrinking state, ranging from the citizen-taxpayer (Stanley, 2016) to the citizen-
as-financial-consumer (Langley, 2008a, 2009b, 2009b). Such work underlines 
the privation, coercion, and emotional distress people can experience because of 
carceral debts and so-called ‘problem’ debt, as well as how vulnerability to these 
forms of indebtedness is structured along axes of gender, class, and race 
(Marron, 2012; LeBaron and Roberts, 2012; Roberts, 2014; Deville, 2015; 
Pitcher, 2016). There is also a strong emphasis in this literature on debt as a form 
of material dispossession (see, for example, Taylor, 2012; Soederberg, 2013, 
2014). 
This everyday image of debt politics helps us to understand the emergence of 
what I term ‘debt-based economic citizenship’, as well as the rise of a figure I 
call, following Lyn Mie Itagaki (2014), the ‘debtor-citizen.’ Writing in the US 
context, and from beyond IPE, Itagaki (2014: 94, emphasis in original) has 
drawn attention to the way in which, in the post-financial crisis setting, ‘the 
debtor-citizen emerges with particular injuries, rights, and avenues for redress 
and whose conditions of citizenship are predicated on a notion of debt.’ As 
Itagaki (2014: 119, n. 1) elaborates:  
Debtor-citizen is an aspirational category that applies to any resident or 
denizen of the nation (and participant in the national economy at the most 
fundamental levels of consumption: food, housing, transportation, 
utilities). For noncitizens (and nonwhite citizens), the relationship to debt 
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has proven even more complicated, the exclusions and penalties even 
more fierce.  
In The Making of the Indebted Man, Maurizio Lazzarato (2012: 89) has gone so 
far as to argue that the debtor is now the paradigmatic neoliberal subject, and 
debt ‘the most general power relation through which the neoliberal power bloc 
institutes its class struggle.’ There is good reason to register concern at 
Lazzarato’s reduction of diverse economic power relations to a single form of 
political-economic relationship (Deville, 2015: 169), especially given the 
suspicion of excessive generalisation, essentialism, and economism that I 
introduced above. There is also good reason to question Lazzarato’s picture as 
one of indebted man, given it is often women who bear the biggest burdens in 
meeting personal and household financial obligations (Adkins, 2016: 6; 
Coleman, 2016: 92; see also Roberts, 2013; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 
2016a, 2016b). Nevertheless, without adopting the totalising character of 
Lazzarato’s argument, it seems clear that, in the UK and US contexts that I 
consider in this thesis, the ‘debtor-citizen’ is fast becoming a pervasive subject 
position. 
To flesh out this idea of debtor-citizenship, I wish now to isolate three key 
concepts that scholars working within the everyday image of debt politics are 
using to advance an understanding of how the debtor-citizen subject is produced 
and the reproduction of debt-based economic citizenship is secured. These 
concepts are: everyday financial literacies, everyday financial performativities, 
and everyday financial moral economies. 
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First, the everyday image of debt politics underlines how financial literacy is a 
technology that shapes the indebted subject in ways congruent with the ongoing 
liberalisation and financialisation of market societies. Feminist, everyday, and 
cultural political economy scholars have examined financial literacy education as 
a process whereby individuals are expected to take on neoliberal cultural-
economic values of thrift, resilience, and personal responsibility (Marron, 2014; 
Clarke, 2015; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a; Santos, 2016). Upon 
finding herself in debt, the debtor-citizen is expected to access financial literacy 
and money advice services in order to become more ‘resilient’ in the future 
(Clarke, 2015: 265). The everyday image of debt politics suggests that financial 
literacy is a key way in which people are taught to adapt to the uncertain effects 
of an increasing reliance on debt-based finance upon their economic security. 
Certain groups, including the unemployed, women, sole parents, and the working 
class, are targeted for particular intervention in literacy programmes 
(Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a). 
Second, authors have looked at non-elite financial performances to understand 
how governance passes through and shapes everyday economic subjects, 
including debtors (see, for example, de Goede, 2005; Aitken, 2007; Langley, 
2008a, 2010; Brassett and Clarke, 2012; Clarke, 2012). For instance, James 
Brassett and Chris Clarke (2012: 13–5) underline how everyday discourses of 
trauma during the sub-prime mortgage crisis helped to constitute a ‘traumatised 
financial subject’ in need of governance, while distinguishing ‘innocent victims’ 
from culpable, ‘irresponsible’ borrowers. Scholars working on everyday 
financial performativities emphasise non-elite performances, rather than the 
performativity of economic theories, models, and calculative devices that 
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financial ‘performation’ studies, inspired by Michel Callon, focus on (see, among 
others, Callon, 1998, 2010; MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie et al., 2007; Watson, 
2009a, 2014; Paudyn, 2013; Braun, 2016; Christophers, 2017). Some have 
argued for combining both performativity and performation approaches to look 
at the ‘layered performances’ of finance within society (Clarke, 2012). 
Third, scholars working within the everyday image of debt politics underline 
how the moralisation of debt and credit produces indebted citizenship. In IPE, 
the moral economy literature tends to focus less on the resistances and 
solidarities that occupy centre stage in canonical historical and anthropological 
accounts of moral economy (Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1976), and more on the 
moralised economies of neoliberalism (for example, Wiegratz, 2010; Watson, 
2012b; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a; although for exceptions, see 
Clarke, 2016; Stanley et al., 2016). Looking at moral economies of debt in the 
UK, scholars have explored how a ‘middle-class moral panic’ among mortgage-
holders helped to insulate private banks from the moral hazard of their lending in 
the wake of the credit crunch (Watson, 2009b), as well as how the current 
Conservative government has used analogies between public and household debt 
to legitimate spending cuts and secure people’s acquiescence to austerity policies 
(Stanley, 2014). Everyday moral economies can also be seen in deeply gendered 
moral interventions into households dependent on high-cost consumer credit and 
headed by women (Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a). The insight from 
this literature is that drawing on and reshaping everyday moral positions is a key 
practice of governance within debt-based economic citizenship. 
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In sum, this everyday image of debt politics explains the rise of debt-based 
economic citizenship in the context of welfare-state restructuring and the rise of 
‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 2009), while illustrating debt’s material, 
cultural, discursive, and moral politics in everyday life. This image traces the 
everyday subject who anchors debt-based economic citizenship: a debtor-citizen 
who is expected to be financially capable and rational in her actions, as well as, 
‘reliably liable’ (Itagaki, 2014) to financial institutions and the state. Far from 
being an unmarked category, this figure is differentiated by class, race, and 
gender, with these identities often dividing ‘deserving’ debtor-citizens from 
‘deviant’ ones (Watson, 2009b; Roberts, 2013; Pitcher, 2016; Montgomerie and 
Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a). 
The everyday image of debt politics adds much to the overall picture of debt 
politics in IPE. It remedies the blindness to debt’s everyday dimensions that is 
characteristic of regulatory approaches to debt. Yet, the everyday image of debt 
politics is still, I argue, captive to a certain picture of people’s agency vis-à-vis 
finance. Those who we might call, for want of a better term, ‘ordinary people’, 
tend to serve as generic examples of the broader penetration of finance into daily 
life (it is important to be mindful, nevertheless, of rhetorical appeals to ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘hardworking’ people in political life [Kirwan, 2013]). In the everyday 
image, the ‘craving for generality’ is evident in a tendency to rely on statistical 
representations to convey the realities of personal and household indebtedness. 
The everyday image of debt politics is also ‘aspect-blind’ in the sense that it 
tends not to attend to debt’s more-than-economic aspects, and in particular to the 
complex sociabilities and solidarities of debt that anthropological accounts 
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foreground (see, for example, Mauss, 2002; Han, 2012; Nguyen, 2012; Bear, 
2015).  
Finally, because it underplays debtor agency, this everyday image of debt politics 
is confronted by the problem of change. In the existing work on everyday debt 
politics in IPE, there is no sustained account of how the debtor-citizen is 
becoming an ordinary democratic subject, as people attempt to rebuild the 
imperfect democracy of financialised market society from within (although for 
some suggestive analyses, see Aitken, 2015b; Clarke, 2016: 131–9; Stanley et 
al., 2016). While this growing literature exposes to excellent effect how debt-
based economic citizenship functions, it pays much less attention to how people 
are opposing this model of citizenship with practices of debt resistance. In sum, 
the everyday image discounts ordinary agencies in finance. 
Samuel Knafo (2010) has made a bold case for attending to agency to correct the 
structuralist bias of much critical political economy. In a recent methodological 
piece, Knafo (forthcoming) offers a persuasive argument as to why IPE scholars 
should examine agency over structure, as well as an overview of what this 
commitment might look like in practice. As Knafo (forthcoming: n.p.) argues: 
‘[d]ue to inherent imbalance between structures and agency, it is futile to 
ascertain their respective influence. This type of exercise will always necessarily 
yield structural accounts that reify social reality.’ He holds that it is possible to 
counterbalance the structuralist bias by ‘systematically tracing the agencies 
involved in the making of liberal financial governance as a means of better 
appreciating what differences people make’ (Knafo, forthcoming: n.p., emphasis 
in original). Knafo (forthcoming) describes his approach as tracing agencies by 
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attending to their specificities. Instead of offering generic characterisations of a 
social grouping, he examines differences within this grouping. For example, by 
asking what distinguishes Birmingham bankers who opposed the gold standard, 
from the Manchester bankers who did not, Knafo (forthcoming) breaks up 
dominant understandings of the acceptability of the gold standard, thus offering a 
different vista on the politics of that time. 
With this commitment to studying agencies in their distinctions and connections, 
Knafo adopts a relationship to the particular that bears comparison with the 
Wittgensteinian position I outlined above, even though he works from a very 
different theoretical position (one inflected by historical materialism and 
committed to far-reaching historicisation). This stance vis-à-vis generic 
characterisations, or what I have followed Wittgenstein in calling the craving for 
generality and the quest for conceptual purity, can yield substantive findings that 
suspend accepted characterisations of various actors and events. Most 
importantly, this stance allows the researcher to discern creativity, social 
struggle, and points of potential political intervention and change.  
Inspired by Knafo, then, the question I ask about agency in this thesis is neither 
‘what is determining: structure or agency?’ nor ‘how do we conceptualise 
ordinary agency?’, but rather: how do various ordinary agencies (in the plural) 
differ from each other, and how do these differences matter in political and 
ethical terms? For example, I ask: what distinguishes the agency of a person who 
avoids debt in accordance with dominant discourses of financial literacy from 
someone who uses the experience of debt-free living to make political and 
ethical claims about financialised ways of living (Chapter Four)? By attending to 
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differences and similarities in debtor agencies, it is possible to come to, if not an 
overarching generalisation about agency or democratic subjectivity, a sense of 
what ordinary democratic agencies and subjectivities look like in practice. 
Following this approach means that, rather than starting from a general 
conception of agency, one begins from the particular case and asks what (if 
anything) makes the example exemplary.  
3. An ordinary image of debt politics 
In this final section of the chapter, I bring together otherwise isolated pieces of 
work in IPE to create the basis for what I call an ‘ordinary’ image of debt 
politics. In particular, I survey some emerging directions taken by those using a 
cultural political economy approach to study debt relations. The cultural political 
economy approach I am interested in draws on a range of disciplinary influences 
to emphasise the constitutive cultural politics of economic practices (see, for 
example, du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 2004; Aitken, 2007; 
Langley, 2008b; Best and Paterson, 2010). This approach has allowed selected 
IPE scholars to side-step generalised depictions of debt and to show indebtedness 
under another aspect by emphasising diverse more-than-economic ethical and 
political vocabularies of debt. The scholars whose work I survey unearth 
democratic potential within the varied relations people establish with each other 
through lived experiences of debt and credit. These bonds and relations might 
seem less sturdy than the ties that bind people to financial institutions and the 
state. However, the emerging ordinary image of debt politics seeks to 
counterbalance accounts of structures of domination in finance with attention to 
people’s everyday practices of freedom. In this section, I argue that selected 
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work using a cultural political economy approach provides a counterpoint to the 
everyday financial literacies, financial performativities, and moral economies 
work on debt-based economic citizenship. I begin with examples of ordinary 
education among debtors. 
As I argued above, scholars working with what I have called the everyday image 
of debt politics help us to understand how financial literacy programmes foster a 
capitalist ethos and seek to refashion the behaviours of marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups by promoting values such as individualism, thrift, and 
resilience. Recently, however, some scholars using a cultural political economy 
approach have begun to highlight the democratic potential of ordinary education 
among debtors, as enacted in online forums and do-it-yourself (DIY) debt 
resistance manuals (Stanley et al., 2016; Aitken, 2015b).  
Liam Stanley et al. (2016) use online debtors’ discussion forums to trace the 
collective networks of advice and mutual support formed as people post about 
their experiences of navigating debt and negotiating with their creditors. 
Studying these forums makes clear the material constraints, anxieties, coercion, 
and conflict that being heavily in debt can entail. However, the forums also offer 
debtors a source of shared information and camaraderie, while constituting an 
informal, distributed mechanism for collectively making decisions about how to 
deal with debts and with creditors. Stanley and his co-authors show how informal 
education among people in debt leads debtors to take ‘unauthorised paths’ in 
their interactions with creditors (Stanley et al., 2016: 78; see also Kerkvliet, 
2009: 238), such as sidestepping debt collection and even refusing to repay their 
debts. The authors dispel the craving for generality by treating people’s 
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interactions in online forums not as examples to illustrate a generalised 
characterisation of debtors (as either empowered or cowed) but instead as 
exemplars of ordinary agency in its complexity. This work recasts everyday 
financial literacies into forms of ordinary education that can fuel the 
development of political subjectivities and collective commitments.  
When this exchange of information about debt and expertise is formalised into 
manuals that discuss how to resist debt in its various forms (see, for example, 
Strike Debt, 2014), ordinary education issues a more overt political challenge to 
the moralisation of debt, the positioning of the debtor as a consumer-citizen, and 
aggressive expansion of the consumer credit industry (Ross, 2013; Aitken, 
2015b). If regulatory programmes for financial literacy seek to create an 
economic subject who is resilient in the face of expected financial failure, such 
literacies not only fail to deliver empowerment on their own terms but also 
spawn counter-literacies (Clarke, 2015). Financial education is not a closed 
neoliberal device that inevitably holds debt-based economic citizenship in place, 
but instead an ambiguous and at times progressive political tool. Ordinary 
education can be a tool of self-cultivation that moves debtors to non-conformity 
with the tenets of debt-based economic citizenship, as I shall demonstrate in my 
discussion of debt-free living manuals and autobiographies in Chapter Four. 
I find a second dimension of this embryonic ordinary image of debt politics 
within the financial performativities literature. As I argued above, this literature 
splits along something of an elite versus everyday line. Much of the literature is 
concerned with the performativity of economic theory and models, but other 
parts of it trace the broader social discourses and everyday dimensions of 
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financial governance. Within this everyday financial performativities literature, 
there is a strand of work that fits particularly well with the ordinary image I am 
describing. This strand foregrounds the prospects for democratic confrontation 
and exchange within liberal financial governance by emphasising moments of 
breakdown, resistance, and subversion in ordinary performances of finance, 
including through expressive practices and cultural artefacts such as art, novels, 
posters, the media, and even press conferences (see, for example, de Goede, 
2005; Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2008a: ch. 9; Aitken, 2014; Clarke, 2012; Brassett 
and Rethel, 2015; La Berge, 2015; King, 2016; Morris, 2016). 
Like scholars examining ordinary education, those looking at ordinary cultural 
performances of finance often examine the particular case to show how it speaks 
back to dominant assumptions both within financialised society and within IPE. 
Take, for instance, Brassett and Holmes (2016), who anchor their discussion of 
doctrines of financial resilience in the case of Dave Fishwick. Dave is a man 
from Burnley, Lancashire who decides to start up a one-man bank because he 
sees the hardships caused by high-street banks, which have stopped lending as 
part of the contraction of credit in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Dave calls his lending operation ‘Bank on Dave!’, using the double meaning of 
‘bank’ in this phrase to evade the regulatory oversight of the then Financial 
Services Authority (Brassett and Holmes, 2016: 385). Dave sets out to help 
others with his loans and savings company, adopting a model of banking built on 
human contact and the promise of a more relational form of finance.  
Brassett and Holmes read Dave’s case against the backdrop of the expansion of 
discourses of resilience in financial governance, but they neither generalise his 
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case into a heroic refusal nor use it to build an all-encompassing concept of 
either resilience or resistance. The authors avoid assuming the crystalline purity 
of these concepts. In looking to the specificities of Dave’s resistance, Brassett 
and Holmes ask what distinguishes his agency from the generic resilience agency 
presumed by both institutional promoters of resilience, such as the Bank of 
England, and much of critical resilience studies in IPE and the social sciences.  
As the authors remark, this ‘is not the community-based resilience of top-down 
neoliberal governance widely critiqued in the literature, but rather the everyday, 
playful, swearing, resistant resilience of Dave, from Burnley’ (Brassett and 
Holmes, 2016: 386, emphasis in original; citation omitted). Brassett and Holmes 
therefore avoid the essentialism that runs through current academic debates about 
resilience, while also gesturing toward resilience’s unexpected potential in its 
conjuring of resistant subjects (for other important exceptions to essentialist 
accounts of resilience, see Anderson, 2015; Brassett et al., 2013). In so doing, 
they reveal the democratic potential of ordinary performances within dominant 
models of liberal financial governance. This is an insight that will also surface, in 
Chapter Five, within my study of Debt Resistance UK, a group that uses the 
highly conventional language of financial auditing to make passionate, 
democratic claims about the effects of local authority indebtedness in the UK. 
The third and final new direction in the literature that has the makings of an 
ordinary image of debt politics has some affinity with the everyday moral 
economies work I surveyed above. However, it differs from this work in a key 
respect: it pluralises IPE’s conceptions of economic subjectivity, values, and 
relations by showing the concept of ‘debt’ itself under a different aspect. This 
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work reverses blindness to the more-than-economic dimensions of debt by 
foregrounding a more open framing of indebtedness in political praxis. At this 
point, it will be helpful to note that, in society at large, activists and NGOs talk 
not only about financial debts but also of ecological debts, social debts, and the 
debts incurred as a result of slavery and colonial injustices (see, for example, 
Jubilee South, 1999; Raina, 2005; Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate 
Debt, n.d.). These groups use the more-than-economic character of debt as a spur 
to political claim-making.   
The linguistic lineage of debt is similarly multiple, as the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED) (1989) indicates. The OED starts from the routine financial 
understanding of debt as ‘a sum of money or a material thing’ but goes on to 
reference the religious, ethical, and intimate dimensions of indebtedness. It does 
so by discussing debts to Providence, the idea of debt as an intimate relation 
(wherein ‘love the gift is love the debt’), and the belief that ‘God is the creditor, 
men the debtors, and sins the debt.’ Even within the narrow confines of the 
English language, an alternative semantic web surrounds IPE’s taken-for-granted 
definition of debt. As economic sociologist Nigel Dodd (2014: 89) summarises, 
‘[t]he moral economy of debt embraces everything from friendship, through 
neighborliness, to revenge.’ These examples drawn from political praxis and 
linguistic lineages help us to see that, as Harker (2017: 14) observes, ‘debt 
ecologies are reworked and/or refused by other obligations, commitments and 
desires.’ 
To return to a cultural political economy approach, Rob Aitken offered an early 
account of debt’s more-than-economic aspects within his broader project of 
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developing a historically sensitive account of popular finance in IPE. Aitken 
(2008) sets the ideas of American folk singer Woody Guthrie, who was writing 
in the 1940s, in counterpoint to the IPE trope of ‘embedded liberalism.’ This 
trope, Aitken argues, has come to figure as a boundary marker between 
neoliberal times and a seemingly rosier age in which finance was reconciled with 
‘social’ purpose. In his writing, and especially in the piece People I Owe, Guthrie 
develops a narrative of ‘reciprocal’ economy and relational indebtedness that 
Aitken places in relief to embedded liberalism. The result of this ‘counterpoint’, 
as Aitken calls it, is to show that the embedded liberal compromise did not just 
‘contain’ finance but also, in Aitken’s (2008: 440) words, ‘established conditions 
for a kind of rationalisation of finance; a system of representation which 
continues today to diagram finance as a rational and unproblematic category.’ 
In his piece on Woody Guthrie and embedded liberalism, as well as his more 
recent work on the Strike Debt movement (Aitken, 2015a: ch. 7, 2015b), Aitken 
poses ethical questions about people’s ordinary obligations that go unasked by 
scholars working within the everyday image of debt politics. For example: are 
we all in debt to each other? And, if so, how might we refashion the practices 
and vocabulary of finance to reflect and foster this sense of mutuality? By 
drawing attention to an aspect of the concept of debt that is ‘hidden’ in its 
‘simplicity and familiarity’ (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. I, § 129), Aitken 
reveals social entailments of indebtedness that stand in counterpoint to liberal 
financial ethics. Importantly, Aitken’s contrapuntal analysis is not about casting 
one narrative (the regulatory narrative of embedded liberalism) as dominant 
(general), and another (Guthrie’s reciprocal economy) as alternative or subaltern 
(particular). Instead, he seeks, in his own words, to ‘insert a stutter’ into received 
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understandings of both liberal finance and indebtedness (Aitken, 2008: 439). 
Aitken’s reading powerfully undermines the way in which debt has come to be 
read as a financial practice apart from ethics and distinct from the self. I will pick 
up this reading in Chapter Six, when I discuss how the resistance movement 
Strike Debt mobilises similar ideas of debt as an ordinary obligation to others in 
order to encourage debt refusal. 
Finally, Robbie Shilliam (2013) offers another counterpoint to work that is blind 
to the more-than-economic aspects of debt, this time by exploring transversal 
relations among governments and citizens in formerly colonised countries. Like 
Aitken, Shilliam works with what Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 71) would 
call the ‘blurred edges’ of the concept of debt. Shilliam does so by starting from 
what would appear to be a paradox within regulatory IPE work: the generosity of 
Guyana in the wake of the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010. 
Guyana’s aid made it, in relative GDP terms, one of the most generous donors in 
the international community. Citing the sentiments of Andaiye, a social activist 
from a grassroots women’s organisation, Shilliam reads this generosity with 
reference to a strongly articulated sense on the part of the Guyanese of 
indebtedness to Haiti for the gift of the liberatory consciousness of the Haitian 
revolution (Shilliam, 2013: 167). In this revolution, the enslaved people of Saint-
Domingue (later the Republic of Haiti) overthrew slavery in a radical 
reconstitution of modernity’s values of liberty, fraternity, and equality.  
Shilliam shows that, in acknowledging this ‘debt’, the Guyanese state dissented 
from its assigned place in the global political economy, including from its 
position as a ‘poor’ country and as a ‘beneficiary’ rather than giver of aid. More 
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importantly, for Shilliam this example shows how the solidarities engendered by 
experiences of colonial modernity give rise to transgressive practices of indebted 
obligation between postcolonial subjects. He suggests that non-Western practices 
of gift exchange and debt have a spiritual force that is repressed in subject fields 
such as IPE. Shilliam thus opens up non-Western cosmologies and 
epistemologies as a basis for understanding indebted relations and decolonising 
ideas of debt, gift, and exchange in this subject field. In so doing, he underlines 
the more-than-economic aspects of debt and hence reveals the relative aspect-
blindness entailed in the everyday image of debt politics in IPE. 
At this point, perhaps my reader will suggest that the works I have discussed, 
built as they are on everyday examples, are entirely consistent with the everyday 
image of debt politics that I sketched in section two of the chapter. Nevertheless, 
I contend that these pieces ‘dissolve’ rather than ‘solve’ the problems of debt as 
conceived within both regulatory and everyday approaches to IPE. Whether the 
problem is that of the omnipotence of resilience in neoliberal governance, or the 
apparent puzzle of why a developing country would give aid so generously, these 
scholars use examples as ‘perspicuous representations’ to provoke the dawning 
of a different aspect. They ‘provincialise’ neoliberalism and embedded liberalism 
(Chakrabarty, 2008; see also Aitken, 2011), rather than subsuming everyday 
practices, values, and subjectivities beneath these general concepts. They avoid 
essentialist understandings of agency and resistance, and they show debt politics 
under another aspect by demonstrating how the more-than-economic dimensions 
of indebtedness can be a spur to transgressive politics and ethics. The scholars 
behind this work achieve these effects in methodological terms by treating 
ordinary examples as exemplars: as things-in-themselves worth thinking with. 
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At the same time, these scholars do not deny the realities of power and 
domination. Rather, they show precisely that practices of freedom emerge from 
people’s everyday experiences of practices of governance. Combined, this work 
shifts us away from a focus on the reproduction of liberal financial belonging 
within debt-based economic citizenship to an understanding of the complex 
ecologies of debt today. In sum, these examples take us beyond the everyday 
image of debt politics, but also beyond understandings of financial resistances as 
straightforwardly ‘alternative’ (see also Langley, 2008a: ch. 9). In turn, this 
relational understanding of resistances and alternatives as emerging from an 
‘alternation’ (Maurer, 2008: 69; Tooker and Maurer, 2016: 342) between 
practices of governance and practices of freedom is important because, in Matt 
Davies’s (2016: 2) words, ‘IPE’s view of everyday life tends to be one-sided: 
either defining it [everyday life] as the locus for a politics of resistance or as an 
inert space in which domination manifests itself.’  
To end by returning to the ideas I introduced at the beginning of the chapter, I 
should once again clarify that I am not suggesting that the emerging ordinary 
image of debt politics is more ‘accurate’ than the everyday image, or that 
scholars working with other images suffer some kind of false consciousness. 
This would be the argument of someone who understands the world in terms of 
ideological, rather than aspectival, captivity (Owen, 2003). We cannot do 
without pictures, for they make our lives intelligible (Heyes, 2007: 18). The point 
is to ask what our pictures do, and, more importantly, what they allow us to do or 
prevent us from doing. Aspectival captivity is a problem when it diminishes our 
ability to perceive practices of freedom, or when it diminishes our capacity to 
experience ourselves (and perceive others) as agents who can pursue the ends 
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that matter to each of us (Owen, 2003: 83–4). In the next chapter, I develop 
further the account of the ordinary that I have begun to elaborate here by 
examining the methodological bases of the ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s work. 
However, first I will summarise the argument of this chapter. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have argued that the everyday image of debt underplays ordinary 
agencies in finance and those of debtors in particular. This image tends to stress 
debt’s disciplinary power at the expense of giving an account of the varied ways 
in which people are navigating and challenging debt-based economic citizenship. 
While the existing literature provides a nuanced political-economic engagement 
with everyday dynamics of debt and credit, it tends to use people’s lives to 
exemplify general financial logics rather than as exemplars to think with. 
Because these images are captives to a certain economism (in that they do not 
see other dimensions of indebtedness that come from debt’s more-than-economic 
status), they neglect how alternative ethical and political vocabularies of 
indebtedness act as spurs to democratic politics today.  
The ordinary image I have assembled here is not intended to minimise the 
significance of the disciplinary force of debt-based economic citizenship. 
Instead, I intend the image to act as a ‘counterpoint’ (Aitken, 2008) to the 
everyday image of debt politics. My criticism is therefore not that the everyday 
image is wrong, but rather that it may not reflect ‘our real need’ at this particular 
time. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. 1, § 108, 
my emphasis) states that he seeks to turn his whole inquiry (and hence the 
direction of his earlier work) around: ‘the axis of reference of our examination 
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must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.’ Some IPE scholars 
are seeking to turn their enquiries around to start from the possibilities for agency 
and disruption, rather than the limits to change (Knafo, 2010, forthcoming; Huke 
et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 2016). I have joined these scholars here. Understanding 
how and why people resist debt and, in the process, become ordinary democratic 
subjects in finance, is one small way to contribute to the critical task of 
reorientation in IPE. 
The point is not simply to imagine debt differently in advance, as though this 
idealism would in itself change indebted relationships (the picture does not 
change; we do). An ordinary image of debt politics suggests, instead, that IPE 
scholars should neither content themselves with castigating indebtedness as a 
closed structure of domination, nor uncritically celebrate a debt of relationality. 
Rather, we might fruitfully examine the ways in which people in daily life 
follow, contest, and reject commonly sanctioned obligations of debt and credit. 
We can then practically engage with the possibilities and difficulties that arise 
from people’s ordinary ethical and political work. In the next chapter, I provide 
some methodological tools to take this engagement further by turning to J. L. 
Austin, and his version of ordinary language philosophy, as my guide to the 
‘ordinary.’  
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Chapter Two: How To Do Agency with the Ordinary 
 
Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our 
word is our bond. 
– J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1962) 
 
 
In this chapter, I develop the foundations of an ordinary image of debt politics by 
turning to Austinian ordinary language philosophy, the second of Stanley 
Cavell’s influences. Austin’s arguments are familiar to IPE scholars because of 
the rapidly expanding studies of financial performativity in the field. However, 
the focus on performativity within IPE has come at the expense of an 
engagement with Austin’s other ideas. I argue that attending to four core, yet 
usually overlooked, dimensions of the ordinary language philosophy project 
provides a way to investigate ordinary agency. These dimensions involve: 
examining ordinary ethics; understanding ordinary action; scrutinising ordinary 
language usage; and reanimating ordinary words. 
I develop this argument across four sections. In each section, I use examples to 
indicate how an ordinary language philosophy approach can be used to study 
resistances to debt, although I reserve the bulk of this exemplification for Part 
Two of the thesis. In section one, I demonstrate that ordinary ethics is a central 
concern of Austinian ordinary language philosophy. Austin was interested not 
only in the pragmatic force of speech acts (what we do with words) but also in 
the ethical entailments of these acts: the commitments and responsibilities people 
enact in speaking. In particular, Austin highlights the difficulty of escaping the 
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pragmatic effects of our utterances and hence the need to navigate, in 
conversation with others, our responsibilities for what we do when saying 
something. Austin therefore places great emphasis on studying what Cavell 
labels ‘elaboratives’: the acts of speech, such as excuses, through which we 
justify and elaborate reasons for our actions.  
In section two, I flesh out the Austinian notion of elaboratives by linking it to 
Hannah Arendt’s understanding of human action. Specifically, I argue that 
Arendt’s account of human action as unpredictable, irreversible, and mutually 
authored, rather than sovereign, shows that elaborative speech acts such as 
excusing and forgiving are necessary parts of the human condition. Arendt helps 
to spell out the understanding of human action and agency that is implicit in 
Austin’s speech act theory. She shows the importance of understanding not only 
what we do with words but also how we continually renew the conditions of 
agency through elaborative acts of speech. 
In section three, I outline the ordinary language philosopher’s methodological 
procedure of scrutinising how a word is ordinarily used. I begin by rebutting two 
misunderstandings of this procedure, namely that it is only about language and 
that it reifies the ‘ordinary’. Austin examines ordinary language not so much 
because he wants to understand individual words, but because he seeks to 
comprehend the phenomena these words relate to us. Studying ordinary language 
usage allows him to examine the phenomena, concepts, and forms of agency that 
language makes available to us. However, this does not mean treating existing 
language usage as sacrosanct. According to Austin, everyday expressions serve 
as a starting point for criticism, rather than as an unassailable authority.  
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In section four, I begin to make the transition from first- to second-generation 
ordinary language philosophy by introducing the particular strategies of reading 
that Cavell develops from the work of Austin and, to a lesser extent, 
Wittgenstein. Cavell seeks to reanimate words by excavating their multiple 
histories and resonances to reveal lineages we have forgotten or that are hidden 
in plain sight. Cavell proposes this practice of reading as a way to redeem the 
immanent possibilities of ordinary language and practice. In turn, this redemptive 
practice of reading can be used to renew an imperfect democracy from within, as 
I will show in my studies of debt resistance in Part Two of the thesis. 
1. Examining ordinary ethics 
In Chapter One, I outlined the makings of an ‘ordinary’ image of debt politics in 
IPE. In this chapter, I add depth to this image by proposing a broad methodology 
based on the ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin. As I noted in the 
previous chapter, scholars in IPE and related fields have used Austinian accounts 
of performativity to explore the contingent enactment of economic subjects, 
markets, and ‘the economy’ more broadly (see, for example, MacKenzie, 2005, 
2006; Clarke, 2012; Brassett and Clarke, 2012). Building on these foundational 
Austinian analyses, IPE scholars have proposed further bifurcations of the 
concept of performativity, using a range of scholars other than Austin. This 
increasing conceptual sophistication in financial performativity studies is 
valuable, although it is not my intention to review performativity debates here. 
Instead, I wish to return to Austin to highlight an element of his work that 
remains under-examined in IPE and in performativity studies: its ordinary ethics. 
It is only by understanding the ethical dimensions of ordinary language 
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philosophy that the full stakes of understanding economic life in performative 
terms can be adequately grasped. To understand ordinary ethics in turn requires a 
brief survey of Austin’s arguments about speech acts. 
Writing in the middle third of the twentieth century, Austin famously challenged 
the assumption that the primary way in which we use language is to state 
something and hence to describe or reflect reality. In How to Do Things with 
Words, Austin (1962a) directs philosophy’s attention away from language’s 
semantics (the discrete meanings of words) and toward its pragmatics (the use 
and effects of words in context). Specifically, Austin shifted linguistic 
philosophy away from the concern with what is meant in saying something (what 
is stated) to an interest in what is done in and by saying something (what is 
enacted or performed). Austin tentatively used the concept of the ‘performative 
utterance’ to capture the way in which to say something is also to do something. 
He further proposed not truth and falsity but ‘felicity’ (happiness or success) and 
‘infelicity’ (unhappiness or lack of success) as the means to evaluate the 
utterance: that is, to describe the conditions in which a ‘performative’ takes 
effect or fails to (if the speech act does not come off this is a ‘misfire’; if it is 
performed in a less than exemplary fashion this is an ‘abuse’) (Austin, 1962a: 
15–24; Crary, 2002: 63). 
To use a celebrated example, the concept of performativity suggests that to utter 
‘I do’ is not to state or describe the fact of my becoming married to you, but 
rather to perform the act of marriage: it is to marry you. When I say ‘I do’, 
Austin (1962a: 6) observes, ‘I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in 
it.’ Austin soon realised that his initial binary distinction between performative 
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utterances that do things, on the one hand, and constative statements that 
describe things (and hence are either true or false), on the other hand, did not 
hold. As a result, he revised this distinction into a multi-dimensional concept of 
‘speech acts’, proposing that an utterance has locutionary meaning (it says 
something, such as referring to the concept and practice of marriage), 
illocutionary force (it does something in saying something, such as enacting 
marriage), and perlocutionary effects (it does something by saying something, 
such as, one would hope, making the people at the marriage ceremony happy) 
(Austin, 1962a: 120). 
Austin’s work on speech acts has sparked much debate in the humanities and 
social sciences, the rehearsing of which is not required for my purpose here. 
Suffice to say that Austin’s arguments have been read, misread, extended, and 
refuted to productive ends in philosophy, literary theory, and political thought 
(see, for example, Searle, 1969; Derrida, 1977; Fish, 1982; Felman, 1983; Butler, 
1993, 1997; Skinner, 2002), if often at the expense of Austin’s original claims 
and intentions (Crary, 2002, 2007: ch. 2; Laugier, 2013: ch. 9). Something 
similar can be said of the way in which IPE scholars have used Austin’s ideas 
about performativity, although I do not propose to offer a corrective to the 
reception of the Austinian concept of performativity in IPE here (see Clarke, 
2012). In essence, I do not argue that the existing use of Austin within IPE is 
incorrect but rather that it is importantly incomplete. I seek to offer a picture of 
the significance of Austin’s work in IPE that broadens the interest in 
performativity to encompass ordinary ethics. 
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For Austin, who held a chair in moral philosophy at Oxford, studying ‘how to do 
things with words’ entailed a necessary sensitivity to the ethical implications and 
effects of this ‘doing.’ Austin’s profound interest in ethics is evidenced by his 
nuanced explorations of excuses and the phrases we use to attribute 
responsibility (Austin, 1970a, 1970b). In ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Austin (1970a) 
explores the effects of the various ways in which we justify and excuse our 
actions. Consider the difference, for instance, between describing oneself as 
having done something ‘by accident’ versus claiming to having done it ‘by 
mistake.’ At first glance, this distinction appears trivial and inconsequential. But 
Austin uses examples of when and how we would use these two words (or of 
‘what we should say when’ [Austin, 1970a: 182]) to draw out the ethical 
significance of this distinction.  
To borrow one of Austin’s examples, if I shoot your donkey by accident (for 
instance, one day I take a dislike to my own donkey, decide to shoot him, and 
train my gun on him, but just before I pull the trigger your donkey unexpectedly 
moves into the way, with the result that I accidentally shoot your donkey instead 
of my own), this is not the same thing as me shooting your donkey by mistake 
(when, for instance, I see that there are two donkeys in the paddock but fail to 
take sufficient care to ensure that the one I am aiming at, and end up shooting, is 
mine) (Austin, 1970a: 185, n.1). My responsibility is lessened when I claim to 
have shot your donkey by accident (provided you accept this claim), whereas I 
may be expected to assume (or, more accurately, I am assuming) greater 
responsibility if I assert that I made a mistake in failing to be sure that I was 
aiming at my donkey rather than at yours.  
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This example demonstrates that ethics is at stake in our use of language precisely 
because language is not simply a reflection of meaning (semantics) but 
something that produces effects (pragmatics), such as those of responsibility. If 
Austin (1970a: 175) delights, as he says, ‘in hounding down the minutiae’ of 
language, his detailed discussion of examples of everyday usage is not linguistic 
pedantry. Instead, Austin uses these explorations to show that the fine-grained 
distinctions we make in language are of ethical import and that ordinary 
language acts as a resource for thinking about ethics. For Austin (1970a: 182), 
‘our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth 
drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking.’ Given this 
practical stock of distinctions and connections, Austin sees no need to escape 
into hypothetical discussion or to construct abstract moral frameworks. Instead, 
the task of ordinary language philosophy is, in Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 1999: pt. 
1, § 116) phrasing, ‘to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use’ by attending to the ways and the contexts (the ‘language-games’) 
in which words are used. Austin’s ‘plea for excuses’ is therefore both a plea to 
attend to the ethical work that we do with language and a plea to take ordinary 
language seriously as a source of ethical insight. 
At the heart of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy is an appreciation of how 
the performative or illocutionary force of language gives rise to ethical dilemmas 
of responsiveness and responsibility. Take a promise to repay some money, such 
as that performed, given the appropriate conditions, in the utterance ‘I owe you 
twenty pounds.’ Say we are in a pet shop. I am particularly taken by the bright 
plumage of a goldfinch, but I have forgotten my purse. You are kind enough to 
buy me the bird. I respond to this act by saying ‘I owe you twenty pounds’, thus 
	 63 
promising and committing to repay you. As students of performativity will 
readily acknowledge, my utterance here does not reflect my owing and my 
obligation to repay you; instead, it brings these states into being.  
This pragmatic emphasis on what an utterance does leads Austin to refute the 
idea of a separation between an inner and outer self (and between intention and 
effect) that would allow me to nullify my promise to you by saying that although 
I had outwardly promised to repay you for the goldfinch, my inner self—my 
heart or head—wasn’t in it (Austin, 1962a: 9–10). In this sense, we have no 
choice but to mean what we say, to take responsibility for our words, even if 
what we do in saying something often outstrips what we intended to do; meaning 
is not a matter of choice (Cavell, 1976a). In saying ‘I owe you twenty pounds’, I 
am neither stating that I owe you, nor stating that I promise to repay you; rather, 
I am promising. In this manner, Austin (1962a: 10, emphasis in original) 
concludes, ‘[a]ccuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that 
our word is our bond.’  
But what are we to make of this invocation of ‘morality’? Austin’s argument that 
our word is our bond might be interpreted, at worst, as the antithesis of ethical 
responsibility (suggesting that our language binds us in ways that we cannot help 
but obey) or, at best, as an abstract, moralising claim (we must always keep our 
promises because keeping promises is good, right, just, virtuous, and so forth) 
(see discussion in Loxley, 2007: 39–41). However, in observing that ‘our word is 
our bond’, Austin is not claiming that promises ought to be kept. He is instead 
reflecting on the ethical implications of the pragmatics of speech: Austin is 
showing what it is I am doing when I utter a formulation like ‘I owe you’, but 
	 64 
equally what I am doing when I claim to have a private inner world that could 
protect me from the consequences of my speech acts.  
Read against this backdrop, Austin’s focus on excuses and justifications (or what 
Cavell (1999: 310–2) would later call ‘elaboratives’) is precisely a corrective to a 
moralising reading of the idea that our word is our bond. Because our words 
have illocutionary force (in pragmatic terms, because they do things and thus 
commit us to courses of action), we must attend to ethical questions regarding 
the justification, defence, excuse, and mitigation of our actions. Such questions 
include when and how we will follow through on our commitments, and whether 
being held to our word (or holding ourselves to it) is appropriate in a particular 
situation. These are not questions that can be answered apart from context or 
with reference to the conventions of felicity conditions alone (Austin, 1963: 31). 
To speak as a human (rather than to sing as a goldfinch) is to mean what one says 
and to take responsibility for one’s words, but also to engage in conversation 
with others about one’s commitments and the effects of one’s actions, and how 
these are to be borne. Austin’s account of ordinary ethics is therefore not an 
invocation of moral laws or frameworks. Instead, this account is an invitation to 
conversation about the appropriateness of an action in a specific context. 
2. Understanding ordinary action 
Austin’s insights into the ethical consequences and dilemmas arising from the 
performative force of utterances can be deepened by turning to Hannah Arendt’s 
(1958) account of the conditions of human action in The Human Condition 
(hereafter, HC). At first glance, this association might seem an odd one. Arendt 
delivered bold political accounts of action, while Austin revelled in offering 
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minute philological explanations of linguistic action. Yet, Austin and Arendt 
share an interest in examining speech acts such as promising, forgiving, and 
excusing in order to grasp human action. Although Arendt was not a philosopher 
of ordinary language, she was deeply interested in questions of action, agency, 
and responsibility, just like Austin. If Austin emphasises the ethical implications 
of language’s active force, Arendt emphasises the unpredictable and irreversible 
force of human action more broadly. I discuss Arendt’s arguments to deepen the 
understanding of action, agency, and responsibility available in Austin’s work. 
According to Arendt, human action takes place in a world marked by an 
irreducible plurality and hence the condition of non-sovereignty (HC: 7-8). Each 
of us acts, she says, within a ‘“web” of human relationships’ (HC: 183): a web 
created by the fact of living among others or inter homines esse (HC: 7-8). 
Arendt terms this web of relationships the ‘in-between’, ‘something which inter-
est, which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together’ 
(HC: 182). As well as being an objective space, inter-est is a subjective one, 
constituted by exchange between subjects in which they disclose themselves: it is 
an ‘in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin 
exclusively to men’s acting and speaking directly to one another’ (HC: 183, 
emphasis in original).  
Because we inhabit the world with others, because we live inter-est, the 
outcomes of our actions (as well as the nature of our identities) cannot be known 
fully in advance. One person’s action invites another’s reaction, which in turn 
creates further actions and reactions, so that an individual is unable to fully know 
or control the unfolding process of action (HC: 190). Human action, for Arendt, 
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thus entails what she calls unpredictability, irreversibility, and a certain 
anonymity or lack of individual authorship, all of which are born of plurality as a 
feature of the human condition (HC: 220). It is worth quoting Arendt (HC: 233) 
at length here to appreciate the significance of these features of human action as 
they relate to elaborative speech acts:  
That deeds possess such an enormous capacity for endurance…could be a 
matter of pride if men were able to bear its burden, the burden of 
irreversibility and unpredictability…That this is impossible, men have 
always known. They have known that he who acts never quite knows 
what he is doing, that he always becomes “guilty” of consequences he 
never intended or even foresaw, that no matter how disastrous and 
unexpected the consequences of his deed he can never undo it, that the 
process he starts is never consummated unequivocally in one single deed 
or event, and that its very meaning never discloses itself to the actor but 
only to the backward glance of the historian. 
Arendt’s account of action resonates with the account of action in speech that 
Austin delivered at about the same time. Speech has predictable outcomes 
through its illocutionary or performative conventions (it can be used to enact a 
union, or a promise to repay a debt), but it also has unpredictable and 
unconventional perlocutionary effects (the union might make an interested party 
happy or unhappy; the commitment to render a debt similarly so). Just like 
Arendt’s irreversible deeds, an Austinian promise cannot be ‘reversed’ (a broken 
promise is still a promise), only its abrogation mitigated, defended, or justified 
with elaboratives. For Arendt, the only reprieve from what she calls the 
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‘calamities of action’ that ‘arise from the human condition of plurality’ (HC: 
220) (and specifically from the uncertainty and irreversibility of action that 
human plurality entails) lies in the faculties of promising and forgiving. Our 
ability to make and keep promises is a ‘remedy’ for the ‘chaotic uncertainty of 
the future’ (HC: 237). According to Arendt, promises ‘set up in the ocean of 
uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security without which 
not even continuity…would be possible in the relationships between men’ (HC: 
237).  
These promises, just like those entailed in Austin’s pragmatic understanding of 
‘our word is our bond’, cannot be turned into generalised or abstract moral 
claims without losing their very purpose. The generalisation of promises such 
that they must never be broken, and hence the removal of the remedy of 
forgiveness, stymies the human ability to start again and to initiate new actions, 
or what Arendt calls ‘natality’ (HC: 9). As Arendt (HC: 244) argues: 
The moment promises lose their character as isolated islands of certainty 
in an ocean of uncertainty, that is, when this faculty is misused to cover 
the whole ground of the future and to map out a path secured in all 
directions, they lose their binding power and the whole enterprise 
becomes self-defeating. 
We can bind ourselves with promises, take on debts, give our word as our bond, 
and continue to act and to be free despite being non-sovereign (due to our 
interdependence with others) precisely because we know that we can be released 
from our bonds. Otherwise, ‘[w]ithout being forgiven, released from the 
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consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be 
confined to one single deed from which we could never recover’ (HC: 237).  
Let me now summarise the conception of ordinary ethics and agency that comes 
out of my reading of Austin and Arendt. Austin demonstrates how our words, 
with their illocutionary force, commit us to courses of action. We cannot deny 
the implications of our speech; breaking a promise does not make the promise go 
away. Nor is it enough to say: ‘I promised but I didn’t mean it’. It is an ordinary 
entailment of a promise that one mean it. Because our words bind us through 
their quality as action, we must navigate the responsibilities and commitments 
we produce with them. Austin’s grasp of the force of language means he is not 
only interested in the pragmatic implications and commitments of language 
(How to Do Things with Words), but equally in how we navigate, mitigate, and 
modify the force of our words (‘A Plea for Excuses’). In this latter and often 
neglected part of Austin’s work lie the ethical dimensions of speech act theory. 
Understanding the pragmatics of speech requires attending to ordinary ethics, 
and vice versa. The two go hand-in-hand. Arendt further spells out the 
understanding of human action and agency that is implicit in Austin’s work. She 
shows that we cannot be expected to foresee all the possible courses of action 
that might lead us away from keeping a promise, for action in the world with 
others is unpredictable as well as irreversible and mutually made. We must 
understand both how we do things with words and how these things can be, if 
not fully undone, at least modified, mitigated, excused, or forgiven.  
Together, Austin and Arendt show us that making a promise (like the promise to 
repay a sum of money) and forgiving (such as the cancellation of a debt or 
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modification of its terms) are simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary acts. 
They are instances of ‘natality’ that allow us to go on. As Bonnie Honig (2013: 
227) observes, while Arendt tends to depict these speech acts in broad 
brushstrokes as ‘ruptural and extraordinary’ moments of politics, Austin 
impresses upon us their ‘context-dependence and ordinariness’. This 
simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary character of speech is revealed in the 
politics of debt today. The ‘ordinary’ monetised speech acts entailed in the 
millions of contractual promises that sat at the heart of the US subprime 
mortgage crisis have become extraordinary moments of politics (Appadurai, 
2016). At the same time, the failure to treat debt ‘forgiveness’ as an ordinary, 
necessary and habitual consequence of human freedom and action (see Graeber, 
2012) has led to the extraordinary, tragic politics of austerity we see in countries 
such as Greece (Graeber, 2011). 
To further relate these insights to the politics of debt, we might say that finance’s 
performative promissory notes of debt go hand-in-hand with acts of debt 
forgiveness or debt cancellation (to use a term less tied to the moralising version 
of the idea that ‘our word is our bond’). If promising and forgiving are 
performative ethico-political acts, then the debtor-creditor relation, which relies 
on the promise to repay and the ever-present possibility of having to ‘forgive’ a 
debt or alter the terms of repayment, is particularly amenable to being understood 
in terms of Austinian ordinary ethics. Whereas creditors emphasise the 
performativity or illocutionary force of language in the commitment to repay a 
debt, debtors and those acting on their behalf are working in the territory mapped 
by Austin’s ‘Plea’. They stake their practices of freedom on elaborative speech 
acts. 
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The tactics of resistance that I have identified through my research are three key 
ways in which people are navigating debt as a promise to repay in the afterlives 
of the global financial crisis. These tactics are also ways in which people pursue 
an eventual democratic everyday from within the highly imperfect actual 
everyday of debt-based economic citizenship in financialised society. While 
much ink has been spilled in IPE over how creditors enforce their claims to 
repayment, much less has been written on how debtors are resisting these claims. 
Yet it is crucial to examine how debtors and their advocates navigate, mitigate, 
modify, or break with the promise to repay by avoiding, auditing, and refusing 
debt. These elaboratives are acts of natality that allow people to go on. I contend 
that tactics of debt resistance work in a way akin to Austinian elaboratives: they 
serve to justify, defend, elaborate, and sometimes defy the commissions and 
omissions of debtors vis-à-vis their creditors (and those of creditors vis-à-vis 
debtors). People enacting elaborative resistances do so not within a language of 
the moral law but with an appreciation of the contingencies, infelicities, and 
mutually authored character of human action that comes from the condition of 
inter-est, or living among others. Understood as speech acts that do not issue 
from pre-formed subjects but help to constitute them, elaboratives also bring new 
democratic subjects of debt into being.  
With an understanding of ordinary ethics and this brief, suggestive sketch of its 
relevance to debt politics in place, a further question arises: how might one study 
ordinary ethics? What, in other words, is an ordinary language methodology? In 
the next section, I answer this question by discussing Austin’s broad proposals 
for studying ordinary language usage. I continue to focus primarily on Austin 
because Austin offers a sharper statement of his procedures than does 
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Wittgenstein, but also because Austinian procedures deeply influenced Cavell 
throughout his career (see, for example, Cavell, 1976b, 1994a, 2005). It should 
be noted that these procedures are not fixed ‘methods’. Austin offered broad 
methodological recommendations rather than rules, stating that the usefulness of 
his counsel was to be tested and decided from case to case (Gustafsson, 2011: 1).  
In examining this counsel, I begin by outlining ordinary language philosophy’s 
procedures in the negative. That is, I discuss two common misunderstandings of 
these procedures: first, that they deal only with language; second, that they reify 
the ‘ordinary’. I then discuss, in the positive, three of Austin’s recommendations 
regarding how to study ordinary language. These recommendations are that one 
should: 1) use examples of ordinary language usage, to 2) better understand the 
situations in which we find ourselves brought to use particular words, including 
by 3) drawing distinctions and connections between examples. In turning to this 
discussion, the reader should note that I am attending to matters of methodology 
rather than method here. That is, I discuss the broad procedures of ordinary 
language philosophy and the epistemological commitments behind them. The 
details of my methods, or the specific techniques and tools I have used for the 
research underpinning Chapters Four, Five, and Six, are included in those 
substantive chapters. 
3. Scrutinising ordinary language usage 
Austin scrutinised examples of ordinary language usage as the basis for what he 
called his ‘field work in philosophy’ (Austin, 1970a: 183, emphasis in original). 
This field work consisted in gathering examples of ordinary language usage, or 
of ‘what we should say when.’ In ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Austin describes his 
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procedure of deploying examples as one of ‘examining what we should say 
when, and so why and what we should mean by it’ (Austin, 1970a: 182, emphasis 
in original). A common misunderstanding of this dictum is that Austin and his 
fellow ordinary language philosophers are interested only in language (as though 
language exists apart from the world). However, Austin (1970a: 182, emphasis in 
original) explicitly sets this misconception aside: 
In view of the prevalence of the slogan “ordinary language”…one thing 
needs specially emphasizing to counter misunderstandings. When we 
examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what 
situations, we are looking…not merely at words (or “meanings”, 
whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk 
about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our 
perception of…the phenomena. 
Examining how we use words is thus ‘a means to better understand the totality of 
the situation in which we find ourselves brought to use words’ (Austin, 
‘Discussion générale’, as cited and translated in Laugier, 2013: 64). 
These clarifications suggest that Austin’s approach is not restricted to a particular 
subject. Ordinary language philosophy does not mandate the study of certain 
topics over others. As Cavell (1976c: 95) puts it: ‘Ordinary language philosophy 
is about whatever ordinary language is about.’ To return to Austin’s topic in ‘A 
Plea for Excuses’, when we study the language of excuses, we gain access to 
everyday conceptions of agency, freedom, and responsibility. Hence, we 
understand what it is to act (the phenomena of and conditions of possibility for 
human action that also interested Arendt). This phenomenological impulse is 
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why Austin (1970a: 182) ventured ‘linguistic phenomenology’ as a name for his 
way of doing philosophy, before conceding that this was ‘rather a mouthful.’ 
Ordinary language philosophy is the name that has stuck.  
Having refuted the idea that ordinary language philosophy is only about 
language, I turn to a second common criticism of this approach, namely that it 
reifies the ordinary. Critics have called Austin (and also, frequently, 
Wittgenstein) a conservative who clings to the language of dead times (see, for 
example, Gellner, 1959; Marcuse, 2007: ch. 7; Graham, 1977). However, this 
charge does not hold. The procedure of reasoning based on examples of ordinary 
language usage does not require that we treat language as never changing or 
never needing to be changed. As Austin (1962b: 63; see also Garvey, 2014: xii) 
himself argues: 
Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may 
not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, 
things should be left exactly as we find them; we may wish to tidy the 
situation up a bit, revise the map here and there, draw the boundaries and 
distinctions rather differently.  
Thus, the appeal to ordinary language is not a claim to the sanctity of everyday 
expression but to its utility as a starting point for dissolving philosophical 
confusions and avoiding metaphysical habits (such as the craving for generality 
and quests for crystalline purity in concepts). This appeal is a methodological 
directive to attend to what people do and say in context. As Cavell (1976d: 270) 
clarifies, using language typical of the time he was writing, ‘It [the “ordinary” in 
the phrase “ordinary language philosophy”] does not refer to particular words of 
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wide use, nor to particular sorts of men. It reminds us that whatever words are 
said and meant are said and meant by particular men.’ 
With this understanding of what ordinary language philosophy is not, let me now 
outline what it consists in methodologically. As noted, Austin was wary of 
offering prescriptions and did not cast his procedures as fixed methods or fully 
generalisable rules. Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is a methodological rule of 
thumb in ordinary language philosophy that one proceed from examples of what 
is ordinarily said in a context or situation. The focus is on finding ‘exemplary 
situations’ and on ‘attending to examples rather than to samples’ (Loxley, 2007: 
32). This approach contrasts with that of a descriptive linguist, who would likely 
collect and examine a representative corpus of words. This linguist might, for 
instance, sample some texts to consider the frequency with which ‘debt’ is used 
as well as where, in order to devise a rule for how a word is used. The result of 
this approach (which does not exhaust the array of methods in linguistics) would 
be the creation of a literal or denotative grammar.  
By contrast, the ordinary language philosopher will attend to ordinary language 
as a way to discover and understand the conditions of living with others in the 
world (Cavell, 2002: xix), such as the agentic responsibility for one’s words that 
is revealed in attending to the language of excuses. The ordinary language 
philosopher’s investigation of usage does not seek simply to describe usage 
(much less to prescribe it) but to see what this usage tells us about the conditions 
of human action. This approach involves what Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999, pt. 1: 
§ 90) calls ‘grammatical investigation’: investigation of the conditions of 
possibility for phenomena, including the shared forms of life in which our 
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diverse language-games are located. This idea of grammatical investigation is 
also implicit in Austin’s stated aim to use examples to ‘better understand the 
totality of the situation in which we find ourselves brought to use words’ (Austin, 
‘Discussion générale’, as cited and translated in Laugier, 2013: 64, my 
emphasis). As Fleming (2004: 80) observes, ‘[r]eminding ourselves about the 
conditions that make our present concerns possible is central to the method of 
philosophical inquiry that governs ordinary language philosophy.’  
Let me write more concretely to draw out how grammatical investigation works. 
To return to an example I introduced in the last chapter: the Oxford English 
Dictionary opens out conceptions of debt beyond ‘a sum of money or a material 
thing’ by noting usages including debts to divine Providence, debt as the 
mutuality of love, and debt as the mark of sin. The point of a grammatical 
reading is not to sample texts to see how many times ‘debt to Providence’ occurs, 
nor to describe what this concept and phrase means. Instead, someone 
undertaking a grammatical investigation would seek to understand how and why 
this conception of divine debt becomes available to us in a particular context and 
what pictures sustain it (for example, a picture of human agency as beholden to 
the wisdom of God).  
Similarly, by comparing and contrasting ordinary usages of ‘debt’, such as debt 
as the bond of love versus debt as a sum of money owed, we might uncover a 
hitherto unexamined assumption that has remained hidden because of its 
simplicity and familiarity, namely the idea that debt is a financial category rather 
than a more-than-economic one. Looking at usages that differ from the debt of 
financialised obligations might help to dissolve the problem of being unable to 
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see beyond the disciplinary powers of financial debts. In this grammatical 
investigation, then, ‘[t]he work of the philosopher consists in assembling 
reminders for a particular purpose’ (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. 1, § 127). By 
examining ordinary usages of ‘debt’, we are reminded of other forms of 
obligation, such as the relations of indebtedness enacted by the Guyanese vis-à-
vis Haiti (Shilliam, 2013), or those enounced by Woody Guthrie in relation to his 
fellow citizens in People I Owe (Aitken, 2008).  
One strategy for ‘assembling reminders’ is to use comparisons among examples, 
as my last paragraph on contrasting usages demonstrates. Recall that Austin 
(1970a: 182, my emphasis) advocates examining ordinary language because it 
‘embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the 
connexions they have found worth marking.’ When Austin marks connections 
and distinctions, he brings the object of his analysis into focus, so that his reader 
might appreciate this object in its specificity. As Cavell (1976e: 96) explains:  
The positive purpose in Austin’s distinctions resembles the art critic’s 
purpose in comparing and distinguishing works of art, namely, that in this 
crosslight the capacities and salience of an individual object…are brought 
to attention and focus.  
Drawing connections and distinctions provides a way of escaping the ‘craving 
for generality’ while still allowing for a sense of systematicity through 
comparison.  
Let me give an example of this methodological injunction to attend 
comparatively to distinctions and connections. In this thesis, each chapter of Part 
Two considers a key tactic of debt resistance (avoiding, auditing, or refusing 
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debt). In bringing these tactics together in one place, I seek to distinguish 
between the ethical and political implications of each tactic, while also showing 
their connections in terms of the emergence of a form of ordinary democratic 
subjectivity that I will conceptualise in the next chapter as ‘perfectionist’ in 
spirit. This simultaneous practice of differentiation and connection allows me to 
show that a new democratic subject of debt is emerging in the afterlives of the 
global financial crisis, without essentialising the resistances I examine by 
presuming to find one thing that unites them (a crystalline conceptual purity) or 
providing a generalised depiction of resistance (the craving for generality). This 
approach, which I described in Chapter One as that of looking for ‘family 
resemblances’, conveys the systematicity of emerging resistances without 
presuming that these resistances do, or should, take one hegemonic form (such as 
a counter-hegemonic movement).  
Moreover, Austin’s approach enables me to engage with the ethical and political 
implications of the fine differences within a given tactic of resistance. For when 
we are gripped by the craving for generality, we fail to perceive important 
differences within a family of practices. As John Gerring (2001: 69) argues, 
‘[t]he strength of ordinary language analysis has been in elucidating the 
complexity of terms, not in taming that complexity. Ordinary language analysis, 
as pioneered by John Austin and others, is an exercise in splitting, not lumping.’ 
Following this cue, in Chapter Four, for instance, I show that it matters whether 
debt avoidance is promoted as a way to produce financial capability or as a 
means to enact what I will call self-reliance. These two values might initially 
strike the reader as either indistinguishable or not worth distinguishing, and 
certainly there is no need to grasp the distinction at this stage. Nevertheless, just 
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as Austin’s differentiation of an accident from a mistake takes on its importance 
only when illuminated by examples, so I hope to show that differences within 
ordinary (debtor) agencies matter politically and ethically, by offering a 
‘perspicuous representation’ of these differences.  
In the Wittgensteinian terms that I introduced in the previous chapter, the success 
of this perspicuous representation is that we see things differently. When we 
attend to the connections and differences within a family of tactics of resistance 
or even within a particular tactic, complexity and ambiguity come to the fore. 
Resistance itself appears plural and more ambiguous. By encouraging attention 
to fine-grained differences, an ordinary language approach is in accord with the 
argument made by Foucauldian and poststructuralist IPE scholars that there is no 
one grand, unambiguous gesture of resistance or refusal (Amoore and Langley, 
2004; de Goede, 2005a, 2005b; Amoore, 2006; Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2008: ch. 
9). At the same time, by encouraging an examination of what I called in the last 
chapter the overlapping ‘fibres’ of resistance, such an approach can show how 
political resistances are substantive practices of civic freedom through which 
people strive to experience themselves as self-directing agents in financial and 
economic life. 
I am now in a position to summarise the broad methodological approach of 
ordinary language philosophy, based on my reading of Austin in this chapter and 
informed by the Wittgensteinian ideas that I used to frame Chapter One. 
Someone inspired by ordinary language philosophy will: 1) seek to dissolve 
problems or confusions created by hegemonic pictures, by 2) revealing ‘aspects’ 
of social reality to which we become blind due to their simplicity and familiarity. 
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She will do this by: 3) using examples of ordinary language usage understood in 
context, to 4) better understand the situations in which we are brought to use 
particular words, including by 5) attending to the distinctions and connections 
people make in language (and hence in life). Furthermore, someone inspired to 
do democratic things with ordinary language philosophy will, as I shall argue in 
the next section, use this approach with the aim of 6) redeeming an imperfect 
democratic situation from within by revealing and reactivating alternative 
possibilities for words and the practices and phenomena they convey.  
In this thesis, I seek to: 1) dissolve a hegemonic picture of the disciplinary power 
of debt, by 2) revealing the ordinary agency of debtors, as well as their use of the 
more-than-economic character of debt as a spur to democratic politics. I do so 
by: 3) developing examples of ordinary usage (such as ‘avoiding’, ‘auditing’, and 
‘refusing’ debt, as well as diverse usages of ‘debt’ itself), understood in cultural-
political-economic context, 4) to better understand the situations (both in IPE and 
in everyday political practice) that lead us to use particular forms of resistance to 
the exclusion of others. This includes: 5) considering the distinctions and 
connections between and among tactics of resistance, to show the systematicity 
of resistances to debt without depicting them in generalised, essentialist, or 
economistic terms. In essence, I seek to better understand the political-economic 
context (including the practices of governance) in which these people have been 
brought to use these particular words, as well as the practices of civic freedom 
such resistances enact. Finally, 6) I do so with the aim of exploring the extent to 
which debt-based financialised society, as an imperfect democracy, can be 
redeemed or substantively democratised from within. In so doing I do not try to 
provide a direct ‘application’ of ordinary language philosophy, as to do this 
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would run counter to Austin’s suspicion of any generalised or mechanistic 
applications of his ideas. Instead, I offer an inquiry into debt resistances that, 
inspired by ordinary language philosophy’s procedures, seeks ‘to tidy the 
situation up a bit, revise the map here and there, draw the boundaries and 
distinctions rather differently’ (Austin, 1962b: 63) with regards to the democratic 
potential of ordinary acts by everyday financial subjects.  
4. Reanimating ordinary words 
In this final section of the chapter, I move from Austin to his student Stanley 
Cavell. I also move from the broad procedures of ordinary language philosophy 
to the more specific strategies for reading words that Cavell develops in his 
work. Building on the methodological commitments of first-generation ordinary 
language philosophy, Cavell develops a practice of reading words that can be 
used to reanimate existing ethical and political vocabularies. Cavell’s ordinary 
language criticism combines Austin’s interest in the specificity of words with 
Wittgenstein’s concern to grasp the conditions of possibility for (or ‘criteria’) 
governing what we say. However, Cavell is also interested in the metaphorical 
dimensions of language, in contrast to Austin and Wittgenstein. He is particularly 
concerned, more than his first-generation teachers, ‘to reanimate our life with 
words’ (Mulhall, 1994: 176): to make evident alternative ways of doing things 
and relating to others. His practice of reading ‘assembles reminders’ with the 
purpose of bringing us back to the immanent possibilities of ordinary language 
and practice. For this reason, Stephen Mulhall calls Cavell’s practice that of 
‘redemptive reading’ (Mulhall, 1994: 185–95; see also Cavell, 1988: 51). 
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Cavell is particularly interested in reanimating our life with words by reading the 
‘multiple resonances’ of a word (Mahon, 2014: 71). Mulhall (1994: 171–7) has 
identified four ways of reading these resonances that make up a Cavellian form 
of ordinary language criticism, namely looking at the mythological, criterial, 
etymological, and atomic dimensions of a word. Only the first three strategies 
interest me here because the fourth (an ‘atomic’ way of reading, which involves 
breaking a word into its constituent parts or atoms) remains under-developed by 
Cavell, who only uses it in a short piece on Edgar Allan Poe (Cavell, 1994b). 
Cavell uses the other three strategies throughout his work. I outline them in detail 
because each of my substantive chapters puts one or more of these strategies to 
work. 
The first mode of reading, a mythological one, strays furthest from the ground 
covered by Austin and Wittgenstein. A mythological reading explores a word’s 
metaphorical or mythical dimensions. It involves offering a symbolic account of 
a word in order to show us the word under a certain aspect: to show how 
something usually strikes us, or an attitude we hold toward something in the 
world (Mulhall, 1994: 173). This mythology cannot be judged true or false; 
instead, it captures how we take something to be. It is an ‘apt, economical and 
potent manifestation of the way we relate to the constraints and emancipations of 
a convention’ (Mulhall, 1994: 173).  
This explanation is quite abstract, so let me introduce an example that I will 
develop later in the thesis. In Chapter Four, I show how a certain mythology of 
self-reliance informs the contemporary tactic of avoiding debt through debt-free 
living experiments. Cavell himself reads this mythology of self-reliance in Henry 
	 82 
David Thoreau’s (1995) Walden, a book that is, at the surface level, about an 
individual who withdraws from society. Cavell reads Thoreau’s account of self-
reliance in Walden in mythological terms, to show the impossibility of complete 
material and social independence (we cannot live without others, or without the 
dependencies and debts of existence) and the importance of ‘redeeming’ the 
concept of self-reliance to encourage individuals to become capable of critical, 
independent judgement of the societies in which they live. Extending Cavell’s 
account, I show in Chapter Four that while some debt-free living advice manuals 
teach self-reliance in the sense of a narrow liberal-individualist type of 
autonomy, others use experiments in living to teach the debtor to develop her 
political judgement and hence to engage in economic disobedience. By providing 
a myth that pushes the idea of the liberal, autonomous individual to the extreme, 
Cavell, via Thoreau, allows the conventions of self-reliance to appear under 
another aspect, as a necessary precursor to democratic engagement with the 
world. 
While this mythological strategy of reading strays far from Austin and 
Wittgenstein, a criterial reading, by contrast, cleaves very closely to the ordinary 
language philosophy procedure of asking when and how we would ordinarily use 
a word. This criterial mode of reading combines Wittgenstein’s interest in 
criteria (which refer to the conditions of possibility of word usage), on the one 
hand, with Austin’s question of ‘what we would say when’, on the other hand. 
By asking this question, we can reveal and recount the implicit criteria 
underpinning an ordinary usage. Take, for example, the criteria for using the 
word ‘audit’, which is the tactic of resistance I examine in Chapter Five. 
Thinking about how and when we might use the word ‘audit’ in ordinary 
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conversation, we might recall, for instance, that it is possible to ‘audit’ a module 
at a university. Thinking further about the criteria for this particular usage, we 
might then be reminded of the connection of auditing to listening. Auditing a 
module involves listening to others, including the lecturer and other students 
participating in the module. Listening to others is therefore a necessary 
commitment or entailment (a criterion) of this form of auditing. In turn, listening 
to others usually involves responsiveness; hence, listening and responsiveness 
might be said to be criterial of this everyday usage of auditing. In Chapter Five, I 
show how this criterial reading of ‘audit’ opens up, in the work of Debt 
Resistance UK, a humanistic counterpoint to technical financial auditing, turning 
a formalistic exercise in transparency into an exchange characterised by 
democratic responsiveness.  
The final strategy of reading, an etymological one, is the most straightforward. 
This strategy involves examining the ‘historical vicissitudes’ of a word in order 
to think about how the word could be projected differently (Mulhall, 1994: 174). 
Here, Cavell shares Austin’s interest in the fact that ‘no word ever achieves 
entire forgetfulness of its origins’ (Austin, 1970b: 283). Words come to us, 
Austin notes evocatively, ‘[t]railing clouds of etymology’ (Austin, 1970a: 201, 
original emphasis omitted; see also Mulhall, 1994: 175). Take the language of 
excuses: ‘In an accident something befalls: by mistake you take the wrong one: 
in an error you stray’ (Austin, 1970a: 201–2, emphasis in original). In Chapter 
Six, I deploy this strategy in drawing attention to the trailing etymologies of 
‘refusal’. Exploring the etymology of ‘refusing’ reveals that the word derives 
from ‘refunding’, which is in turn linked to ‘refounding’. With this etymology in 
mind, the act of refusing a claim (such as the claim that it is always necessart to 
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repay a debt) is not necessarily simply an act of negation or destruction but can 
also appear as one of refounding. As I show in relation to Strike Debt, the tactic 
of debt refusal can be used as a democratic stance through which people attempt 
to reconstitute and refound financialised society from within, rather than as a 
mere act of negation. 
These three strategies of reading can redeem and reclaim existing terms and 
practices from within. They can also help to reconstruct existing subjectivities. 
As Mulhall (1994: 177, my emphasis) describes it, reading a word redemptively 
involves:  
acknowledging that this word has activated for us a hitherto unknown 
aspect of our own (actual and potential) responsibilities and commitments 
as a speaker of the language to which the word belongs—revealed and 
revivified an aspect of our lives as speakers, and so of ourselves.  
Looking at the mythological, criterial, and etymological resonances of a word 
can remind us of some dimension of ordinary language (and hence of ordinary 
action and agency) that we have forgotten; it helps to ‘assemble reminders’. 
What unites Cavell’s strategies of reading is that they show how little acquainted 
we are with the words that we ordinarily use. In Mulhall’s (1994: 176) words, 
such strategies reveal ‘the degree to which what our words mean, and what we 
may thereby be held responsible for meaning by them, can run beyond our initial 
knowledge (although not beyond our eventual comprehension).’ This practice of 
reading also requires us to acknowledge the relative autonomy of words: the fact 
we cannot use words in any which way because they come to us with histories of 
usage; they have histories of usage that we inherit (Mulhall, 1994: 176). Cavell’s 
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strategies of reading thus chime well with Austin’s and Arendt’s emphasis on the 
complex ethical commitments and responsibilities of being with others in 
language. 
It is my contention, one that I will substantiate via my studies of debt avoidance, 
auditing, and refusal in Part Two of the thesis, that Cavell’s practice of reading 
can inspire democratic reinvention and renewal. A redemptive reading is one 
way in which people strive to rebuild the imperfect democracy of a financialised 
society built on debt; it is a practice whereby individuals and groups develop 
what I will introduce in the next chapter as ‘perfectionist’ democratic 
subjectivity. So although this Cavellian ordinary language criticism may seem 
both abstract and schematic in advance of its exemplification in Part Two of the 
thesis, I have introduced it here to highlight its critical purpose of reanimation, as 
well as its lineage in first-generation ordinary language philosophy’s procedures.  
Finally, and in summation, Cavell’s ordinary language criticism provides a way 
for us to educate ourselves on the possibilities and alternatives for action 
immanent in ordinary language, which can allow us to perform our ordinary 
obligations differently. Cavell’s ordinary language criticism therefore runs in 
parallel to the emerging ordinary image of debt politics that I sketched in Chapter 
One, which emphasises ordinary education (in counterpoint to top-down 
everyday financial literacies), ordinary performance (in counterpoint to the 
governing effects of everyday financial performativities), and ordinary 
obligation (in counterpoint to constraining everyday financial moral economies). 
To extend these new directions in IPE, it is helpful to return to the broad project 
of Austinian ordinary language philosophy as it exists beyond the concept of 
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performativity, in order to open out unused resources in both Austin’s oeuvre and 
the work of Stanley Cavell. Such has been my goal in this chapter.  
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has acted as a bridge between IPE work on the everyday politics of 
debt, which I discussed in Chapter One, and Cavell’s second-generation ordinary 
language philosophy, which will be my focus in Chapter Three. The building 
blocks of this bridge are to be found in Austinian ordinary language philosophy. 
I have argued that Austin’s broader project provides methodological resources 
with which to fill in the ordinary image of debt politics implicit within IPE. This 
return to Austinian ordinary language philosophy involves examining ordinary 
ethics, understanding the conditions of ordinary action, scrutinising ordinary 
language usage, and reanimating ordinary words through a practice of 
redemptive reading. 
To substantiate this argument, I began by introducing ordinary ethics as a key but 
neglected part of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy. Combined with an 
Arendtian account of action, an Austinian reading of ordinary ethics suggests: 1) 
that the everyday things we do in and through language have ethical import; 2) 
that the illocutionary force of language means we cannot help but mean what we 
say; 3) that in meaning what we say, in being bound by our words, we must 
grapple with ethical and political questions relating to the consequences and 
effects of our actions, such as those of when to keep or break promises and when 
to forgive others; and 4) that promising and forgiving, as simultaneously 
ordinary and extraordinary acts, are constitutive remedies in a human world 
marked by the uncertainty, irreversibility, and co-authored character of action. 
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This understanding of ordinary ethics takes us away from the moralised readings 
of finance, debt and credit so ably analysed by the everyday moral economies 
literature in IPE and toward contextualised studies of ordinary agency. 
Next, I outlined Austin’s broad methodological tenets. Austin develops examples 
of ordinary language usage to draw out distinctions and connections that allow us 
to better understand the situations in which particular people find themselves 
brought to use particular words. Ordinary language philosophy thus has a 
phenomenological dimension that transcends a focus on words in themselves, 
while also emphasising contextual studies in place of abstraction and excessive 
generalisation. Consequently, it cannot be said that ordinary language philosophy 
is just about language. Nor is ordinary language philosophy a conservative 
approach that seeks to leave language and the world as they are. Austin holds 
that boundaries will need to be redrawn and changes made.  
Indeed, ordinary language philosophy, particularly in its Cavellian guise, offers a 
redemptive practice of reading: a way to redeem everyday concepts and practices 
by examining the multiple resonances of words. Specifically, Cavell’s practice of 
reading emphasises the mythological, criterial, and etymological dimensions of 
words. These three strategies of reading recall to us the hitherto unacknowledged 
aspects of our responsibilities and commitments as speakers. These strategies can 
revivify our ethical and political vocabularies, and, with these vocabularies, 
ourselves as speakers who live inter-est, among others. While I have presented 
these strategies of reading in the abstract in the present chapter, I put them to use 
in Part Two of the thesis, alongside a set of concepts developed from Cavell’s 
work. 
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In the next chapter, I delve further into Cavell’s distinctive ordinary language 
philosophy in order to build a substantive conceptual framework within which to 
examine debt resistances. Just as Cavell proposes a novel reading of the 
methodology of ordinary language philosophy, so he offers a unique conception 
of how we do democratic things with words and hence of how democratic 
subjectivity develops. In moving from methodology to the substantive 
conceptual content of Cavell’s arguments, I prepare the ground for Chapters 
Four, Five, and Six, each of which is anchored by one of the concepts I introduce 
in the next chapter. Specifically, I set out three Cavellian concepts that I argue 
can be understood as forming a perfectionist ‘grammar’ of democratic 
personhood or subjectivity. Not only is it possible to do agency with ordinary 
language philosophy, as I have shown in this chapter, it is also important to 
understand how this agency forms democratic subjects. Such is my goal in 
Chapter Three. 
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 Chapter Three: Stanley Cavell and Ordinary Democratic Subjectivity 
 
If there is a perfectionism not only compatible with democracy but 
necessary to it, it lies not in excusing democracy for its inevitable 
failures, or looking to rise above them, but in teaching how to respond to 
those failures…otherwise than by excuse or withdrawal. 
– Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The 
Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (1990) 
 
In this chapter, I develop a conceptual framework for understanding ordinary 
democratic subjectivity drawn from Stanley Cavell’s ordinary language 
philosophy. I develop this framework so that I can show, in the substantive 
chapters to follow, how people seek to rebuild the imperfect democracy of 
financialised society from within by resisting debt. Here, I argue that Cavell’s 
body of work yields three concepts that help us to understand how people 
become ordinary democratic subjects: by acting as an ordinary exemplar of non-
conformity (and hence developing democratic individuality), by issuing a 
passionate utterance that calls on others to change (engaging democratic 
intersubjectivity), and by making a claim to community that treats commonality 
as a contestable claim (thereby forming democratic community). These concepts 
correspond to the grammatical persons ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we’ respectively, which is 
why I suggest they form a perfectionist ‘grammar’ of democratic personhood or 
subjectivity. 
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Given the unfamiliarity of Cavell’s thinking to IPE scholars, my aim in this 
chapter is to outline the substance of a Cavellian conceptual framework. I take up 
the task of exemplifying this approach and its utility for understanding debt 
resistances in Part Two of the thesis. I introduce Cavell’s concepts in the context 
of his broader body of work because it would be difficult for the reader to grasp 
the specific Cavellian arguments that I make about debt resistances in Part Two 
without understanding the broader theoretical vista of Cavell’s work. The flipside 
of my decision to provide a detailed map of Cavell’s thinking here is that the 
reader need not retain the detail of all the Cavellian ideas that I present in this 
chapter, as I will return to my three chosen concepts in the triptych of chapters to 
follow.  
These three concepts are developed chronologically across Cavell’s career, and 
my discussion follows this chronology. The remainder of the chapter is divided 
into four sections. The first three sections cover the chosen Cavellian concepts, 
while the fourth brings these concepts together into a democratic grammar. In 
section one, I introduce the idea of the ‘claim to community’, which emerges 
from Cavell’s early readings of Austin and Wittgenstein. Cavell argues that the 
ordinary language philosopher’s procedure of asking ‘what we say when’ 
constitutes a contestable claim about ‘us’ that he calls the ‘claim to community’. 
Making a claim about ‘our’ use of language creates a form of dialogue about the 
form and basis of our lives together. Treating community as a claim provides a 
non-essentialist way of understanding the ordinary democratic ‘we’. 
In section two, I discuss Cavell’s concept of the ‘ordinary exemplar’. Cavell 
develops this idea in his mid-career work on the American Transcendentalists 
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Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. The Transcendentalists are 
essentially concerned with how individuals can develop a sense of moral 
autonomy and independence from inherited societal ideals and values for the 
purpose of social critique. Emerson and Thoreau emphasise a practice of 
reflexive engagement with one’s acquired selfhood. This process usually 
involves an exemplary figure, the ‘ordinary exemplar’, with whom one engages 
in an open-ended ethical and political conversation. Cavell develops from 
Transcendentalist thought what he calls Emersonian or moral perfectionism, an 
ethical and political disposition toward self-transformation that allows people to 
come to stand as examples for each other. 
In section three, I introduce an important register in which perfectionist 
conversation takes place, namely that of the ‘passionate utterance’. Cavell 
develops this concept late in his career as an extension of Austin’s notion of the 
performative utterance. Although a devoted follower of Austin, Cavell finds that 
Austin neglects the perlocutionary dimension of speech in favour of accounting 
for language’s illocutionary or performative force. Cavell is concerned that 
Austin underplays the unconventional and passionate dimensions of speech, as 
well as speech’s perfectionist potential. He rectifies this oversight by accounting 
for the way in which people use emotional and passionate speech to establish 
moral and political relationships with others. Cavell thus proposes a two-fold 
understanding of speech’s quality as action as being both passionate and 
performative. 
Finally, in section four I draw my three Cavellian concepts together into what I 
call a ‘grammar’ of democratic personhood or subjectivity. I suggest that 
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together these three concept provide a way to visualise how democratic 
subjectivity is developed as people learn to speak in the name of a democratic ‘I’, 
‘you’, and ‘we.’ 
1. Cavell’s claim to community 
In this first section, I introduce Cavell’s concept of the ‘claim to community’ as a 
model of democratic collectivity and show how this concept emerges from 
Cavell’s engagements with Austin and Wittgenstein, as well as his enduring 
interest in philosophical scepticism. This discussion provides the basis for my 
exploration, in Chapter Six, of how the activist group Strike Debt has gone about 
creating a form of indebted community that challenges the received form of 
belonging characteristic of debt-based economic citizenship. I start here from the 
claim to community because it provides an entry point into Cavell’s earliest 
work. I begin by introducing Cavell’s work and influences. 
For over 40 years, the work of Stanley Cavell has occupied the position of a 
bridge between Anglo-American and Continental traditions of philosophy. As I 
outlined in Chapter Two, Cavell is deeply influenced by the ordinary language 
philosophy of J. L. Austin and the later Wittgenstein. He also works with the 
ideas of Heidegger and Nietzsche, as well as those of the American 
Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau. By delving into what he portrays as 
the unexpected resonances and rhyming of themes and concepts across these 
diverse thinkers, Cavell seeks to undo the mutual shunning of Anglo-American 
and Continental approaches, as well as to unsettle habitual distinctions between 
philosophy, literature, and popular culture (Cavell, 2005a: 215, 1992: xiv). 
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Cavell’s broad method, if his approach can be formulated in these terms, is to 
develop a theme or concept from a mundane moment in a philosophical text, 
film, or play. Over time, Cavell compulsively returns to, questions, and revises 
his arguments and concepts. As a result of this perfectionist practice of reading, 
there is no one place from which to gather a definition of Cavell’s concepts or a 
précis of his arguments. Instead, these ideas evolve through a process of 
accretion, as Cavell pursues conversation with his favoured thinkers and cultural 
and philosophical texts. This makes the process of developing an exegetical 
account of Cavellian concepts a significant labour in itself, especially given 
Cavell published seventeen books and many articles over the course of his forty-
year career. 
Cavell (1976a, [1979] 1999) dedicated his earliest work to clarifying and 
defending the ordinary language procedures of Austin and Wittgenstein. As I 
outlined in Chapter Two, Austin proceeds by giving a series of fine-grained 
examples of ‘what we say when’ to develop contextualised ethical knowledge. 
As I also argued there, Austin’s examples are not mere linguistic curiosities; they 
are microcosms of ethics, designed to tell us something about human action. As 
James Conant (2011: 1008) puts it, ‘[e]ach one is, in its own way, a little 
morality play’. Recall that Austin uses these miniature plays to pull out both our 
necessary responsibility for the pragmatic effects of our utterances and the 
variety of ways in which we assume, modify, mitigate, or negate that 
responsibility (Austin, 1970; Cavell, 1976b: 12). To put a Cavellian gloss on it, 
Austin’s ordinary language philosophy helps us to become morally intelligible to 
ourselves and others: it produces a form of ethical self-knowledge (Mulhall, 
1994: 279). 
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Many critics have missed both the ethical and critical orientation of ordinary 
language philosophy and have instead presumed that this type of philosophy is 
an empirical endeavour. As a result, Austinian ordinary language philosophy was 
soon attacked by Austin’s contemporaries for its apparent empirical inadequacy, 
with critics charging that ordinary language philosophy lacked rigour and yielded 
trivial knowledge. Cavell emerged as an early defender of Austin’s procedures, 
which he first encountered when in 1955 Austin visited Harvard, where Cavell 
was studying, to deliver the series of lectures that would eventually be published 
as How to Do Things with Words (Austin, 1962). Writing in defence of Austin, 
Cavell (1976a) uses his early work to respond to criticisms of ordinary language 
philosophy mounted by the logician Benson Mates. There are a number of parts 
to Mates’s (1958) criticism, but two are particularly salient. First, Mates asserts 
that ordinary language philosophers lack reliable evidence and would be better 
served by drawing on a sizeable linguistic corpus to support their claims. Second, 
he argues that there is no clear case for why philosophers should be interested in 
being constrained by what we ordinarily say. 
Mates bases his first assertion on the fact that some of Austin’s claims about 
‘what we say when’ conflict with those of Gilbert Ryle, a practitioner of the 
same methodology. This clash proves, for Mates, the lack of validity of the 
ordinary language method. Mates traces these inconsistencies to what he sees as 
the ordinary language philosophers’ conflation of the first-person singular ‘I’ 
with the first-person plural ‘we’. In essence, Mates believes that ordinary 
language philosophers lack sufficient evidence to verify their claims because 
these claims consist in articulating what the philosophers themselves would say 
in a given circumstance, as a basis for what ‘we’ say. That is, ordinary language 
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philosophers fail to go out into the world to collect a sample of usages, instead 
falling back on a subjective ‘I’.  
Cavell responds by arguing that the philosopher of ordinary language, as a native 
speaker of the language, is perfectly entitled to draw on her own knowledge to 
determine what we would likely say in a particular situation. ‘Such speakers,’ 
Cavell (1976b: 4, emphasis in original) suggests, ‘do not, in general, need 
evidence for what is said in the language; they are the source of such evidence.’ 
As Mulhall (1994: 9–10, my emphasis) explains, ‘when a native speaker tells her 
interlocutor what is said when, her authority is, in the last instance, herself; she 
offers her practice, her personal responses, as an example or paradigm.’  
This exemplary dimension of ordinary language philosophy, whereby Austin and 
Wittgenstein dare to speak for ‘us’, means that the ordinary language 
philosopher’s method parallels a form of representative political speech: it 
involves a claim to community (Cavell, [1979] 1999). The ordinary language 
philosopher’s reasoning over what we say when functions, then, not as an 
empirical claim but as a contestable claim about ‘us’. As Cavell (1999: 20) 
elaborates in a famous passage:  
The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria 
on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And 
the claim to community is always a search for the basis upon which it can 
[be] or has been established.  
By framing the appeal to ‘what we say when’ as a claim and a search, Cavell 
proposes an understanding of community as vulnerable and fragile. Sometimes 
the ordinary language philosopher’s claim to articulate what ‘we’ say will not be 
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accepted by her interlocutor: her examples are not beyond criticism and dispute 
(as the disagreement between Ryle and Austin demonstrates). Indeed, in the 
process of projecting examples, ‘I may find out that the most common concept is 
not used by us in the same way’ (Cavell, 1976c: 67), in which case I will have 
learned something about both myself and ‘us’. In Cavell’s reading, this 
orientation to both community and its contestability is an essential, rather than an 
incidental, aspect of the ordinary language philosopher’s procedure. The 
examples that ordinary language philosophers use are designed to sound out what 
Wittgenstein (1969: 24–5) terms the ‘criteria’ or acquired rules for usage that 
inform our lives together, and thus to bring out the existence of community (if 
we agree) or its lack (if we disagree).  
Given this emphasis on both community and criticism, ordinary language 
philosophy entails neither a lapse into private self-analysis (where the 
philosopher is talking only about what she would say), nor a complacent claim to 
representativeness (where she assumes everyone necessarily does what she 
does). Instead, the ordinary language philosopher focuses our attention on the 
(contested) relation between the ‘I’ making a claim and the ‘we’ invoked in 
‘what we say when’. To make a claim about ‘our’ use of language is to engage in 
dialogue about the form and basis of our lives together. It is, as Andrew Norris 
(2006: 3) adds in emphasis to Cavell’s formulation, to search for the basis upon 
which community is or can be established. This search is democratic in that an 
individual requires no special capacity or knowledge to be part of it. We each 
have the ability to project examples and to tease out the ‘criteria’ behind what we 
say and do. By recounting these criteria, we begin to see the implicit ‘grammar’ 
that makes up our form of life together. 
	 97 
Here Cavell brings the later Wittgenstein’s vocabulary into dialogue with 
Austin’s ideas. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, 
§90, emphasis in original) describes his inquiry as ‘directed not towards 
phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the “possibilities” of phenomena’, or 
their grammar. Importantly, a Wittgensteinian ‘grammar’ is not premised on the 
idea that there are iron-clad, codified rules that govern the correctness of our 
speech. Instead, the picture of language being proposed is one in which words 
have ‘a history of use that endows them with powers or potentialities that 
constrain their future use, but do not foreclose more or less creative “projections” 
of them into new contexts’ (Baz, 2012: 3, n. 2). Grammatical investigation 
acknowledges that the criteria for usage that we assume govern use in fact 
emerge from that use: our utterances form the basis for constructing 
conventional, codified grammatical rules, rather than being based on any such 
rules (Mulhall, 1994: 9). To put this slightly differently: as the speaker of a 
language, one inherits ‘socially given’ criteria for usage (Laugier, 2006: 31), 
while also being called upon to accept or reinvent these criteria.  
By conjoining Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation to Austin’s procedure of 
reasoning based on examples, Cavell turns ordinary language philosophy into a 
way of interrogating community. According to Cavell’s reading, when we 
engage in conversation over examples of ‘what we say when’, we are recalling 
and recounting the criteria underpinning what we do, and hence making the 
‘grammar’ of our lives together evident. We open up the terms of actually 
existing community to inspection and debate. The terms of community are both 
given (we inherit them from others) and fragile (they are based on nothing more 
than our willingness to keep using them, on the continued existence of a shared 
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form of life). Cavell underlines both the naturalness and the contingency of 
community in an important passage from his early work: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, 
and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. 
Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the 
grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing 
insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on 
the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, 
modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of 
fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a 
rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an 
appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein 
calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and community, 
rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple 
as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying. 
(Cavell, 1976c: 52) 
This concept of the claim to community is in turn linked to Cavell’s concern with 
what he calls scepticism. The idea of scepticism will not figure prominently in 
my discussions in the chapters to follow, but it is important to understand this 
notion because it underwrites Cavell’s conception of community, as well as his 
particular understanding of injustice. In philosophy, scepticism is most 
commonly thought of as the problem of how I can know I exist, or how I can be 
certain of the existence of objects. However, Cavell is most interested in ‘other-
minds’ scepticism, or scepticism regarding the existence of others. In its 
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philosophical guise, other-minds scepticism is a desire for our relations with 
others to be rooted in the certainty of knowledge, in something beyond (ordinary) 
language, which, as we have seen, has no way of guaranteeing our continued 
mutual understanding. This desire for certainty is necessarily frustrated by the 
limits to knowledge entailed in the fact that humans are separate, finite beings 
(the limits Arendt also grasped). The sceptic, in his investigations of knowledge, 
encounters a certain truth, namely that we are each limited and separate, but he 
turns away from this truth through ‘the conversion of metaphysical finitude into 
intellectual lack’ (Cavell, 1999: 493). He turns the reaching of an ethical limit 
(the question of whether we will reach across the boundaries of the self to 
acknowledge others) into an abstract epistemological one (the question of 
whether we can know the other exists) (Cavell, 1999: 493). The sceptic turns our 
relations with others into a problem of knowledge rather than one of 
acknowledgement.  
For Cavell, the uncertainty of the claim to community, and hence the necessary 
fragility of our language (and of the communal life that we establish through it), 
leaves us open to scepticism. When we grasp that our language and community 
are rooted in nothing more, but also nothing less, than the sharing of a form of 
life and inherited criteria for usage, our belief in the usefulness of our ordinary 
words and our relations with others are opened up to sceptical doubt. The 
‘terrifying’ moment at which one realises the fragility of community, and hence 
the possibility that we will find ourselves ‘unable to make sense of one another’ 
(Norris, 2006: 6), highlights the threat of a breakdown in our attunement to each 
other, and the possibility that we will fail to acknowledge others’ claims. For 
Cavell, this scepticism plays out in everyday life, as people fail to acknowledge 
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others but also to acknowledge how the self is formed within what Arendt (1958: 
183) calls the ‘“web” of human relationships’. 
It follows from Cavell’s rather complex reading of scepticism that an alternative 
response to scepticism in our relations with others lies in what Cavell calls 
practices of acknowledgement. Using the ordinary language procedure of asking 
when and how we would use the verb ‘to know’, Cavell makes a discovery about 
our ordinary concept of knowledge. While the sceptic asserts that I can never 
really ‘know’ that someone is in pain (because I do not share this other’s mind), 
Cavell notes that this is not how we would ordinarily use the concept of 
knowledge. We often use the phrase ‘I know’ not to express certainty about 
another, but to acknowledge something about her (Cavell, 1976d). For example, I 
might say ‘I know he is in pain’ not as an expression of certainty but as an 
acknowledgement of another’s pain. Cavell shows that, in ordinary usage, 
‘knowing’ is as much a practice of acknowledging something as it is one of 
obtaining certainty and proof. If the philosophical sceptic generalises not 
knowing into a permanent, epistemological doubt about his existence and the 
existence of objects and other minds (in short, as a failure of knowledge), he does 
so at the expense of an appreciation of the everyday failures of 
acknowledgement. 
By using a textbook ordinary language philosophy procedure to work through 
ordinary usages of ‘knowing’, Cavell offers a diagnosis of injustice rooted in the 
way we approach what Arendt (1958) would describe as the human condition of 
finitude and separateness. Scepticism, Cavell shows, is not something to be 
overcome but something that each of us lives in daily life: it is a response to the 
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fact that we are finite beings. Crucially, Cavell argues that we decide how to live 
our scepticism, whether by turning the necessary limits to our knowledge of 
others into an acknowledgement or an avoidance of them. Passing someone who 
is homeless and asking me for money, I can avoid looking at this person and 
offering them comfort, by saying to myself that I do not know the person’s 
circumstances and hence whether this person is the author of their own 
misfortune. Alternatively, I can acknowledge that, for whatever reason, this 
person in front of me is, in some way, in pain. As Cavell (1976d: 263, emphasis 
in original) explains:  
your suffering makes a claim upon me. It is not enough that I know (am 
certain) that you suffer—I must do or reveal something (whatever can be 
done). In a word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what 
“(your or his) being in pain” means. Is. 
Hence, failures of acknowledgement are more serious than failures of 
knowledge: ‘A “failure to know” might just mean a piece of ignorance, an 
absence of something, a blank. A “failure to acknowledge” is the presence of 
something, a confusion, an indifference, a callousness, an exhaustion, a coldness’ 
(Cavell, 1976d: 264).  
Failures of acknowledgement are often, at root, simultaneously failures to 
acknowledge something about oneself, namely one’s common finitude and 
vulnerability with others (Markell, 2003: 35–8), or what Arendt (1958) presents 
as our non-sovereign human condition. A failure to acknowledge the limits to the 
self allows one to act as though such limits do not apply; it allows one to adopt ‘a 
posture of mastery and invulnerability in the face of the future’ and hence to fail 
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to acknowledge the effects of one’s actions on others (Markell, 2003: 36). 
Failures of acknowledgement, in setting up this lack of connection of the self to 
others, thus make it easier for people to entertain and sustain inequality and 
unjust social and economic structures. 
 With Cavell’s ideas of the claim to community and an ethics of 
acknowledgement, we have come a long way from Austin’s initial procedure of 
asking ‘what we say when’. However, Cavell’s contribution to ordinary language 
philosophy flows from precisely this procedure, which he combines with 
Wittgenstein’s conception of criteria and grammar and Cavell’s own distinctive 
reading of scepticism. By creating an original synthesis of elements from 
Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s work, Cavell amplifies the ethical dimensions of 
ordinary language philosophy. In Cavell’s hands, ordinary language philosophy 
becomes a way of engaging with scepticism (and failures of acknowledgement), 
as we recount and test the criteria governing our language and lives together and 
make claims to community. Cavell shows how an ordinary language 
methodology can be used to draw out the existence of community and our basic 
attunement to others, where the sceptic doubts these. Nevertheless, Cavell is also 
more than aware of the limits to community, as these are expressed in everyday 
failures to acknowledge others, and in the necessity for individuals to question 
the parameters or criteria of community that they inherit. 
2. Cavell’s ordinary exemplar 
If sceptical failures of acknowledgement involve the subject turning away from 
others, then the ethical disposition Cavell calls ‘moral perfectionism’ provides a 
route back to ethical interpersonal relations, based on attraction to an exemplary 
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other (Rhu, 2006: 88). Cavell (1990, 1995, 2003) develops his account of moral 
perfectionism most fully in his mid-career work on Emerson to account for how 
someone’s ordinary example can become exemplary, through work on the self 
and conversation with others. In this section, I examine the ‘ordinary exemplar’ 
as Cavell’s model of selfhood. I argue that the ordinary exemplar provides a 
model of the democratic subject who successfully navigates the twin perils 
entailed in the ‘claim to community’: on the one hand, the risk that the individual 
will slip into social conformity (an unquestioning adoption of the societal criteria 
inherited from others); on the other hand, the risk that she will give in to 
scepticism (a blindness to relations with others and the criteria that bind us 
together, a blindness that blocks community through failures of 
acknowledgement). The ordinary exemplar is a model of democratic 
individuality. By introducing the concept of the ‘ordinary exemplar’ and 
explaining how it is linked to the broader theme of moral perfectionism in 
Cavell’s work, I pave the way for a discussion, in Chapter Four, of how people 
who avoid debt can exemplify for others the development of independent, critical 
thinking about debt-based economic citizenship.  
Moral perfectionism is the ethical disposition that Cavell puts at the heart of his 
work. It is worth noting that perfectionism is not a formal moral theory, like 
Utilitarianism or Kantianism, that seeks to specify the grounds for making moral 
judgements. For this reason, Cavell provides no definitive statement of its 
principles, and no exhaustive list of its characteristics. Instead he prefers to 
outline what he calls ‘an open-ended thematics…of perfectionism’ (Cavell, 
1990: 4). Cavell develops this thematics across readings of political and cultural 
texts ranging from Hollywood comedic films to the works of canonical thinkers 
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such as Plato, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Emerson, and Thoreau, among many others. 
The question that perfectionism addresses is not how I judge or decide what is 
best, good, right, or virtuous, but how I come to want ethical and political change 
to begin with: how I come to a position whereby I desire a transformation of 
myself and my society. Perfectionism further concerns how I can achieve this 
change and show others, in a non-moralising way, that things might be different, 
while leaving it open to these others to decide whether or not to acknowledge 
and adopt my example. Moral perfectionism thus involves the development of an 
exemplary self who can become representative for others (echoing Cavell’s 
interest in how Austin and Wittgenstein make representative claims in outlining 
‘what we say when’).  
As a process of ethical self-formation, moral perfectionism encompasses a series 
of questions and practices that sit below the level of making explicit moral 
claims. These questions and practices include: the question of the extent to which 
I, as an individual, am prepared to live a life of social conformity (to accept, 
without thinking, inherited criteria), or conversely to query social understandings 
of necessity (Cavell, 1990, 1992, 2003, 2004); the ways in which I acknowledge 
others or avoid such acknowledgement in my everyday actions, inactions, and 
interactions (Cavell, 1976d, 1976e, 1999: ch. 8); and the extent to which my 
intuitions and discoveries about ethical and political life can become 
representative for another, including by challenging that other and allowing 
myself to be challenged by her (Cavell, 1990: ch. 1). It follows from this set of 
questions that perfectionism is intimately concerned with ethical and political 
selfhood.  
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Cavell finds the resources for a perfectionist account of the development of 
ethical selfhood not in Austin and Wittgenstein but in the nineteenth-century 
writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau (Cavell, 1990, 
1992, 1995, 2003). Cavell is drawn to Emerson and Thoreau because of what he 
sees as their incessant concern with the subject’s capacity for autonomous moral 
action and their exploration of the relation of the self to others in a democracy. 
He also finds that Emerson and Thoreau prefigure certain dimensions of ordinary 
language philosophy. The interest of these authors in the common, the low, and 
the everyday aligns them with the ordinary language philosopher who insists on 
attending to ordinary usage. However, in contrast to first-generation ordinary 
language philosophy as a series of claims to community, Emerson and Thoreau 
offer an account of how one might use ordinary examples as a means of working 
on the self, which is in turn a precondition for reworking communal relations. 
For Cavell (1990: 31), Emerson and Thoreau offer a vision of what we might call 
the ‘ordinary exemplar’, or the subject who can ‘manifest for the other another 
way’. 
Cavell builds his idea of the exemplar, and of moral perfectionism more 
generally, around Emerson’s conception of the self as doubled. Emerson treats 
the self as doubled: as ‘always having been attained’ and ‘always having to be 
attained’ (Cavell, 1990: xxi), a self split between conformity and settlement, on 
the one hand, and curiosity and restlessness, on the other hand. The Emersonian 
self is premised on what Cavell (1990: xxxvi) calls ‘the doubleness of human 
habitation’. The Transcendentalists present the doubled self in the figures of the 
internal neighbour and spectator (Cavell, 1992), who holds out to the attained 
self the promise of building a further and better self.  
	 106 
This idea of a doubled, perfectionist self is not premised on an essentialist or 
perfectly reflexive self. Indeed, Cavell (1990: xxviii, xxxiv), drawing on 
Emerson, warns against adopting what he calls the ‘metaphysical’ idea of seeing 
the self as either perfectly transparent and intelligible, or as fixed and true. For 
Cavell (1990: xxxiv), the idea of a fixed, true self ‘seems rather something 
imposed from outside oneself, as from another who has a use for oneself on 
condition that one is beyond desire, beyond change.’ The idea of a self beyond 
change is a self in the state of conformity that leaves Emerson so indignant, a 
state that ‘press[es] upon us an empty voice’ (Cavell, 1990: xxxvii), the voice 
that coaxes us into conformity to socially given criteria. 
When the ordinary exemplar finds herself pressed into the service of these 
criteria, she seeks to turn away from her ‘attained’ self in pursuit of a next or 
further self. Emerson calls this turning away ‘aversion’ to conformity. Lawrence 
Rhu (2006: 1–2) explains Cavell’s adoption of this idea as follows:  
such a turning suggests to Cavell an experience quite different from 
simply willful avoidance. “Aversive thinking”, as Cavell characterizes 
this Emersonian response…calls up the idea of conversion. It entails 
nothing less than the transformation of the self. 
In contrast to liberal individualist understandings of ethics, perfectionist 
transformation of the self is not work that can be done entirely alone. This work 
requires an exemplar, whether embodied in another person, or given form 
through internal dialogue with one’s further self. Exemplary encounters need not 
be face-to-face: conversation with an ordinary exemplar can take place in an 
imaginative process, as when writing and reading become a conversation 
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between an author and her reader. Thus, while moral perfectionism’s emphasis 
on the self might seem to leave little room for intersubjective exchange, others in 
fact play an important role in perfectionist self-development. This other is, for 
Cavell (1990: xxxii), ‘the friend, the figure, let us say, whose conviction in one’s 
moral intelligibility draws one to discover it, to find words and deeds with which 
to express it, in which to enter the conversation of justice.’ 
The aesthetic dimension of exemplarity is important to Cavell (1990: xxviii), 
who argues that ‘[w]hile it can seem that we can afford quite easily to get along 
without aesthetic companionship, perfectionists will wish to show how fateful 
that isolation can be.’ Indeed, the ordinary exemplar works in an irreducibly 
aesthetic way. This is because in moral perfectionism ethical constraint takes the 
form, not of a Kantian ‘ought’ but of attraction to the esteem of an exemplary 
other (Cavell, 1990: xxix–xxx). As Shusterman (1997: 103–4, citing Cavell, 
1990: 31) elaborates: 
Such critique by exemplars of difference seems especially democratic 
since it works not by appeal to some absolute end or fixed standard that 
denies our freedom to choose the life we think more perfect. Instead the 
exemplar’s critical force derives from its aesthetic appeal, its attraction 
over other ways of living. The aim is not to refute the other’s way of 
living, “but to manifest for the other another way”.  
In moral perfectionism, ethical and political insight are not imposed, but 
exemplified and shown, aesthetically registered.  
This emphasis on aesthetics and culture might lead to the charge of a certain 
elitism in both the working of the ordinary exemplar and the idea of moral 
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perfectionism, and hence to a questioning of the democratic potential of 
perfectionist thinking. Cavell (1990: ch. 3) notes that, in A Theory of Justice, 
John Rawls (1972) argues that perfectionism cannot be a pretender to the title of 
a theory of justice because the idea of perfection or a perfect specimen is elitist. 
Cavell, however, emphasises that Emersonian perfectionism denies the ultimate 
perfection of any culture or the superiority of one culture over another. Indeed, 
he follows Emerson in emphasising the final settlement of one’s self on any fixed 
cultural exemplar as a state of conformity. 
Moral perfectionism also denies the idea that one person is innately more 
virtuous or skilled than another. Instead, Cavell (1990: 25–6) affirms Emerson’s 
belief, expressed in the latter’s essay ‘Self-Reliance’, that each and every person 
is possessed of ‘genius’. In turn, ‘[g]enius is not a special endowment, like 
virtuosity, but a stance toward whatever endowment you discover is yours’ 
(Cavell, 2003: 92). Emerson thus prefigures the democratic impulse of the 
ordinary language philosopher, who requires of her reader no special knowledge, 
only a willingness to attend carefully to the distinctions, connections, and effects 
of her everyday language. As Rhu (2006: 4) notes of Cavell’s moral 
perfectionism, ‘while the genius it seeks to cultivate is equally distributed, the 
desire for such cultivation depends upon the willingness of the individual.’ 
Hence, Cavell (1990: xxx–xxxi) emphasises the difficulty of aversive thinking 
and of turning away from accepted social norms, rather than cultural or 
intellectual exclusivity. 
Let me restate the main tenets of moral perfectionism, which acts in counterpoint 
to the theme of scepticism. Perfectionism involves acknowledging the finitude of 
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the self in a way that differs from the sceptic’s retreat to abstract questions of 
knowledge. It involves a willingness to treat the company of another (whether 
internal or external to the self) as exemplary in order to enact further 
development of one’s limited self. Therefore, perfectionism is bound up with the 
actions of the ordinary exemplar. Acting against conformity, an ordinary 
exemplar questions the ethical desirability of her life but also of the societal 
criteria she has inherited. Such a move from the individual to society might seem 
a hasty one given the emphasis in moral perfectionism on a self-regarding ethics 
(Cavell, 1990: xxvii); however, the relationship between the individual and 
society is of critical importance to the perfectionist, who can become a social and 
political critic. The process of developing moral autonomy and independent 
thinking, or what Emerson calls ‘self-reliance’, is a necessary condition for 
exercising one’s public political voice. It is a precursor to becoming a political 
friend for another. Moral perfectionism, just like the ordinary language 
philosopher’s conversation based on examples, is a conversation among people 
who seek to become representative for each other. 
3. Cavell’s passionate utterance 
The conversation of moral perfectionism involves a type of speech that Cavell 
calls ‘passionate utterance’, which is the third and final concept I examine in this 
chapter. The speaking self in the work of Emerson and Thoreau is one who 
expresses and responds to emotions such as shame, fear, hope, empathy, and 
desire. This self responds to democratic imperfection in expressive terms: her 
emotions act both as a spur to work on the self and as a means of singling out 
another person for exemplary conversation. In this third section of the chapter, I 
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argue that passionate utterance is an important, if neglected, component of 
democratic conversation and one that creates ordinary democratic 
intersubjectivity. To make this argument, I outline Cavell’s extension of Austin’s 
category of the perlocutionary speech act into the concept of the ‘passionate 
utterance’. In a fuller discussion in Chapter Five, I will examine the role that 
passionate utterance plays in the debt auditing work of Debt Resistance UK. 
In an essay entitled ‘Performative and Passionate Utterance’, Cavell (2005b) 
offers a sympathetic criticism and extension of Austin’s speech act theory. By 
engaging with Austin’s account of the performative utterance, Cavell aims to 
better account for the expressive and passionate dimensions of speech. As I 
outlined in Chapter Two, Austin (1962) offers an accomplished investigation of 
the illocutionary force of speech in How to Do Things with Words. While 
appreciative of his teacher’s singular achievement in this text, Cavell finds 
Austin strangely silent on the expressive and emotive character of speech. This 
silence is a problem because, for Cavell, passion and emotion are a key part of 
speech’s quality as action, rather than being incidental to this quality. Cavell 
therefore sets out the concept of the ‘passionate utterance’ as a complement to 
Austin’s notion of the performative utterance. 
Ever the devoted student of Austin, Cavell is at pains to position his discussion 
as a development, rather than a refutation, of Austin’s insights into the 
performative force of language. Cavell explains his motivation as one of taking 
up Austin’s own example in a sympathetic conversation. Cavell clarifies (2005b: 
159–60) that he ‘do[es] not mean, insipidly, to take a rich text to task for lacking 
a further richness beyond its plan’ but rather that he finds Austin’s neglect of the 
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expressive dimension of speech ‘to go suddenly counter to its own drift, to close 
a door it should at least invite others to open.’ In opening this door and further 
developing Austin’s sparse remarks about the perlocutionary dimension of 
speech, Cavell makes an important development of Austinian speech act theory 
in his own right.  
To understand the idea of the passionate utterance, let us start from the 
distinctions that Austin uses to anchor his investigation of how we do things with 
words. Recall from Chapter Two that, having discarded his original division 
between constative utterances (statements) and performative utterances (acts), 
Austin makes a threefold distinction among the locutionary dimension of an 
utterance (or its meaning), the illocutionary dimension (the force of an utterance, 
or what is done in saying something), and the perlocutionary dimension (the 
consequential effect of an utterance, or what is achieved by saying something). If 
to speak is usually to refer to something (the locutionary meaning) and to 
accomplish an act (the illocutionary act), speaking also produces an effect on the 
speaker, audience, onlooker, or other party (the perlocutionary effect). 
Consider the difference between warning someone (which is an illocutionary act) 
and alarming them (which is a perlocutionary one) (Austin, 1962: 103). If I run 
out of my office and yell out to my colleagues ‘I warn you: there’s a fire!’, I 
achieve an illocutionary act (I am not simply reporting my warning to my 
colleagues but actually warning them). In addition to accomplishing the act of 
warning, my act of speech is likely to have an effect on my colleagues, such as 
alarming them (if they believe me) or annoying them (if I have a reputation for 
crying wolf), as well as further possible effects on them, such as persuading them 
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to act (whether by leaving the building or reporting me to our office manager) 
(Cavell, 2005b: 169). Or, to consider Austin’s original example, my uttering of 
the formula ‘I do’ will, given the right conditions, felicitously achieve the act of 
our marriage, and this will be the working of illocutionary force. However, the 
perlocutionary effect of my utterance can be varied: this utterance might make 
you deliriously happy (because you are marrying me, the woman of your 
dreams), or it might provoke despair (because you are secretly pining for 
someone else). 
A key difference between illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect is the 
extent to which they are governed by convention. While the illocutionary is 
predictable (I can reasonably assume that my ‘I do’ will result in our marriage), 
the perlocutionary is less so (I cannot predict whether my colleagues will be 
annoyed by my yelling ‘fire!’, happy because it gets them out of giving a lecture, 
or extremely fearful because they have had a close call before). As Austin (1962: 
103) notes, warning occurs through the conventional use of a performative 
formula, but alarming someone cannot be a matter of convention. Which of these 
feelings and actions my warning produces cannot be a matter of convention but 
must be a matter of you, your personal response. Hence, the passionate utterance 
brings the grammatical person ‘you’ into the picture. 
Reflecting on the differences between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary, 
and hence between a performative utterance and a passionate one, Cavell sets out 
to develop Austin’s notion of the perlocutionary into an explicit set of ‘felicity’ 
or ‘happiness’ conditions (the conditions of a successful passionate utterance). 
Mirroring Austin’s set of conditions for the performative utterance, Cavell’s 
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(2005b: 180–2) list of perlocutionary conditions lays the basis for 
conceptualising the passionate utterance. I do not treat this list in any detail here 
because I will discuss its components at greater length in Chapter Five. For the 
moment, it will suffice to note that Cavell finds perlocutionary conditions to be 
the reverse of Austin’s illocutionary conditions. To provide a simplified schema, 
and one that need not be retained fully at this stage, the perlocutionary is 
characterised by: 1) its essentially unconventional nature (whereas the 
illocutionary is a set of conventional procedures for performing something), 
hence it is also notable for 2) the way in which it opens up a space of exchange 
between two parties, and thus 3) for the fact it brings the second person into view 
(establishing a direct relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘you’), thereby 4) 
creating a demand for acknowledgement that is itself 5) an attempt at moral 
education that 6) the other may take up or deny, acknowledge or avoid.  
One implication of Cavell’s discussion is that a passionate utterance creates a 
type of intersubjective conversational exchange in the way a performative 
utterance usually does not. This exchange can be useful in a democratic polity. 
On the one hand, democratic interaction and exchange often takes the form of a 
conversation in which we give reasons for our examples, for why we do what we 
do. But often these reasoned conversations come to an end. Then we need 
passionate utterances: a form of speech in which one party, in her concern for or 
outrage at another, in both her conviction of the other and her conviction in 
another’s potential for change, leads this other person to desire change (Mulhall, 
1994: 279–80). As an example, Cavell (1981) examines this process of 
passionate exchange in a genre of Hollywood film known as the ‘comedy of 
remarriage’. In his book on remarriage comedy, Cavell looks at how women and 
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men navigate the process of reversing a breakdown in their relationship to get 
back together (Cavell was writing at a time before heteronormative 
understandings of marriage had come under sustained attack). Cavell finds that, 
in these films, the couple’s ability to turn a shattered union into a re-union 
depends on precisely the form of passionate utterance just described: both a 
conviction of and a conviction in the other, expressed in unconventional, 
passionate speech. Each partner to the marriage acts as a friendly but provocative 
exemplar for the other, holding out the prospect of a future, better self. Here we 
see one elaboration of Cavell’s interest in the exemplary potential of the figure of 
the friend (which complements his interest, seen in his discussion of Emerson 
and Thoreau, in the exemplary potential of the self’s internal spectator or 
neighbour). 
In sum, Cavell holds that the focus of speech act theory past and present on the 
illocutionary force of the performative utterance has led to a neglect of 
passionate speech (although, more recently, see Butler, 1997). Moreover, this 
focus on the illocutionary has led scholars of performativity to lose sight of the 
ethical and political significance of a passionate register of speech and 
conversation. Cavell asserts that we should not ignore passionate utterances in 
favour of performative ones. The passionate and the performative are two 
essential, intertwined dimensions of the active quality of language. Thus he 
claims that ‘[f]rom the root of speech…two paths spring: that of the 
responsibilities of [performative] implication; and that of the rights of 
[passionate] desire’ (Cavell, 2005b: 185). Keeping both paths open is imperative 
to democratic interaction and aversive exchange, for only ‘[t]hen we shall not 
stop at what we should or ought to say, nor at what we may and do say, or are too 
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confused or too tame or wild or terrorized to say or to think to say’ (Cavell, 
2005b: 185). Cavell’s moment of not stopping is essential to the process of 
reworking an imperfect democracy. If a passionate utterance is felicitous, if it 
succeeds in being accepted as a claim to community, then a democratic union or 
re-union results, only to become subject to ongoing, perfectionist questioning 
and conversation. 
4. A Cavellian grammar of democratic subjectivity  
Together these three concepts help me to visualise and understand ordinary 
democratic subjectivity. Up to this point, I have discussed these ideas in the order 
that Cavell developed them. I have done this to convey the analytical thread that 
runs through Cavell’s body of work, as he first engages with Austin and 
Wittgenstein, then cross-fertilises their ideas with American Transcendentalism, 
and finally comes full circle back to Austin at the end of his career to further 
probe his teacher’s ideas. In this final section of the chapter, I propose to re-order 
these concepts so that, as a series, they move from the ordinary exemplar to the 
passionate utterance, and on to the claim to community. This re-ordering allows 
me to bring Cavell’s concepts together in what I call a ‘grammar’ of democratic 
personhood or subjectivity, comprising the ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we’.  
Let me begin by explaining my terms. I do not use ‘grammar’ here in the 
specialist sense it has in Wittgenstein’s work (that is, to refer to the criteria that 
tell us ‘what kind of object anything is’ [Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: § 373]). 
Instead, I deploy grammar in the way we use it when we refer to grammatical 
categories such as the first person, second person, and third person. I draw 
inspiration for the idea of a grammar of democratic personhood or subjectivity 
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from Veena Das (2015), an anthropologist who works with ordinary language 
philosophy. In a recent chapter, Das (2015: 89) poses the question of ‘how we 
might think of the relation between the first person, the second person, and the 
third person in the scene of everyday life.’ Transposed into the setting of my 
research, this question provides a way to conceptualise how democratic 
subjectivity is developed as people learn to speak in the name of a democratic ‘I’, 
‘you’, and ‘we.’ Because, in Cavell’s work, democratic subjectivity is in 
significant part a matter of finding and developing democratic voice, the idea of a 
grammar of personhood provides a useful way of thinking about democratic 
subjectivity. 
In particular, this way of thinking allows me to foreground how Cavell’s 
concepts centre on categories of democratic personhood. First, the ordinary 
exemplar is about developing democratic individuality or selfhood: the ordinary 
democratic ‘I’. In Chapter Four, I will show how a genre of debt advice manual 
encourages individuals to become aversive democratic subjects who avoid debt 
in order to make a political statement about how people are dependent on debt, in 
financialised society, to meet their basic needs. The passionate utterance is, in 
turn, about forging democratic intersubjectivity or exchange, when the ‘I’ makes 
a direct address to the ‘you’. In Chapter Five, I will demonstrate how Debt 
Resistance UK uses debt auditing to address direct passionate claims about 
wrongdoing to figures in banks and local authorities, with the aim of creating 
democratic intersubjective conversation or exchange. Finally, making a claim to 
community involves positing democratic collectivity: the ‘I’ and ‘you’ come 
together as an ordinary democratic ‘we’. In Chapter Six, I show how Strike 
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Debt’s popular peer-to-peer debt cancellation mechanism, the Rolling Jubilee, 
functions as a claim to a community of debtors.  
I propose this trio of Cavellian concepts not as a universally applicable 
framework, but as a way to understand my substantive exemplars of debt 
resistance. These concepts have helped me to understand how some people who 
resist debt are striving to rebuild the imperfect democracy of financialised 
society from within. Rather than forming a pre-built frame over which my cases 
are then stretched, my conceptual arguments are woven from and into my 
substantive understanding of resistances to debt, as Chapters Four, Five, and Six 
will show. Indeed, following the tenets of ordinary language philosophy, we 
might say that Cavellian thinking is best worked out in the context of examples. 
Like Das (2014: 280–1), I find that ‘it is the concrete events of my fieldwork that 
clarify the ideas I find in Austin and Cavell and reassure me that the 
philosophical puzzles they bring up can and do arise in the concrete relations and 
weaves of life we inhabit.’  
Given this is the final chapter of Part One of the thesis, let me restate the 
arguments I have made so far. Based on the ground I have covered in Part One, it 
should now be apparent that the ‘ordinary’ as I use it is not a synonym for the 
‘everyday’ as it has been used in IPE. As Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell 
describe it, the ‘ordinary’ of ordinary language philosophy is an epistemological 
commitment and a methodological approach, rather than a set of people or level 
of analysis. As an epistemological commitment, studying the ‘ordinary’ involves 
avoiding the craving for generality, questioning the crystalline purity of 
concepts, and becoming aware of aspect-blindness (Chapter One). 
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Methodologically, engaging with the ‘ordinary’ from the vantage point of 
ordinary language philosophy involves examining ordinary ethics and 
understanding ordinary action as non-sovereign, while scrutinising ordinary 
language usage and remaining aware of the potential for ordinary words to 
reanimate existing ethical and political vocabularies (Chapter Two). Cavell’s 
picture of the ordinary, in particular, allows us to see everyday life as a site of 
ordinary democratic subjectivity: something that holds the potential for people to 
exercise democratic agency and strive against injustice, but which is also the 
source of injustices because of scepticism and failures of acknowledgement 
(Chapter Three). In this way, Cavell implicitly questions the division between an 
inert everyday life and a progressive everyday politics that has come to structure 
the ‘Everyday IPE’ project (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2007; for a Lefebvrian 
version of this argument against the Hobson and Seabrooke division, see Davies, 
2016). 
At this point, and as I will demonstrate in Part Two, it is worth underlining that 
there is much that Cavellian scholars might learn from their IPE counterparts. As 
I argued in the thesis Introduction, Cavell is not a political economist, but shared 
themes run across his work and IPE scholarship, including the interest in the 
everyday, speech act theory, ethics, and culture. To take the final theme, Cavell’s 
philosophy shares with everyday and cultural political economy approaches to 
IPE a commitment to take cultural practices and artefacts seriously. Cavell draws 
on a range of cultural resources and texts, including Thoreau’s Walden (which I 
will discuss in Chapter Four), Hollywood films (to feature in Chapter Five), and 
plays like Ibsen’s A Doll’s House (discussed in Chapter Six). Nevertheless, IPE 
scholars would certainly want to teach Cavell that culture is simultaneously 
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political-economic (Best and Paterson, 2010; Sum and Jessop, 2013; 
Montgomerie, forthcoming). Cavell’s emphasis on everyday culture needs to be 
extended through an encounter with cultural political economy approaches to 
IPE. In the context of my research, this extension is important because 
democratic subjectivities and practices of civic freedom are conditioned by the 
culture, politics and moralities of capitalist market life. Both practices of civic 
freedom and practices of governance are cultural, political, and economic. 
Therefore, if in Part One I have interpreted Cavell’s work to make his thinking 
available in the field of IPE, in Part Two I both exemplify the utility of Cavellian 
thinking for IPE and demonstrate to Cavellian scholars the importance of 
everyday cultural political economy. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have developed a conceptual framework for understanding 
ordinary democratic subjectivity. I have argued that Cavell’s concepts make up 
what I call a grammar of democratic personhood. In sum, Cavell translates the 
procedures of ordinary language philosophy into a form of democratic moral and 
political conversation, so that dialogue over examples becomes a way of issuing 
and navigating ‘claims to community.’ Just as Austin believes that everyday 
examples teach us much about the ethics of our ordinary actions and omissions, 
so Cavell underlines the perfectionist ethical and political character of the 
ordinary with the concept of the ‘ordinary exemplar.’ The mode of speech that 
Cavell calls ‘passionate utterance’ is central to exemplary conversation, as it 
provides a way of registering claims to injustice and drawing others on to their 
further self, and, potentially, on to community. Together these three concepts 
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make up a grammar of democratic personhood or subjectivity because of their 
respective emphases on the ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we.’ 
One of Cavell’s central contributions to ordinary language philosophy is his 
accounting for the diverse ways in which we do ethical and political things with 
words. This accounting is also the basis for my contribution to IPE, which in turn 
comes from introducing a Cavellian account of ordinary democratic subjectivity 
into the study of finance. In Part Two of the thesis, I show how Cavell’s 
grammar of democratic subjectivity plays out in contemporary resistances to 
debt, while also drawing attention to the cultural-economic imaginaries that form 
the backdrop to these resistances. In Chapter Four, I use Cavell’s idea of the 
ordinary exemplar to study how individuals cultivate democratic individuality by 
avoiding debt, while also showing how this practice of freedom is located within 
a pervasive liberal cultural-economic imaginary of financial capability. Chapters 
Five and Six then draw on the concepts of the ‘passionate utterance’ and the 
‘claim to community’ to reveal how people forge democratic intersubjectivity in 
debt auditing, and democratic community through debt refusal, respectively. 
Again bringing a cultural political economy approach to bear on Cavell’s 
concepts, I show that debt auditing takes place within a cultural-economic 
framework of financial transparency, while debt refusal speaks to a pervasive 
imaginary of liability. The ordinary image of debt politics that results from these 
studies shows how people engaged in resistances to debt, although their actions 
bear the imprint of conventional financial imaginaries, are reconstructing debt 
relations in perfectionist terms as a site of democratic selfhood and community. 
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Part Two  
 
 
Cavellian Readings of Resistances to Debt 
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Chapter Four: Avoiding Debt 
 
The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. 
– Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’ (1841), as cited in 
Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome 
(1990a) 
 
Avoiding debt and taking steps to live debt-free are not usually considered 
political activities, much less tactics of resistance. In this chapter, I draw on debt 
advice literature to argue that avoiding debt can indeed be a practice of resistance 
and one that develops ordinary democratic individuality. I place Cavell’s concept 
of the ordinary exemplar at the heart of my argument. I use this concept to 
understand how and when people engaged in debt-free living challenge systems 
of work and finance that fail to yield substantive freedom for them. As I outlined 
in Chapter Three, Cavell develops the idea of the ordinary exemplar in his 
readings of the American Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau. These 
authors show the democratic importance of the individual who experiments with 
different ways of living in order to develop self-scrutiny and independent 
judgement, or what Emerson calls ‘self-reliance’. An ordinary exemplar 
questions the state of society as it stands and exemplifies the contestability of 
society’s values and politics. The exemplar models self-reliance to encourage 
others to develop and exercise their democratic individual voice. 
Using this understanding of exemplarity, I analyse the narratives of avoiding 
debt through debt-free living contained in debt advice manuals. I divide these 
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narratives into two types: narratives of financial capability and narratives of self-
reliance. I argue that while most debt advice manuals promote ‘financial 
capability’ by positioning the individual as a personally responsible financial 
consumer-citizen, some manuals seek to provoke Emersonian self-reliance and 
hence non-conformity in their readers. To deepen my account of this second 
category, I show how the debt-free living autobiography genre further 
exemplifies self-reliance and ordinary democratic selfhood. This distinction is 
important because IPE scholars have tended to study financial education in a 
uniform manner as a form of neoliberal discipline and constraint (for example, 
Finlayson, 2009; Clarke, 2015; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a; Santos, 
2016). By contrast, my reading suggests that the subject of debt advice exceeds 
this disciplinary force and that advice books can redeem the concept of 
autonomy by showing it under another aspect, as a quality necessary for 
democratic individuality. Financial self-help books contain greater possibilities 
than the literature on everyday financial literacies would seem to suggest. 
I develop this argument across four sections. In section one, I extend the account 
of Cavell’s concept of the ordinary exemplar that I offered in Chapter Three. I 
begin by examining Cavell’s reading of exemplarity as a perfectionist theme in 
the work of Emerson and Thoreau, foregrounding Cavell’s engagement with 
Thoreau in particular. Cavell follows Thoreau in symbolising the self-reliant 
subject as having an internal ‘neighbour’ or ‘observer’ who provides perspective 
on the self’s behaviour and who draws the existing self on to a next or further 
self. Importantly, for Cavell, this doubling is modelled in the relationship that 
Thoreau, as a perfectionist author, establishes with his reader. For this reason, I 
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illustrate the working of ordinary exemplarity with reference to Thoreau’s 
Walden as Cavell interprets it. 
In section two, I show that Cavell’s concept of the ordinary exemplar can be used 
to distinguish between debt advice manuals that teach financial capability and 
those that aim to provoke self-reliance in their readers. I argue that most debt 
advice manuals socialise their readers into financial capability as a norm of debt-
based economic citizenship. These manuals instruct their readers to avoid debt in 
order to ‘get ahead’ and better accumulate wealth in the future. They promote the 
financially capable self as a freestanding individual who avoids dependence on 
others. This financial capability debt advice literature represents what Cavell 
calls a ‘debased’ perfectionism because it emphasises developing the self in 
order to adapt to rather than question societal norms and criteria. 
However, not all debt advice texts are animated by this conformist spirit. In 
section three, I examine two texts that seek to provoke self-reliance in their 
readers. I focus on one debt advice manual entitled Your Money or Your Life 
(Robin et al., 2008) and one autobiography called Walden on Wheels: On the 
Open Road from Debt to Freedom (Ilgunas, 2013). These accounts undermine 
the idea of autonomy as a form of sovereign independence. Indeed, they redeem 
the concept of autonomy by showing this concept under another aspect, as self-
reliance or the ability to think for oneself. I end this section by addressing the 
relationship between financial capability and self-reliance. These two ethics of 
the self are not polar opposites, and so I argue that financial capability takes the 
form of a ‘debased’ perfectionism and a parody of self-reliance. 
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I end the chapter by returning to IPE work on everyday financial literacies, 
which I introduced in Chapter One. Where this literature has tended to theorise 
financial education in repressive terms, I open out the range of ethical and 
political positions that debt-free living literature enables. When popular financial 
education texts seek to provoke self-reliance and invite people to consider 
themselves as ordinary exemplars, these texts offer a democratic counterpoint to 
the liberal-individualist selfhood that underpins debt-based economic citizenship. 
Avoiding debt can therefore be much more than an act of acquiescing to the 
demands of financial literacy programmes; indeed, it can be a way for the 
individual to void her consent to the state of financialised society as it stands. 
1. Cavell on becoming an ordinary exemplar 
In his writings on Emerson and Thoreau, Cavell lays out the vision of democratic 
selfhood he thinks is central to a perfectionist disposition. Cavell himself does 
not give a name to this self, but I call it the ‘ordinary exemplar’. I use this label 
for two reasons: first, because Cavell has frequent recourse to notions of 
exemplarity in his work; second, because of Cavell’s insistence that a democratic 
stance can be developed from ordinary examples. Others have named this self the 
‘Emersonian Exemplar’ (Mulhall, 1994: 297, 301, 331), reflecting the fact that 
Cavell offers his most explicit account of perfectionist selfhood in his work on 
Emersonian or moral perfectionism. 
Moral perfectionism, as I described it in Chapter Three, is an ethical disposition 
rather than a moral theory that tells us what we ought to do. Perfectionism is ‘a 
stance toward one’s life as such rather than toward individual courses of 
conduct’ (Cavell, 2005a: 120). This stance involves a particular type of selfhood: 
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a self that is committed to ongoing work and striving in the face of the 
imperfections of democracy. However, Cavell’s model is not one of a final, 
perfect self or of ultimate perfectibility. Indeed, for Cavell (1990a: 31), who 
follows Emerson in making this argument, the moment at which I side 
definitively with my ‘attained’ rather than my ‘unattained yet attainable’ self is 
precisely one of conformity.  
Against conformity, the perfectionist self or exemplar is drawn onward, in 
experimentation. This self reflects Emerson’s observation that ‘[a]round every 
circle another can be drawn’ (Emerson, ‘Circles’, as cited in Cavell, 1990a: 
xxxiv). Cavell (2003: 13) follows Emerson in picturing the relationship between 
the attained and unattained self as a succession of ‘ever-widening circles’. This 
encirclement has no predetermined route or endpoint. As Cavell (1990a: xxxiv) 
explains, ‘Emerson’s thought of endless, discontinuous encirclings…does not 
imply a single, or any, direction, hence, in one sense, no path (plottable from 
outside the journey).’  
Cavell is particularly interested in a non-conformist practice of self-encirclement, 
which he variously terms, again using Emersonian terms, ‘aversion’, ‘aversive 
thinking’, and ‘self-reliance’ (Cavell, 1990b). In depicting the ordinary exemplar 
as a self-reliant thinker, Cavell seizes upon Emerson’s argument that, in 
contemporary society, ‘the virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is 
its aversion’ (Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’, as cited in Cavell, 1990a: 37). 
Emersonian self-reliance requires me to move away from unthinking 
acquiescence to society’s demands. To become self-reliant, I have to determine 
which of society’s claims I am prepared to make my own. In this sense, 
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becoming self-reliant is a process of becoming able to rely upon and take 
responsibility for one’s words (and, to use the terminology I introduced in the 
previous chapter, the ‘criteria’ they express and reflect). In short, self-reliance is 
a process of finding one’s own voice. 
To find my voice, I must first acknowledge that the voice and language I take as 
my own are inherited from society, in order to then determine the extent to which 
my words are truly mine. Recall from the previous chapter the Wittgensteinian 
argument that we learn language within a form of life and hence are socialised 
into this form of life and its criteria. All too often this process of inheritance is 
one of ‘“irresistible dictation”—we do with our lives what some power 
dominating our lives knows or reveals them to be, enacting old scripts’ (Cavell, 
2003: 71, citing Emerson, ‘Fate’). Cavell (1992: 107–8, emphasis in original) 
explains this social dictation of voice, but also the process of becoming averse to 
it, in a commentary that paraphrases Thoreau’s Walden: 
What we know as self-consciousness is only our opinion of ourselves, 
and like any other opinion it comes from outside; it is hearsay, our 
contribution to public opinion. We must become disobedient to it, resist 
it, no longer listen to it. We do that by keeping our senses still, listening 
another way, for something indescribably and unmistakably pleasant to 
all our senses.  
If we ‘keep our senses still’, if we withdraw from our daily habits and 
interactions long enough to become aware of our socially dictated thoughts, we 
enable a different form of self-consciousness to develop. We find that what is 
‘pleasant’ to our senses is the approbation of another figure: our internal critic.  
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Cavell’s reading of Walden thus highlights a second feature of the perfectionist, 
in addition to a commitment to aversion or non-conformity, namely that she 
treats herself as doubled or divided. The cultivation of an internal other allows 
the self to ‘leap…the span from one circumference to another’ (Cavell, 2003: 18) 
and hence to move on to a further self. Again paraphrasing the narrator of 
Walden, Cavell (1992: 108) refers to this sense of doubleness as one that 
involves the fostering of:  
a relation between ourselves in the aspect of indweller, unconsciously 
building, and in the aspect of spectator, impartially observing. Unity 
between these aspects [of the self] is viewed…as a perpetual nextness, an 
act of neighboring or befriending. 
In this way, Cavell variously figures the internal critic as a neighbour, spectator, 
or friend who observes the habitual labours of building the self. This next self is 
‘next’ in the sense of being a future self, but one that is attainable now because it 
lies next to us, as our neighbour (Cavell, 1990a: 9). Thus, as Thoreau (1995: 87) 
argues, ‘[w]ith thinking we may be beside ourselves in a sane sense.’ 
This internal observer bears a clear resemblance to the figure of the ‘impartial 
spectator’ in Smithian classical political economy, whose significance as a force 
of moral constraint in liberal market society has been ably discussed elsewhere in 
IPE (see, for example, Watson, 2007, 2012; Clarke, 2016; Glaze, 2016). In 
keeping with this line of work, I wish to underline how treating the self as 
divided or doubled enables a perfectionist back-and-forth assessment of conduct 
by the individual, hence development of the faculty of ethical evaluation and thus 
what Cavell calls integrity. Cavell’s Thoreauian account of the doubled subject 
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suggests an understanding ‘of integrity conceived as an activity’ (Cavell, 1992: 
109). Integrity, which Cavell uses in its dual sense of becoming whole (balancing 
one’s attained and unattained selves against each other) and acting in an ethically 
reliable way, is an activity rather than a finally achieved state. Integrity, or self-
reliance, is an ongoing movement between one’s current self and the next self 
that neighbours it. Integrity is premised on cultivating a willingness to revise 
one’s judgement, to leave one’s house in the wood when it has been built 
(Cavell, 1988: 54, 1992: 45), as Thoreau does, in appreciation of the fact that one 
has ‘several more lives to live’ (Thoreau, 1995: 209). 
This commitment to aversion and revision suggests that, to use Thoreau’s (1995: 
210; see also Cavell, 1992: 45) words, ‘in view of the future or possible, we 
should live quite laxly and undefined in front’. Living this way allows one to 
become an exemplar who can ‘manifest for the other another way’ of living and 
being (Cavell, 1990a: 31). As Norval (2007: 190, citing Walker, 2001: 175) 
argues, ‘such manifestations of other ways of doing things, transcending our 
present horizons, play something of the role books of advice to princes played in 
the past.’ As the protagonist of a democratic advice book (Walker, 2001), 
however, the ordinary exemplar faces an important question. What stops an 
ordinary exemplar from being didactic and elitist in the sense of instructing 
others to adopt her personal values, or those of the few? What differentiates 
democratic advice from the advice offered to the prince?  
In answer to these questions, Cavell notes that while perfectionism can become 
elitist, it need not be so. Here Cavell is responding to John Rawls (1972), who 
describes perfectionism as an elitist moral position, based on a reading of 
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Nietzsche. Cavell (1990a: 101–26, 2004: 208–26) is alarmed by Rawls’s 
conclusion. Because Nietzsche was influenced heavily by Emerson, Emersonian 
moral perfectionism also stands charged with elitism in Rawls’s account.  
Rawls bases his claim about the elitism of perfectionism on a reading of 
Nietzsche, who Rawls claims promotes the adoption of the values of the few. 
However, Cavell (2004: 220) defends the idea that an ethics based on 
exemplarity can be democratic by noting that Rawls misunderstands Nietzsche’s 
use of Exemplare in translating this word as ‘specimens’. Cavell’s student James 
Conant (2001) offers an excellent discussion of the difference between a 
specimen and an exemplar (see also Norval, 2007: 192–6). In contrast to the 
disturbing undertones of biological superiority entailed in the idea of the highest 
‘specimens’, Exemplare are, for Conant (and Cavell), closer to the Kantian idea 
of the exemplary work of art that confronts and makes a demand on me (Norval, 
2007: 193–4).  
To make this demand, the exemplar must stand in a particular relation to me. An 
exemplar, Conant (2001) holds, is notable for its simultaneous closeness to and 
distance from the group of which it is part. Norval (2007: 193–4, citing Conant, 
2001) summarises the three features of this relationship of exemplarity 
particularly well: 
The first is that an exemplar is to be compared and contrasted with 
members of its own genus; it is not something of an entirely different 
nature. The second aspect concerns its exemplarity: an exemplar 
‘illustrates a feature(s) of interest which other members of the genus 
display in varying degrees’; and the third, its exemplariness, the fact that 
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it is distinguished ‘by the pronounced degree to which it displays the 
feature in question’. 
The exemplar does not exist at a great distance from those for whom it 
exemplifies something, but it does exemplify a quality (like self-reliance) in a 
heightened or pronounced way. The exemplar does not stand above me as a 
distant, elite example but rather stands next to me, as my neighbour, manifesting 
a feature that I too have but may not yet have noticed or fully developed. 
This Cavellian emphasis on an exemplary relationship also suggests that an 
ordinary example does not become exemplary on its own. This insight is 
important because, at first glance, a perfectionist ethic of self-reliance can seem a 
solitary, individual practice and thus far removed from democratic interaction 
and community. Yet to read the ordinary exemplar in this way would be to 
neglect an important argument running across Cavell’s work. As I noted in 
Chapter Three, for Cavell perfectionist selfhood requires acknowledging rather 
than avoiding the limits to the individual self that come from the human 
condition of limitation and finitude. Exemplarity is achieved through relations 
with others, rather than being opposed to them. The perfectionist seeks what has 
been called relational autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 1999). As Norval 
(2007: 176, n.116) clarifies:  
The [Cavellian] emphasis on dependence—on others and on language—
contrasts with a liberal stress on autonomy as starting point. By contrast, 
for Cavell autonomy is always something to be attained, and if attained, 
always threatened and precarious. 
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This is Thoreau’s insight, according to Cavell: ‘The drift of Walden is not that 
we should go off and be alone; the drift is that we are alone, and that we are 
never alone’ (Cavell, 1992: 80, emphasis in original). 
In turn, when we acknowledge that we are finite, limited beings, we see that 
reliable judgement requires thinking alongside others (without letting these 
others think for us). Because we are finite, we must seek out exemplary others 
and engage in what Cavell (2008) has called ‘companionable thinking’. Someone 
who seeks to become exemplary must turn outward the findings of her 
experimental attempts at self-reliant thinking (or her intuitions about ‘what we 
say when’) and expose them as provocations to others; only in this way does she 
become representative. For ‘truly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, 
that I can receive from another soul’ (Emerson, ‘Divinity School Address’, as 
cited in Cavell, 1990a: 37–8). In offering ‘provocation’ rather than ‘instruction’, 
an ordinary exemplar aims not to win others over to a pre-given course of action, 
but to provoke them to think for themselves (Norval, 2007: 194). We must take 
what we have learned in the woods and expose it to the test of others (as Thoreau 
does by leaving Walden Pond to write Walden). Publicity therefore represents 
another way of moving from one circle to the next, in complement to rather than 
in replacement of the spectating self. 
Let me end this section by showing how Cavell reads Thoreau’s Walden as an 
exemplary text; that is, as capable of provoking self-reliance in its reader. 
Walden is an account of the just over two years Thoreau spent engaged in an 
experiment in self-reliant living at Walden Pond in Concord, Massachusetts. 
While many have taken Walden to be the work of a misanthrope intent on exiting 
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society, Walden is a democratic advice manual that asks its reader to think about 
the ways in which she fashions her self and about the broader social repertoires 
that enframe this self-fashioning (Walker, 1998, 2001). Walden is, as Cavell 
(1992: 85) puts it, ‘a tract of political education’ centred on ‘recovery of the self’ 
(Cavell, 1992: 80), and through the self, a recovery of society. In Walden, this 
recovery takes place in the face of an economisation of moral and political 
thinking. As Cavell (1992: 88) argues, the opening and longest chapter of 
Walden, entitled ‘Economy’, sets both Thoreau’s vocabulary and the primary 
problem of the book in place. This chapter is ‘a nightmare maze of terms about 
money and possessions and work, each turning toward and joining the others’ 
(Cavell, 1992: 88). Using this dense network of economic terms, Thoreau evokes 
the insidious economisation of everyday life that he perceived in nineteenth-
century liberal market society in the US. As Cavell (1992: 89) aptly observes: 
‘There is just enough description…of various enterprises we think of as the 
habitual and specific subjects of economics, to make unnoticeable the spillage of 
these words over our lives as a whole.’ He continues by noting that ‘[i]t is a 
brutal mocking of our sense of values’ (Cavell, 1992: 89), and in particular of the 
Protestant-capitalist ethic Thoreau sees around him. 
Indeed, Thoreau charges his society with having developed a repertoire of work, 
consumption, and finance that threatens the very fabric and independence of the 
self and the revisability of political community by depriving the individual of her 
capacity for voice. Thoreau therefore seeks ‘to show that our facts and ideas of 
economy are uneconomical, that they do not meet but avoid true need’ (Cavell, 
1992: 90). Taking aim at the ways in which society makes those who are not 
poor per se become so, Thoreau (1995: 4) identifies liberal market society as 
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leading many of his fellow citizens to a crisis he calls ‘quiet desperation.’ The 
result of this so-called ‘economy’ is despair and a lack of true self-realisation: 
‘[a]s if you could kill time without injuring eternity’ (Thoreau, 1995: 4). 
As these criticisms suggest, by living at Walden Pond Thoreau aims not to 
withdraw from society or to achieve complete autonomy. Instead, he seeks to 
become an ordinary exemplar: ‘to alarm his culture by refusing it his voice’ 
(Cavell, 1992: xv). As Cavell (1992: xv) argues, ‘[t]his refusal is not in fact, 
though it is in depiction, a withdrawal; it is a confrontation, a return, a constant 
turning upon his neighbors’, and hence upon his readers. If Thoreau (1995: 1) 
describes his experiment as taking place ‘a mile from any neighbor’, this distance 
is just close enough that he can still be seen. Thoreau is close enough to his 
neighbours in genus and in means to act as an exemplar (unlike Emerson, 
Thoreau was not a man of great means), while also being far enough away from 
them in his radical quest for self-reliance.  
Thoreau outstrips his compatriots in the extent to which he pursues self-reliance 
and rejects socially dictated assumptions regarding what is necessary. In the area 
of clothing, for instance, the narrator of Walden asserts that his fellow citizens 
usually mistake the beginning of a new endeavour as an occasion for new 
clothes, forgetting that the person must change if the clothes are to fit (Thoreau, 
1995: 14). Perhaps the only true occasion of need for new habits, the narrator 
ventures, is the moment of crisis when we decide to change our very mode of 
being: thus ‘our moulting season, like that of the fowls, must be a moment of 
crisis in our lives. The loon retires to solitary ponds to spend it’ (Thoreau, 1995: 
15). In Cavell’s (1992: 45) reading of Walden, Thoreau undergoes his own crisis 
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of ‘moulting’ as he retires to the ‘solitary pond.’ Specifically, Thoreau shows the 
impossible madness of the liberal-individualist ideal of autonomy as a complete 
sovereign independence from others, while nevertheless underlining the 
importance of developing self-reliant judgement. He makes of autonomy a 
democratic virtue.  
Cavell is at pains to underline how Thoreau’s experiment in self-reliance yields 
an acknowledgement of the relational debts to others that we incur in living 
inter-est, to return to Arendt’s (1958: 182) terms. Speaking of his accounts, 
where he tallies his expenditure and income, Thoreau (1995: 38) proclaims: ‘I 
should not thus unblushingly publish my guilt, if I did not know that most of my 
readers were equally guilty with myself.’ When we recall the etymological 
connection between ‘debt’ and ‘guilt’ in many languages (Nietzsche’s ([1887] 
1989) Genealogy of Morals famously plays on the link between debt and guilt 
found in the German word Schuld), it is not hard to see that the narrator becomes, 
over the course of his experiment, an exemplar of the need to work to cast off 
dominant beliefs about economy while acknowledging one’s ‘uncountable’ debts 
to others (Cavell, 2008: 117). 
These debts are incurred by Thoreau in clearing the ground upon which he builds 
his habitation (both his cabin and his self); this indebtedness is, to borrow 
Sparti’s (2000: 93) words, his ‘ontological liability’. These debts also derive 
from the displacement and dispossession that took place before Thoreau started 
work at Walden Pond, when settlers cleared Native Americans from the ground 
upon which the Thoreauian experiment unfolds (Walker, 2001: 161–2). These 
relations, and the debts they give rise to, become increasingly prominent as the 
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text proceeds: ‘[n]ot till we are lost, in other words, not till we have lost the 
world, do we begin to find ourselves, and realise where we are and the infinite 
extent of our relations’ (Thoreau, 1995: 111; see also Cavell, 1992: 50). The 
narrator acknowledges, in short, that his life is embedded in a network of 
contemporary and historical relations with others, even as he guards vigilantly 
against the ways in which ‘the They’ (Bennett, 2002: 1–8) threaten his 
individuality. Here lies the profit and loss statement of Thoreau’s experiment. 
To appreciate an important way in which these debts are repaid requires 
understanding the final, and most important, level at which Thoreau’s 
experiment operates. It is a central plank of Cavell’s (1992) reading that Walden 
is as much an experiment in perfectionist writing and reading as in alternative 
economic living. There is a constant doubling of the terms used in Walden so that 
most of the protagonist’s acts of cultivation, such as hoeing, digging, and 
burrowing, are also those of a writer (Cavell, 1992: 5). ‘It is difficult to begin 
without borrowing’ Thoreau (1995: 26) asserts, and so he takes up the borrowed 
axe with which he begins to build his house. This is a properly literary 
beginning, for if this axe: 
clearly enough figures the writing implement of one whose writing makes 
a house, hence one who criticizes, which is to say, cuts and separates, in 
order to edify; then this writing, in conjunction with the concept of 
borrowing, confesses its taking on of axes and issues explored and 
grounded by others. (Cavell, 1994b: 44)  
When Thoreau (1995: 64) proclaims that ‘my head is an organ for burrowing’, he 
signals that he is cultivating with his head as well as his hands. He is writing as 
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an exemplar for others, seeking to redeem his debts. To burrow is also to borrow, 
reflecting the shared etymology of these words. Perfectionist edification through 
writing and reading is necessarily modulated by the rhythm of a life lived in debt 
and on credit, by the taking on and returning of another’s example. The 
improvement of this example and hence the improvement of oneself is, for 
Cavell, a given of Thoreau’s experiment. ‘I returned it sharper than I received it’, 
Thoreau (1995: 26; see also Cavell, 1994b: 45) remarks of the axe.  
In Cavell’s Walden, then, writing and reading become social acts of borrowing 
and exchange, creating a conversation and confrontation between writer and 
reader through which each seeks to clarify and develop his or her voice and 
judgement. In this perfectionist conversation, the writer must treat his reader as 
capable of self-reliance; that is, capable, if not of choosing the meaning of her 
words, then at least of making ‘an autonomous choice of words’ (Cavell, 1992: 
64). The narrator cannot assume that his example, his reading of economy, will 
be deemed valuable enough to provoke change in another. Perhaps his words will 
be rejected as the mad cry of the loon. As a democratic advice manual rather than 
a book of advice to the prince, Walden must provoke its reader to offer her own 
evaluation of its claims and terms, as well as those of her own life. Walden, as an 
experiment in perfectionist writing, aspires to provoke change in its readers but 
remains committed to do so in light of the democratic ethic of self-reliance. 
I would like to close my discussion of the ordinary exemplar in this section by 
borrowing a final insight from Cavell (this time from his reading of 
Wittgenstein). In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: § 217; 
see also Cavell, 1990a: 70) lays out the following aphorism and scene: ‘If I have 
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exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. 
Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do”.’ Cavell (1990a: ch. 2, 
2005a: 112–4) offers an unorthodox reading of this scene as an ethical moment 
between a teacher and a pupil, one that depicts exemplarity in action. The teacher 
has reached the limits of instruction; this is the point at which the pupil must 
choose whether and how to go on (Cavell, 2005a: 114). The pupil must decide 
whether to take up the example of the application of criteria that is offered to her. 
In this educational moment, instruction gives way to provocation (or rather 
provocation becomes the mode of instruction) as the means of going on. Both the 
Wittgensteinian teacher, leaning patiently on his spade, and the narrator of 
Walden, who borrows an axe with which to clear the ground upon which his 
experiment and example might be received, are figurations of the possibilities 
and risks of acting as an ordinary exemplar for another. Will the reader take up 
Thoreau’s call to think for herself? Will she go on with the author’s example or 
not? Walden, as a series of nested experiments in economy, democratic self-
cultivation, and perfectionist writing, is designed to bring each of us to this point 
of decision, and hence to self-reliance. 
This first section of the chapter might seem like a literary excursus. But in using 
Walden to illustrate Cavell’s concept of the ordinary exemplar and a perfectionist 
ethic of self-reliance, I have foreshadowed the way in which Walden itself has 
become an exemplar for others. As I will show in section three, Walden has been 
treated as a democratic advice manual for those engaged in contemporary debt-
free living. This makes Cavell’s work on Thoreau even more relevant to my 
study of debt avoidance. However, to understand how this is the case, it will be 
necessary to examine a form of debt advice that is not exemplary in Cavell’s 
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sense of the term, and that is part of a cultural-economic imaginary of financial 
capability rather than an ethic of democratic self-reliance. This financial 
capability discourse is my focus in the next section, where I begin by discussing 
developments in financial education before considering contemporary debt 
advice manuals. The third section then brings my Cavellian argument about 
exemplarity directly into line with my engagement with popular debt advice 
literature. 
2. Exemplary debt avoidance and cultures of financial capability 
In the US, popular financial education has been promoted since the 1920s as a 
purportedly democratic intervention in finance (Aitken, 2003, 2005; Ott, 2011). 
In the UK, the corresponding turn to financial literacy is of a more recent 
vintage. Here, the emergence of financial literacy as a formal governmental 
concern originated less in a bottom-up desire to improve the literacy of ‘the 
people’ than in the top-down goal of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government to ensure civil servants’ financial literacy in aid of greater 
accountability to the taxpayer (Poon and Olen, 2015: 277–8). The most recent 
incarnation of financial literacy in the UK is financial literacy education, which 
has become a key support to the promotion of asset-based welfare and the 
reformulation of social-democratic citizens into financial consumer-citizens 
(Finlayson, 2008, 2009).  
In both the US and the UK, contemporary financial literacy education centres on 
a concern to improve the ‘financial capability’ of individuals (Marron, 2012, 
2014). In particular, the financial capability agenda seeks to empower individuals 
as citizen-consumers to actively demand efficient and competitive financial 
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services and to make the ‘right’ decisions about risk and reward given increasing 
complexity in finance (Marron, 2014: 494). Financial capability approaches are 
therefore part of the broader emergence of everyday financial discipline and 
financial-consumer subjectivity (Langley, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b), situated against 
the longer-term withdrawal of the state in the UK and US from active regulation 
of financial markets, as well as reduced state provision of welfare and economic 
redistribution. 
Financial capability approaches also respond to a specific post-crisis context 
characterised by increasing concern about the problem of ‘over-indebtedness’ 
(Marron, 2012). In government policy, over-indebtedness is usually traced to a 
failure of individual control and the inertia of financial consumer-citizens who 
need to be ‘nudged’ more or less overtly to realise their interests (Marron, 2012: 
418). The turn to promote financial capability is also linked to civil society 
reform agendas, which have endorsed financial consumer protection as a central 
plank of post-crisis reforms (Kastner, 2014).  
Chris Clarke (2015) has shown how the individualising effects of financial 
literacy education have intensified since the crisis, as the financial capability 
agenda has become conjoined to discourses of ‘resilience’. Clarke argues that the 
introduction of resilience thinking into financial literacy policy means people are 
being taught to adapt and reconcile themselves to individualised financial 
‘failure’. Contemporary financial literacy education thus implicitly recognises 
the gap between the ostensible promise of liberal financial markets as sites of 
personal wealth creation and the reality of participation in actually existing 
financial markets that are highly technical, uneven in access, and unequal in 
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outcomes (Clarke, 2015). In this gap, Clarke (2015: 273) concludes, lies financial 
literacy’s ‘failed promise’: the everyday financial subject is not ‘failing to learn’ 
(as financial capability approaches would suggest) but ‘learning to fail’ (as 
resilience doctrines teach). 
The learning materials of financial literacy education come in varied forms, 
ranging from the budget tools offered by money advice services to the games of 
educational curricula. The popular debt advice manual is an under-examined site 
of contemporary financial literacy education, particularly in IPE. These manuals 
bear some resemblance to online debtors’ forums, which have been studied as 
sites of peer-to-peer advice and everyday counter-education among debtors 
(Deville, 2015; Stanley et al., 2016; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016b; 
Stout, 2016). But more so than web forums, advice manuals use a ‘perfectionist 
mode of address’ (Arcilla, 2012: 162) whereby the author makes direct appeals 
to her reader. Debt advice manuals tend to be written as first-person accounts and 
as a direct source of examples for others. These manuals therefore provide an 
opportunity to see whether perfectionist self-reliance can be established via debt 
avoidance, as well as what (if any) alternatives to the consumer-citizen 
subjectivity of financial literacy education debt-free living can create. 
In selecting manuals with which to study debt avoidance narratives, I aimed to 
analyse books with broad popular appeal. For this reason, I examined the top 20 
books on the best-seller list for the Budgeting and Money Management 
subcategory of the Personal Finance section of Amazon.com. I excluded any 
books that made only passing mention of debt (for example, those that included 
only brief admonitions regarding indebtedness) and hence which did not offer 
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substantive advice to debtors. If the same author figured several times in the top 
20, I chose the most popular of his or her texts and left out the others, due to 
extensive repetition across these related texts. For books that were broadly about 
money management rather than specifically focused on debt advice, I read those 
sections substantively related to debt. I also studied debt advice blogs and 
websites to see which manuals were commonly recommended. This approach 
allowed me to strike a good balance between books offering general money 
advice that have sections on debt (which is the predominant type of text on the 
Amazon.com best-seller list) and books focused primarily on debt advice (which 
are more frequently discussed on debt advice blogs). 
This genre of popular debt-free living manual forms part of a burgeoning 
financial self-help literature, which itself is part of a broader ‘culture of self-help’ 
in British and especially American society (see, for example, McGee, 2005; 
Illouz, 2008). Financial self-help literature takes varied forms, ranging from self-
published books (for example, Bryn-Jones, 2008) to commercial best-sellers, like 
Robert Kiyosaki’s Rich Dad, Poor Dad series, around which transnational 
business empires have been built (Fridman, 2016). The debt advice manual, as a 
sub-genre within financial self-help literature, is an instructional text that 
counsels people to get out of debt and stay that way. These manuals are not 
peripheral to the workings of finance, although they may not capture the 
attention of high-brow economic thinkers. Advice manuals are the workhorses of 
everyday debt cultures, as well as important artefacts of debt-based economic 
citizenship. Debt advice manuals are products of economic restructuring and the 
extension of finance into daily life, as people seek out a variety of channels of 
support to deal with the challenges of personal and household indebtedness 
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(Deville, 2015; Stanley et al., 2016; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016b; 
Stout, 2016). As such, debt advice manuals reflect broader political-economic 
processes and relations of power. As Fridman (2014: 111) asserts, ‘it is fairly 
clear that the ethical practices of financial self-help engage participants in an 
increasing web of self-discipline that ties them in larger power relations.’  
My analysis of debt advice manuals reveals two broad forms of economic 
subjectivity based on two contrasting yet also internally related ideas: financial 
capability and what I have called self-reliance. To preview my argument in 
advance of exemplifying and supporting it, I suggest that the first type of debt 
advice manual teaches the pursuit of financial freedom in a way that only 
minimally challenges the norms of debt-based economic citizenship. This type of 
text promotes financial capability as a way of breaking one’s dependence on 
debt, with dependence in turn understood through the trope of addiction. 
Financial capability debt advice manuals teach practices of personal accounting 
and stress that debtors must follow their examples to the letter if freedom from 
debt is to be achieved. The second form of debt advice text, on the other hand, 
encourages independent financial judgement and self-scrutiny in a way that 
approximates Emersonian self-reliance. This type of debt advice manual 
promotes financial integrity as something more than a balance-sheet calculation. 
It also exemplifies an alternative form of accounting that encourages the reader 
to think about how her values emerge from financialised society. Such texts 
function, I argue, as exemplary conversation partners.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this latter, Emersonian type of debt advice manual is 
considerably less common than the first. Recall Cavell’s (1990a: xxx–xxxi) 
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argument that, although moral perfectionism is not elitist, for it requires no 
special endowment of quality or character, it is comparatively rare. The majority 
of debt advice manuals are not exemplary in Cavell’s sense of the term, just as 
the majority of people will not be moved to audit the debts of their governments 
(Chapter Five), or to refuse to repay their personal and household debts in order 
to make a political statement (Chapter Six). This uncommonness makes it all the 
more important to understand how and why some forms of resistance are 
perfectionist in effect, and how and why some people are moved to become 
ordinary democratic subjects. By first discussing debt advice manuals premised 
on financial capability and then examining debt advice books that provoke self-
reliance, I seek to show how democratic individuality, or the ordinary democratic 
‘I’, can emerge from within the constraints of debt-based economic citizenship. 
Conventional financial capability debt advice books share the narrative of 
‘journeying’ that Stanley et al. (2016) have shown to be a central component of 
everyday advice and information sharing in web forums for debtors. In the case 
of financial capability debt advice manuals, this journey is often built on a 
narrative of addiction that suggests a concomitant path to personal redemption 
(see, for example, Palmer, 2005; Ramsey, 2009; Carr, 2013; Croke, 2013; 
Mundis, 2012). Indeed, one popular manual, Get Out of Debt Now: The Easy 
Way (Carr, 2013), is written by a self-avowed former chain-smoker who has a 
series of smoking cessation, alcohol abstinence, anti-anxiety, and overeating and 
diet manuals to his name. Another manual, Getting Out of Debt and Staying Out 
(Palmer, 2005), uses an analogy between credit and drug-dealing: the 
‘lender/dealer’ offers you a hit, which feels fine, until ‘you need more and more 
credit to stay afloat’ and the heavies are sent round to ‘sort you out’ (Palmer, 
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2005: 34–5). Debtors are presented as addicted to over-consumption and to 
readily available consumer credit. The journey to break these addictions is in turn 
highly regimented and teleological, as suggested by a tendency to use the ‘steps’ 
structure seen in programmes to tackle addiction (see, for example, Mundis, 
2012). 
In financial capability debt advice, the issue of ‘problem debt’ is one of 
individuals making poor choices. As Fridman (2014: 104, emphasis in original) 
observes, like therapeutic recovery programmes, narratives of self-help recovery 
from debt addiction treat indebtedness as a ‘disease of the will’. Addiction 
narratives cast the debtor as unable to exercise willpower to regulate her 
behaviour and therefore as in need of the assistance of the author, who will help 
her to make better choices. Freedom from debt is thus to be attained through 
dependence on the ideas of another. This encouragement of conformity with the 
author’s thinking manifests the same paradoxes seen in financial capability 
discourses more broadly, which hold that people must be made to be free 
(Marron, 2012: 418). Hence, the narrative of addiction casts the debtor as an 
agent who is personally responsible for her indebtedness, and yet who largely 
lacks the rational, independent thought required to exercise this responsibility. 
Financial capability debt advice manuals promote two key technologies of 
journeying away from addiction. The first is personal financial accounting. 
Financial capability debt advice manuals place great importance on creating a set 
of personal financial accounts, with the reader asked to use diverse matrices and 
tables outlined in the books (see, among others, Palmer, 2005: 80–8; K. Clark, 
2009: 76–84; Weston, 2013: ch. 11). For instance, one of the best-selling 
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financial advice manuals, Total Money Makeover, by evangelical Christian Dave 
Ramsey (2009), promotes a rigid form of accounting for debts and income that is 
designed to create what the author calls a ‘Debt Snowball’. To create this 
snowball, the debtor pays off the smallest debts first, to ensure a psychological 
boost. This somewhat counterintuitive approach addresses indebtedness not by 
tackling the debts that attract the highest interest rate first but by thinking in 
terms of psychological satisfaction. Debt is presented as above all a 
psychological and even spiritual burden rather than a material and practical one, 
thus reinforcing the addiction narrative. 
At one level, this financial capability debt advice mirrors the concern for 
accuracy in accounts seen in Thoreau’s Walden (and, as I will argue in Chapter 
Five, in debt auditing campaigns). For instance, the narrator of Walden includes 
lists of his income and outgoings and excoriates himself for any unnecessary 
expenditure. However, the difference is that, with his account of his accounts, 
Thoreau is gently mocking his neighbours (and those who are ‘next’ to him, his 
readers who are leaning over his book). As Cavell (1992: 30) argues ‘those lists 
of numbers, calibrated to the half cent…are parodies of America’s methods of 
evaluation.’ Thoreau is showing, in essence, that these financial accounts fail as 
techniques of self-knowledge and evaluations of self-worth.  
While Cavell (1992: 30) speaks of the forms of accounting in Walden as being 
‘parodies of America’s methods of evaluation’, he also notes that these accounts 
are simultaneously ‘emblems of what [Thoreau] wants from writing’, namely 
that his writing will allow his readers weigh their words, to see whether these 
words do justice to their vision of what society could be. In this sense, ‘[t]o read 
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the text accurately is to assess its computations, to check its sentences against our 
convictions’, which is an alternative form of accounting (Cavell, 1992: 65). In 
Thoreau’s perfectionist accounting, ‘[t]he point is to get us to assess our 
orientation or position toward what we say’ (Cavell, 1992: 67). The point is to 
develop self-reliance. 
If the first technique for journeying away from debt addiction is financial 
accounting, the second technique lies in the didactic format of the financial 
capability debt advice manual itself. Readers of these manuals are invited to 
follow the examples that the author gives them, rather than being asked, in more 
perfectionist terms, to test and evaluate these examples. Put simply, the aim is for 
the reader to think like the author, and sometimes even to ‘think like the rich’ 
(Fridman, 2014: 91), as evidenced by chapter titles such as ‘The Financial Habits 
of Wealthy People’ (Croke, 2013: ch. 16).  
By contrast, the point of reading Walden is not for the reader to unthinkingly 
quote Thoreau (which, tellingly, the author of one contemporary debt advice 
texts does, without attribution: ‘I am reminded of a quote I heard recently which 
goes something like this: “the mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation”’ 
[Croke, 2013: 11]). If Thoreau (1995: 209) reminds us that he left Walden Pond 
because he had ‘several more lives to live’, he does so to persuade the reader 
who is attracted to his life that she must imagine her own (Cavell, 1992: 45). One 
will not find Walden at Walden Pond; one must locate one’s own Walden, 
develop one’s own voice and judgement in order to then leave that place and go 
out into the world. This emphasis on becoming intelligible to oneself, in order to 
confront and converse with others, is what differentiates self-reliance from 
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financial capability advice. Only with this intelligibility will the individual prove 
‘capable’ in the perfectionist sense of provoking a friend, and, in so doing, 
‘evoking a democracy’ (Arcilla, 2012: 161). 
Overall, the model of subjectivity promoted by financial capability debt advice is 
that of a consumer self who is both sovereign and responsible for her debt 
problems, but who, paradoxically, also needs to be made free through a series of 
exercises. These texts approach freedom as freedom from external constraint and 
in so doing fail to acknowledge how debtors are structurally positioned as unfree 
in liberal financialised societies. Financial capability advice manuals gloss over 
the political economy of personal indebtedness by telling their readers to abstain 
from taking on debt in order to improve their ability to accumulate assets in the 
future. The overall picture of financial capability is thus one that neglects the 
structural conditions that drive personal and household indebtedness (cf. Roberts, 
2013; Pitcher, 2016; Montgomerie, 2009, 2013; Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 
2014; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a). 
To summarise, many debt advice manuals teach that responsible financial 
selfhood is about combatting dependence and breaking free from a personal 
addiction to consumption, overspending, and debt. These manuals prioritise 
practical techniques, such as the ability to draw up an accurate set of personal 
financial accounts, while using a didactic tone of address that enjoins the reader 
to follow their examples to the letter. As such, these manuals present a linear 
path to ‘debt freedom’ that often fails to recognise the difficulty, confusion, and 
hardship that avoiding debt can involve, but also the potential for critical 
engagement with debt-based economic citizenship that debt-free living can 
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entail. These manuals emphasise individual mastery of financial circumstances, 
with little acknowledgement of the implausibility of individuals realising such 
totalising control (Clarke, 2015). I now turn to compare the ‘journeying’ of 
financial capability debt advice with a more Thoreauian, democratic debt advice 
manual, before addressing in conceptual terms the relationship between 
imaginaries of financial capability and self-reliance. 
3. From financial capability to self-reliance in debt avoidance 
Not all debt advice manuals teach financial capability, just as not all people who 
read financial capability texts necessarily follow the example of the consumer-
citizen subject these texts set out. As Poon and Olen (2015: 277) observe, 
‘[l]iteracy…does not lead to one inevitable conclusion but instead a multitude of 
options. And some of the choices consumers make might not be approved by the 
people and institutions promoting literacy as a solution.’ Critical or ‘aversive’ 
financial literacy relating to debt is also to be found in forms ranging from 
overtly politicising debt resistance manuals (Strike Debt, 2014) to the more 
covert and yet often still subversive aid among debtors in online forums (Stanley 
et al., 2016; Stout, 2016).  
To draw out the diverse financial literacies promoted in debt advice manuals, and 
to provide an example of a text promoting self-reliance rather than financial 
capability, I turn to a book entitled Your Money or Your Life: 9 Steps to 
Transforming Your Relationship With Money and Achieving Independence 
(Robin et al., 2008; hereafter, YM). At first glance, Your Money or Your Life 
does not appear particularly different to conventional debt advice manuals. 
Indeed, there are similarities between this text and the advice manuals I 
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discussed in the last section. Like financial capability manuals, Your Money or 
Your Life references a narrative of addiction in the form of an analogy between 
over-eating and over-spending (YM: 75-79). The book also adopts the 
journeying structure of financial capability debt advice texts, as indicated by the 
nine steps to transformation referenced in the subtitle.  
However, Your Money or Your Life begins by distinguishing itself from other 
financial advice guides as follows: 
What these books have in common is that they assume that your financial 
life functions separately from the rest of your life. This book is about 
putting it all back together. It is about integration, a “whole systems” 
approach to life. It will take you back to basics—the basics of making 
your spending (and hopefully your saving) of money into a clear mirror 
of your life values and purpose. It is about the most basic of freedoms—
the freedom to think for yourself. (YM: xxv, my emphasis) 
The goal of Your Money or Your Life is thus to promote what the authors call 
‘Financially Independent Thinking’ (or FI Thinking) (YM: xxx-xxxi). The 
authors describe FI Thinking as ‘a process of examining those basic assumptions 
you have unconsciously adopted, of evaluating your old road map’ because ‘until 
you can think independently, you can’t be independent’ (YM: xxx).  
One of the key components of FI Thinking is ‘Financial Integrity’ (YM: xxi-
xxxii), the definition of which resembles Cavell’s (1992: 109) Thoreauian idea 
‘of integrity conceived as an activity.’ Using an etymological practice of reading, 
the authors of Your Money or Your Life state: 
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The dictionary defines integrity as: “1: an unimpaired condition: 
SOUNDNESS[;] 2: adherence to a code of esp. moral or artistic values: 
INCORRUPTIBILITY[;] 3: the quality or state of being complete or 
undivided: COMPLETENESS.” Financial integrity is achieved by 
learning the true impact of your earning and spending, both on your 
immediate family and on the planet. It is knowing what is enough money 
and material goods to keep you at the peak of fulfillment—and what is 
just excess and clutter. It is having all aspects of your financial life in 
alignment with your values. (YM: xxxi-xxxii) 
However, Financial Independence and Financial Integrity are not to be developed 
in isolation from an understanding of the broader functioning of capitalist market 
society. According to this text, acquiring the freedom to think for yourself 
requires understanding how structural economic changes have shaped both 
individual selfhood and citizenship: 
People in industrialized nations used to be called “citizens.” Now we are 
“consumers”—which means (according to the dictionary definition of 
“consume”) people who “use up, waste, destroy and squander”. 
Consumerism, however, is just a twentieth-century invention of our 
industrial society, created at a time when encouraging people to buy more 
goods was seen as necessary for continued economic growth. (YM: 14)  
Because of this invention, the authors assert: 
We have absorbed the notion that it is right to buy—that consuming is 
what keeps America strong....The only downside is that our rising 
expectations have outstripped our incomes, leaving the average 
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consumer-patriot increasingly in debt. This puts us in a bind: the only 
way for us to exercise our economic patriotism is to go deeper into debt. 
We are in a no-win situation. You’re wrong if you buy and wrong if you 
don’t. (YM: 17)  
Unlike the financial capability debt advice manual, Your Money or Your Life 
recognises the double bind of debt-based economic citizenship. The consumer 
debtor-citizen is berated for spending beyond her means, even as she is reminded 
of her obligation to underwrite the ‘health’ of the economy (Itagaki, 2014). The 
debtor-citizen walks a tightrope: she must realise her personal consumer freedom 
and use credit responsibly to underwrite her welfare, yet also avoid tipping over 
into ‘problem’ debt (Marron, 2012). 
In the face of this double bind, and in pursuit of the freedom to think for oneself, 
the authors of Your Money or Your Life invite their readers to draw up a 
statement of accounts that differs from the type of accounting promoted by 
financial capability texts. At one level, this book urges a similar exactitude in 
accounting to that parodied by Thoreau: ‘Keep track of every cent that comes 
into or goes out of your life’ (YM: 67). But it does so in aid of a Thoreauian 
evaluation of ‘habits’ and how these are linked to the unfreedoms of work (albeit 
typically a specifically middle-class form of work): ‘Look at those clothes. 
Would you wear a noose around your neck or walk around on three-inch heels 
every day if it weren’t expected for the Job?’ (YM: 58). 
In Your Money or Your Life, devices such as the ‘Daily Money Log’ and the 
‘Monthly Tabulation’ are designed to make the reader’s priorities and values 
intelligible to her, so she can determine the extent to which these priorities and 
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values are her own or reflections of the criteria of liberal market society. The 
book proposes alternative units of accounting, such as the ‘real hourly wage’ that 
includes the ‘hours of life energy’ (including social reproductive labour) that go 
into making someone ready for work (YM: 51-54, 89). The point of undertaking 
this alternative accounting is to free oneself from externally imposed measures of 
value, labour, and self-worth in order to develop an ‘internal yardstick for 
fulfillment’ (YM: 113, bolding omitted). This is Financial Independence as self-
reliant thinking. 
Finally, the authors of Your Money or Your Life harness a Cavellian practice of 
reading that redeems words by delving into their ‘trailing etymologies’ (Austin, 
1970: 283). The authors invite their readers to interrogate the language of 
capitalist market society and the criteria its words convey, so as to decide 
whether these criteria meet their real needs. Take a discussion of the word 
‘frugality’: 
Let’s explore this word “frugality” to see if we can’t redeem it as the key 
to fulfilment…We looked up “frugal” in a Merriam-Webster dictionary 
and found “characterized by or reflecting economy in the expenditure of 
resources.” That sounds about right—a serviceable, practical and fairly 
colorless word. None of the elegance or grace of the “enoughness” that 
FIers [Financially Independent Thinkers] experience. But when we dig 
deeper, the dictionary tells us that “frugal” shares a Latin root with frug 
(meaning virtue), frux (meaning fruit or value) and frui (meaning to enjoy 
or have the use of). Now we’re talking! Frugality is enjoying the virtue 
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of getting good value for every minute of your life energy and from 
everything you have the use of. (YM: 159, bolding in original)   
‘Frugality,’ the authors conclude in Cavellian-Thoreauian tones, ‘isn’t being a 
lone and lonely ranger, perfect in your self-reliance. It’s discovering that you 
have more to give and more to enjoy than mere material possessions’ (YM: 161). 
Frugality is being prepared to leave behind the acquired habitation of one’s 
values to discover the other moral and political lives one has yet to live (Thoreau, 
1995: 209). 
To extend my account of how perfectionist, Thoreauian debt advice manuals can 
promote ordinary democratic subjectivity, I turn now to my second example, 
which I suggest takes exemplarity further than does Your Money or Your Life. 
The book in question is an autobiographical account of debt-free living entitled 
Walden on Wheels: On the Open Road From Debt to Freedom (Ilgunas, 2013). 
Walden on Wheels recounts an experiment in avoiding debt undertaken by an 
American college student, Ken Ilgunas, who sets about changing the way he 
lives. Saddled with a student debt of US$27,000 and sick of being a self-
proclaimed ‘loan drone’ (Ilgunas, 2013: 14) pushing carts at his local Home 
Depot store, Ilgunas takes the scissors to his high-visibility work apron one day 
and hits the road.  
Four years, much frugality, and a lot of Alaskan wilderness later, a debt-free Ken 
embarks on a graduate degree while secretly camping out as a van-dweller in a 
car park at Duke University. Ilgunas’s van-dwelling experiment is designed not 
only to keep him out of debt but also to draw attention to the extension of finance 
into daily life, whereby people have come to accept the normality of being 
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under-paid and dependent on finance to access shelter, education, and health 
care. At the end of his experiment, Ilgunas finds that he has succeeded in ways 
he could not have imagined when he first cut up his work apron and walked 
away from the Home Depot store. By the end of his experiment, Ken has paid off 
his original student debt and avoided taking on more debt for his graduate 
studies, courtesy of some unusual living arrangements and varied work choices. 
But more importantly from a perfectionist point of view, Ken has achieved a 
sense of independence from what he describes as a consumer society of ‘boob 
jobs and sweaters on dogs and environmental devastation of incalculable 
proportions’ (Ilgunas, 2013: 259). He has become self-reliant in an Emersonian 
sense: able to perceive the socially dictated terms of self-fashioning that structure 
his society and prepared to publicly voice which of these terms he is prepared to 
accept as his own, and which he thinks must be renegotiated. 
Ken has also become an ordinary exemplar, in that he manifests for others 
another way of approaching work, finance, and consumption. Ken exposes the 
outcomes of his experiment in self-reliance to others: he publishes a popular 
article on his experiment, speaks at his graduation ceremony, and is offered a 
writing job at an independent magazine. Significantly, given the idea of 
exemplarity, Ken also provokes self-reliant judgement in people around him, 
including his best friend, Josh. To pay off his student loans, Josh spends a large 
part of the duration of Ken’s experiment mired, ironically, in an educational 
recruitment job where he is trained in ‘the seven-step sales process’ to get people 
to sign up for substandard, overpriced, debt-creating degrees at a for-profit online 
college (Ilgunas, 2013: 160). By the end of Ken’s experiment, however, Josh has 
been provoked to leave his job. He approaches a law firm that is filing a class 
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action against his former employer and testifies as a whistleblower before the US 
Senate about the predatory practices of the for-profit college industry. Ken has 
acted as an ordinary exemplar by inspiring others around him, like Josh, to 
examine the defensibility of their ways of living and to interrogate their place 
within the broader political economy of debt-based economic citizenship. 
It would be easy for Ken to stop here, content with his achievements and with his 
newly attained self. But Ken is unable to shake a sense of the incompleteness of 
his experiment. He feels a need to move from one circumference of the self to 
the next via an ongoing unsettling of his thinking. Not content to rest with his 
newly attained self, Ken continues to act as his own internal spectator. Perhaps 
his experiment has become dogmatic and moralising, Ken contemplates. ‘It was 
easy for me to see now that when we try to be a “Thoreau” or a “minimalist,” or 
when we try to live according to a strict ideology, we begin to confuse someone 
else’s needs with our own’ (Ilgunas, 2013: 282).  
In adopting this minimalism, has Ken failed to engage with the very term—
debt—that underpins his experiment, and hence the terms of his relations with 
others? Ken thinks about all the people who have helped him along the way. He 
thinks of his ingratitude in refusing the gifts that, he asserts, ‘ha[ve] been forging 
and fortifying human relationships since the dawn of man’ (Ilgunas, 2013: 281). 
Ken turns down the job offer and starts to write a book-length account of his 
experiment, to recount his story on account of others, in order to make good on 
the very debt upon which his quest for self-reliance turns out to be based. ‘It is 
difficult to begin without borrowing, but perhaps it is the most generous course 
thus to permit your fellow-men to have an interest in your enterprise,’ remarks 
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the narrator of Walden (Thoreau, 1995: 26). The interest in the enterprises of 
Ilgunas and Thoreau, the interest on their debts, takes the form of Walden and 
Walden on Wheels. 
Like Your Money or Your Life, both Thoreau’s and Ilgunas’s accounts of living 
debt-free give rise to subjects who seek to redeem an alternative vocabulary of 
economy. To borrow Cavell’s phrasing, these experiments help to ‘win back 
from [the network of economic terms] possession of our words’ by ‘replacing 
them into a reconceived human existence’ (Cavell, 1992: 92). Perfectionist 
accounts of avoiding debt, whether autobiographical in nature or taking the form 
of a debt advice manual, reveal alternative resonances of words such as 
‘accounting’, ‘frugality’, and ‘self-reliance’, while also redeeming the concept of 
debt itself. Turning away from financial capability accounts of financial freedom 
as sovereign autonomy, and away from the idea that dependence on others is 
something to be avoided at all costs, the authors of these perfectionist debt-free 
living accounts acknowledge relational debts to others, while cultivating self-
reliance. 
Our ability to think creatively about the type of economy in which we wish to 
live might depend on just the disposition to self-reliance that a Cavellian 
ordinary exemplar makes manifest. This disposition involves turning away from 
a settled moral or political position; it entails the ability to depart from and revise 
the habitation of one’s judgement, to engage in companionable thinking yet 
remain vigilant of ‘the They’. The point of building one’s house is to leave it, to 
realise the several more lives one has to live. ‘There are many stages to life, and I 
must acquiesce to my soul’s shifting priorities’ (Ken Ilgunas, as cited in Wolk-
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Stanley, 2015: n.p.). Such are the provocations that perfectionist accounts of 
debt-free living have to offer. The question for each of us is whether we will 
choose to acknowledge or avoid their example.  
I would like to end this third section of the chapter by returning to the concepts 
of financial capability and self-reliance in order to ask what the relationship 
between these two ideas might be. A part of my argument that has remained 
implicit up to this point is that financial capability and self-reliance are related by 
‘family resemblances’, rather than being diametrically opposed. It will be helpful 
to return to Cavell’s account of perfectionism to make this argument.  
In Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, Cavell (1990a) notes that 
Emersonian moral perfectionism is necessarily shadowed by what he calls 
‘debased’ perfectionisms. Cavell (1990a: 16) argues that:  
False or debased perfectionisms seem everywhere these days, from 
bestselling books with titles like Love Yourself to the television 
advertisement on behalf of Army recruitment with the slogan, “Be all that 
you can be.”  
Debased perfectionism is evident, Cavell (2004: 11–2, emphasis in original) 
proposes, ‘when someone is glad to tell you how to be all you can be, or…to 
promise you fulfilment through day trading on the stock market.’ Elsewhere 
Cavell (2005b: 27) cites as an expression of debased perfectionism the pompous 
advice Polonius offers to his son Laertes, in Hamlet: ‘Neither a borrower nor a 
lender be.’ In this example, an ideal of being uninvolved in the lives of others 
masquerades as self-reliance.  
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In debased perfectionisms, the individual is enrolled in programmes of self-
development that encourage her to conform to existing paradigms without testing 
the criteria and value of the status quo. Adaptation rather than self-reliance is at 
stake. Debt advice texts, as I have shown, can invite the reader to test the wisdom 
of societal norms, as well as the author’s own advice. Alternatively, they can 
issue a debased perfectionist call for the reader to follow in the author’s 
footsteps, thus telling the reader what she should be. When acting in accordance 
with such debased perfectionisms, one risks enacting not self-creation but self-
negation (Mahon, 2014: 10). Financial capability is therefore not so much the 
other of self-reliance as its debasement or parody. Like the call of the army for 
you to be all you can be within its regimented system of violence, financial 
capability asks of individuals that they accommodate and adapt themselves to the 
status quo of living in a financialised society. 
Cavell’s suggestion that perfectionism tends to be accompanied by its 
debasement raises an important question, which he phrases thus: ‘ought we to let 
the fact of debased or parodistic versions of a possibility deprive us of the good 
of the possibility?’ (Cavell, 1990a: 16). To consider the topic at hand: ought we 
let the existence of debased versions of self-reliance in financial literacy 
education deprive us of the democratic value of autonomy and education? The 
answers to these questions depend on the attitude we take to debased 
perfectionisms. Cavell (1990a: 18, 2004: 11) illustrates this point in relation to 
another of Polonius’s mottos: ‘to thine own self be true.’ This phrase, Cavell 
(1990a: 18) argues, ‘has become all but uncitable as its vulgarizing of good 
advice is vulgarly cited as good advice.’ Yet, he notes, we can approach this 
debased advice in one of two ways: 
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[E]ven here, or here concentrated, there is a despairing and a hopeful 
way to respond: you can hear in [Polonius’s aphorism] redemptive words 
reduced to serving a server, used by a man lost to experience, spoiled by 
his voice, or nonvoice; or you can hear in the words the sound of the 
good heart making a momentary, flickering way back, perhaps called 
back by the man’s taking leave of his son, reminded of his own youth, 
even into this cave of convention. (Cavell, 1990a: 18, my emphasis) 
That there is a hopeful way to respond to imperfection is central to the 
perfectionist attitude to democracy. The perfectionist strives to maintain hope in 
the face of the widespread disappointments of an often deeply imperfect 
democracy, such as those we encounter as debtor-citizens in financialised 
society. To return to the epigraph to my discussion of Cavell’s thinking in 
Chapter Three: 
If there is a perfectionism not only compatible with democracy but 
necessary to it, it lies not in excusing democracy for its inevitable 
failures, or looking to rise above them, but in teaching how to respond to 
those failures, and to one’s compromise by them, otherwise than by 
excuse or withdrawal. (Cavell, 1990a: 18)  
Rather than withdrawing or recoiling from instances of debased perfectionism 
and imperfect democracy, perhaps we might look for the ‘flickering’ of their 
betterment. Within debt advice, for example, even the conventional financial 
capability debt advice text need not be entirely without potential. As Liam 
Stanley and his co-authors (2016: 80) observe of online debtors’ advice forums, 
‘it is worth being clear that either aspiring towards or actually living debt free in 
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a society and a historical moment so infused with debt is an act of resistance 
nonetheless, whatever route is taken to get there.’ And so in giving voice to the 
desire of individuals to be freed from constraint, even the orthodox financial 
capability advice manual might contain within itself the makings of its better 
neighbour. 
4. Rethinking everyday financial literacies in IPE 
To the IPE scholar interested in the operation of power, politics, and discipline 
through finance, an emphasis on individual integrity, alternative measures of 
value, and personal frugality might seem naïve, even complicit in the constraints 
on people’s lives that neoliberalism creates. Yet in presenting financial self-help 
as the means by which people ‘try to adjust themselves to the changes brought by 
late capitalism’ (Fridman, 2014: 92), critical scholars risk becoming blind to the 
ways people move variably within and beyond the economic subject positions 
laid out for them. This blindness is a version of what I called, at the beginning of 
the thesis, aspect-blindness. 
This argument is important because critical evaluations of financial literacy have 
grown in number in recent years, as I showed in Chapter One (see, for example, 
Finlayson, 2009, 2008, Marron, 2012, 2014; Clarke, 2015; Santos, 2016; 
Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a). Political economists have shown how 
financial education makes individuals responsible for their own well-being and 
economic security (Marron, 2009; Clarke, 2015). At the same time, scholars in 
IPE and related fields are taking aim at cultural agendas of thrift and self-reliance 
as instantiations of neoliberalism and austerity politics after crisis (Bramall, 
2013; Stanley, 2014; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016a; Santos, 2016). 
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Writing in New Political Economy, for example, Santos (2016: 1) denounces 
financial literacy as a ‘neoliberal cultural project of cultivating self-reliance and 
individual responsibility at the expense of collective forms of provision across 
new areas of economic and social life.’ Writing on the neighbouring domain of 
financial self-help, Fridman (2014: 101) argues that ‘[f]inancial self-help is a 
neoliberal project because it supplies practitioners with discourses and practices 
that seek to turn them into autonomous subjects responsible for their financial 
well-being and who value independence over anything else.’  
The debt avoidance texts I have studied in this chapter urge caution in the face of 
these bold statements about financial education. As I have shown, debt advice 
manuals and debt-free living texts vary in the extent to which they reproduce a 
cultural-economic imaginary of financial capability. Some authors are motivated 
by a perfectionist spirit and act as exemplars to provoke a democratic ethic of 
self-reliance in their readers. Attempts at financial self-improvement through 
debt-free living are therefore not uniform in their politics and ethics. 
This diversity is something ordinary language philosophers remind us of, by 
asking us to attend to the subtle yet politically and ethically charged differences 
between concepts as they are used in different situations. An ordinary language 
philosophical approach invites us to think carefully about the gradations among 
concepts that are often held to be synonymous, such as, for example, egoism, 
individualism, autonomy, independence, and self-reliance. Emphasising both the 
variation among financial educations and the differences within concepts marked 
by family resemblances is not a trivial move. By treating examples not (only) as 
instantiations of general financial logics but (also) as exemplars to think with, we 
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escape the craving for generality. We also come to see that seemingly 
synonymous words and concepts can have very different implications in terms of 
ethics, agency, and responsibility. 
This is not to deny that many debt advice texts teach a sovereign mastery of the 
self, use a mode of didactic instruction, and accommodate the reader to debt-
based economic citizenship. However, others teach non-conformity and 
acknowledge our interdependence with others, while exhorting the reader to test 
and find her own way of living. Texts both discipline and enable. As Poon and 
Olen (2015: 275, my emphasis) argue: 
financial literacy is posed as an enormous benefit to ordinary people. It 
pulls and stretches the emancipatory politics of literacy, drawing a strong 
analogy between contemporary financial competence and old-fashioned 
reading skills. Does the analogy work? Is it compelling? It all depends on 
what you have been reading.  
My argument therefore differs from the dominant critical view of everyday 
financial literacies in two key respects. First, where IPE scholars criticise the 
promotion of autonomy as involving the abandonment of the individual to 
market forces, I argue that there is good reason to question the ‘abandonment of 
autonomy’ itself (Button, 2015). Second, drawing on Cavell’s arguments about 
democratic subjectivity, I question the presumed opposition between individual 
self-reliance and collective politics that seems to structure this work. As Hammer 
(2002: 130) observes, for Cavell, ‘citizenship implies an obligation to seek a 
discovery of my own position, i.e. self-knowledge, so as to reveal with whom I 
am in community, that is, how far we can speak for each other.’ Self-reliance, in 
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its Emersonian guise, is not opposed to collective politics and care for others but 
is rather the very medium for expressing these politics and ethics. Thus the 
problem with orthodox financial capability advice is not that it encourages 
autonomy per se but that it teaches a debased autonomy, not that it 
‘responsibilises’ but that it offers an impoverished understanding of what 
responsibility and freedom can be.  
Concluding remarks 
Practices of avoiding debt and living debt-free are unlikely to reach the threshold 
for political resistance used by many IPE scholars examining debt-based 
economic citizenship (although see Stanley et al., 2016). However, in this 
chapter I have used Cavell’s concept of the ordinary exemplar to argue that 
avoiding debt can be both a practice of resistance and a way of developing 
democratic individual subjectivity. My examination of debt advice manuals and 
debt-free living autobiographies thus suggests a more ambiguous situation than 
critical accounts of financial education usually convey. While some debt advice 
manuals teach orthodox financial capability, others act as ordinary exemplars of 
self-reliance, understood as the development of independent judgement.  
To make this argument, I began by tracing the concept of the ordinary exemplar, 
based on Cavell’s understanding of Emerson’s moral perfectionism and 
Thoreau’s account of self-reliance in Walden. I showed that the ordinary 
exemplar is not content with her attained self but rather, through 
experimentation, pushes herself on to a further or next self. Exemplarity requires 
developing self-reflection, so that one can come to rely on one’s opinions and 
develop one’s own voice. The resultant ‘integrity’ allows the individual to 
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contest dominant values and political claims, and hence to manifest for others 
another way. Exemplarity is therefore not a solo practice; rather, it requires 
dialogue with concrete or internal others, as well as the others brought forth in 
literature, as Cavell’s reading of Walden suggests. 
Next, I turned to evaluate the exemplary potential of debt advice manuals. I 
began by linking these manuals to a cultural-economic imaginary of financial 
capability. I showed how financial capability debt advice manuals use an 
addiction narrative to promote a teleological journey to ‘debt freedom.’ Freedom 
is understood in a negative sense as freedom from the interference of others. This 
freedom is to be obtained through strict personal financial accounting and by 
following the example of didactic texts to the letter. Moreover, financial 
capability debt advice manuals neglect the structural conditions of personal 
indebtedness and mount limited political critique of these conditions. Such texts 
are therefore not perfectionist in the Cavellian sense, for they do not provoke 
self-reliance as both thinking for oneself and thinking critically about society’s 
values and criteria. 
In section three, I showed that this financial capability approach is not exhaustive 
of all debt advice manuals. Debt advice texts are not always conservative 
enactments of a neoliberal status quo. They can transform the individualist self 
into an ordinary exemplar who challenges the false freedoms afforded by debt-
based economic citizenship. I augmented my analysis of debt advice manuals 
with the example of Walden on Wheels, an autobiographical account of living 
debt-free. I then returned to the relationship between financial capability and 
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self-reliance to show that this relationship is not one of opposition. Instead, 
financial capability is the debased perfectionist equivalent of self-reliance. 
Finally, returning to IPE and to the everyday financial literacies work I 
canvassed in Chapter One, I argued that it is important to draw these distinctions 
among different forms of popular debt advice and financial education because 
financial literacy programmes have tended to strike IPE scholars uniformly as a 
manifestation of neoliberal discipline and constraint. By contrast, my reading 
suggests that the subjects of debt advice in financial self-help books sometimes 
exceed the discipline of financial capability discourses. The books themselves 
can redeem the concept of autonomy by showing it under another aspect, as a 
precondition for acting as an ordinary exemplar and creating an ordinary 
democratic ‘I’. In the next chapter I link this ‘I’ to the ‘you’ by discussing the 
‘passionate utterance’ as the second element of my Cavellian grammar of 
democratic personhood or subjectivity. I show how a perfectionist form of debt 
auditing links the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ in a responsive relationship, whereby 
‘auditing’ becomes a practice of listening receptively to others. 
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Chapter Five: Auditing Debt 
 
That we are not transparent to ourselves means that…criticism demands 
confrontation and conversation. 
– Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a 
Register of the Moral Life (2004) 
 
Debt auditing has become a prominent tactic of resistance in the afterlives of the 
global financial crisis. Social movements and activist groups in Belgium, France, 
Spain, Tunisia, and the UK, to name but a few examples, are conducting citizen-
led audits to call for greater transparency in government finance and with the aim 
of having particular debts declared illegitimate. In this chapter, I examine how a 
London-based activist group called Debt Resistance UK has used debt auditing 
to challenge local authority debts to private banks in Britain. I use Cavell’s 
concept of the passionate utterance, which I introduced in Chapter Three, to 
frame this study. As I outlined there, Cavell develops this concept when he 
revisits Austin’s work on speech acts, with the aim of bringing the perlocutionary 
dimension of speech out of the shadows of Austin’s analysis. Cavell shows that 
the perlocutionary holds the key to understanding how people use emotional and 
passionate speech to establish ethical and political relationships, especially with 
the aim of persuading others to change.  
Drawing on this conceptual discussion, I argue that ordinary democratic 
exchange about finance is best achieved by working in a passionate rather than a 
performative register of speech. Substantively, I contend that Debt Resistance 
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UK’s public debt auditing work approximates a Cavellian passionate utterance, 
although to limited perfectionist effect due to the imaginary of transparency that 
underpins the practice of auditing. As a ritualised way of demonstrating 
transparency in public life, auditing makes it difficult to engender responsive 
exchange between citizens and governance figures. For this reason, while Debt 
Resistance UK’s public performances of debt auditing have been successful in 
bringing local authority indebtedness to public attention, these performances 
have to date proved relatively ‘infelicitous’ as a passionate utterance in 
persuading governance figures to change. By contrast, Debt Resistance UK’s 
behind-the-scenes auditing speech, which members have used to challenge 
gendered inequalities of labour and opportunity within the group, comes much 
closer to the type of perfectionist exchange Cavell suggests passionate utterances 
can spark. This latter example offers a democratic counterpoint to the ritualised 
performance of audit within liberal financial governance. It does so by returning 
us to an ordinary usage of ‘auditing’ as a practice of listening, revealing 
responsiveness to be a criterion of democratic auditing. 
I develop this argument across four sections. In section one, I deepen my account 
of the passionate utterance, which I introduced in Chapter Three as a 
counterpoint to Austin’s understanding of the performative utterance. Recall that 
while the success of a performative utterance is judged in terms of whether or not 
it brings a conventional effect or state of affairs into being, the success of a 
passionate utterance lies in whether it brings a new perfectionist ethical and 
political relationship into being. Given this relational emphasis, and to better 
reflect on the example of Debt Resistance UK, I extend Cavell’s discussion of 
the passionate utterance by linking it to his work on friendship. The relationship 
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of friendship might seem an odd model for democratic confrontation in finance. 
However, adopting an attitude of political friendship toward others can enable 
responsive democratic exchange, as I undertake to show in the case of Debt 
Resistance UK. 
In section two, I introduce the debt auditing activities of Debt Resistance UK and 
situate these activities within a broader cultural-economic imaginary of 
transparency. The central government in the UK is promoting transparency 
through an ‘armchair auditing’ agenda that directs non-expert lay auditors to 
make use of openly available government data to scrutinise government 
accounts. The aim of this armchair auditing agenda is to reduce fiscal ‘waste’ 
and to rebuild trust in government. However, citizen debt auditors such as Debt 
Resistance UK have translated this agenda into a more radical anti-austerity 
politics. Looking at Debt Resistance UK’s local authority debt auditing 
campaign, I demonstrate that the group’s public auditing of the conduct of local 
authorities and private banks fulfils most of the basic conditions of a passionate 
utterance. From a perfectionist point of view, however, the group’s passionate 
utterances have to date ultimately proved ‘infelicitous’ because they have not 
resulted in responsiveness on the part of those at whom they are directed.  
In section three of the chapter, I move from these ‘frontstage’ performances of 
dissent to what Erving Goffman (1956: 69–82) calls the ‘backstage’: the 
mundane activities and efforts that stand behind public presentations of self. 
Turning to the backstage allows me to discuss an example of a more fruitful 
process of passionate utterance and democratic conversational exchange. In 
particular, I argue that the backstage ‘auditing’ of gendered conduct within Debt 
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Resistance UK has been more ‘felicitous’, in perfectionist terms, than the group’s 
frontstage work because it has successfully addressed claims about unequal 
gender relations within the group. This example shows how auditing can be 
practised to engender substantive democratic responsiveness rather than a form 
of procedural transparency.  
I end the chapter by making the case for passionate utterance as a useful 
conceptual addition to work on the expressive dimensions of financial 
performativity, thus returning to my criticism of the partial way in which 
ordinary language philosophy has been inherited and used by political 
economists. Those using a cultural political economy approach to IPE have 
shown the importance of emotion, affect, and expressivity to the enactment of 
liberal financial governance. By contrast, a Cavellian reading shows how 
passionate speech can transform liberal financial governance practices, such as 
auditing, into modes of democratic exchange. Passionate utterance, I conclude, 
has an important role to play in generating both ordinary democratic 
intersubjectivity and everyday democratic control of finance.  
1. Cavell on issuing a passionate utterance 
Cavell’s engagements with Austinian ordinary language philosophy range from 
his early defence of Austinian procedures (Cavell, 1976), which I outlined in my 
discussion of the ‘claim to community’ in Chapter Three, to his autobiographical 
reflections on the revolutionary effects Austin’s ideas have had on his work 
(Cavell, 1994). Across his career, Cavell shows himself to be an assiduous 
follower of Austin. However, in an essay entitled ‘Performative and Passionate 
Utterance’, Cavell (2005a) issues a friendly challenge to his mentor. In this 
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essay, Cavell sets out to explore a difficulty he finds in Austin’s work, which he 
diagnoses as Austin’s ‘relative, continued neglect of the passions, or say the 
expressive, in speech’ (Cavell, 2005a: 159).  
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin associates the performative character of 
language (that is, language’s quality as action) with illocutionary force (or the 
way in which an action, such as warning someone, is accomplished in the act of 
uttering something), while setting aside the perlocutionary effect (or what is done 
by or as a consequence of the utterance; that is, the effects of the warning) as too 
broad and too unconventional to warrant systematic attention. Consider Austin’s 
(1962: 109, emphasis in original) words to this effect:  
It is certain that the perlocutionary sense of “doing an action” must 
somehow be ruled out as irrelevant to the sense in which an utterance, if 
the issuing of it is the “doing of an action”, is performative…For clearly 
any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in 
sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without 
calculation, of any utterance whatsoever. 
Given this unpredictable quality, Austin discontinues his study of perlocutionary 
effects in favour of examining illocutionary force. Yet this omission of the 
perlocutionary from Austin’s otherwise detailed discussion of speech acts runs 
counter to his own interest in the ethical entailments of speech (as seen, for 
example, in the reflections on elaboratives in ‘A Plea for Excuses’ that I 
discussed in Chapter Two). By eliding the perlocutionary from his discussion, 
Austin closes off insights into the ways in which passionate speech can produce 
ethical understanding alongside more conventional forms of moral 
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argumentation and reasoning (Crary, 2006: 57). In sum, by prioritising 
illocutionary force over perlocutionary effect, Austin systematically discounts 
the way in which people use expressive and passionate speech to establish ethical 
and political relationships with others. 
Cavell takes up where Austin leaves off by offering a detailed exploration of the 
perlocutionary effects of an utterance. Most importantly, Cavell argues that 
passionate speech is structured as perlocutionary effect rather than as 
illocutionary force. In speaking, I can bring off a conventional state of affairs 
through the workings of illocutionary force. For example, in uttering ‘I do’, and 
following a number of related conventional procedures (of speech but also 
physical action, such as placing a ring on my beloved’s finger), I become 
married. However, I can also use my speech to establish a new, unconventional 
relationship with another, in which case there are no illocutionary procedures to 
guide me. For instance, if I profess my love to someone who is forbidden to me, I 
make an improvisational claim on this other person that renders me vulnerable to 
the risk of rejection. 
It is worth clarifying at this point that Cavell envisages the passionate and the 
performative as two potential routes the subject takes in speaking, rather than as 
fully separate classes of utterance. As Das (2014: 284) elaborates, the 
performative and the passionate:  
appear to Cavell not as two types of utterances but as two possibilities of 
the speech act—the first opening up the possibility of participation in the 
order of law…and the second as the improvisation stemming from the 
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disorders of desire in which the speech act renders the speaker vulnerable 
to risks.  
Here Das picks up on Cavell’s (2006: 273, citation in original omitted) remark 
that ‘[a] performative utterance is an offer of participation in the order of law. A 
passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the disorders of desire. 
Both seem registers of the political life.’ 
To better understand this distinction between performative and passionate 
speech, it is helpful to follow Cavell in picking out the differences between the 
illocutionary act (as a hallmark of the performative utterance) and the 
perlocutionary act (as a mark of the passionate utterance). Just as there are 
illocutionary verbs, so too we can identify perlocutionary ones. To begin, Cavell 
notes that illocutionary and perlocutionary verbs act in different ways. As he 
explains:  
perlocutionary verbs not only do not name what they do (as to say the 
illocutionary “I promise, beseech, order, banish…you” is to promise, 
beseech, order, banish…you), they cannot…unprotectedly be said at all: 
to utter “I seduce, alarm, amuse…you” is not only not to do anything, it is 
in an obvious sense not so much as to say anything. (Cavell, 2005a: 171, 
emphasis in original) 
Cavell’s charge of non-sense in these instances arises because if I were able to 
say ‘I seduce you’, ‘I embarrass you’, or ‘I harass you’ in an illocutionary way, 
‘I would be exercising some hypnotic or other ray-like power over you, you 
would have lost your freedom in responding to my speech’ (Cavell, 2005a: 172). 
As Cavell’s examples demonstrate, the you is essential to any passionate 
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utterance. That is to say, ‘the claim to my having embarrassed or harassed you by 
saying something must come primarily from you, not me’ (Cavell, 2005a: 179). 
The centrality of the second person to a passionate utterance marks a key point of 
difference from the performative utterance. Cavell (2006: 271) summarises this 
variance thus: ‘Austin says: In a performative utterance the “I” comes essentially 
into the picture. I will add: In a passionate utterance, the “you” comes essentially 
into the picture.’ Passionate utterance opens up an uncertain space of exchange 
between the two of us, as I seek to establish my position or ‘standing’ with you 
and to garner acknowledgement of my passionate claim. This quest to establish 
my right to make a claim is necessary because, as Das (2014: 284) notes, 
‘passionate statements such as “I love you” cannot rely upon convention but 
must stake a claim to be unique to that speaker and that addressee.’ As a result, 
my passionate proclamation of love is unlikely to be ‘unhappy’ on the basis that I 
have invoked the wrong formula or that I lack the authority to make such a 
claim. (For who else could authorise my claim? Who else knows my feelings as I 
do?) Indeed, if you refute my claim on these grounds, you risk not a ‘misfire’ or 
‘abuse’ of speech (which are Austin’s main classifications of how performatives 
can go wrong) but a sense on my part that your proceduralism is offensively 
misplaced in the face of my passion. 
Based on his exploration of the differences between the illocutionary and the 
perlocutionary, Cavell formulates a set of conditions for the successful fulfilment 
of perlocutionary objectives in a passionate utterance. These conditions are to be 
read with an eye to their contrast with the illocutionary conditions of the 
performative, which I list first. 
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Austin’s illocutionary conditions 
1. There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain 
words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
2. The particular persons and circumstances in a particular case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
3. The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and 
4. Completely. 
5. Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having 
certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain 
consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those 
thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
themselves, and further, 
6. Must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.  
(Cavell, 2005a: 165, citing Austin, 1962: 14-15). 
Cavell’s perlocutionary conditions 
1. There is no conventional procedure and effect. The speaker is on his or 
her own to create the desired effect. 
2a. (In the absence of an accepted conventional procedure, there are no 
antecedently specified persons. Appropriateness is to be decided in each 
case; it is at issue in each. I am not invoking a procedure but inviting an 
exchange. Hence:) 
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 I must declare myself (explicitly or implicitly) to have standing with you 
(be appropriate) in the given case. 
2b. I therewith single you out (as appropriate) in the given case.  
 (Illocutionary conditions 3 and 4 have no analogues for perlocutionary 
acts, there being no antecedent procedure in effect.) 
5a. In speaking from my passion I must actually be suffering the passion 
(evincing, expressing, not to say displaying it—though this may go 
undeciphered, perhaps willfully, by the other), in order rightfully to 
5b. Demand from you a response in kind, one you are in turn moved to offer, 
and moreover 
6. Now 
7. You may contest my invitation to exchange, at any or all of the points 
marked by the list of conditions for the successful perlocutionary act, for 
example, deny that I have standing with you, or question my 
consciousness of my passion, or dismiss the demand for the kind of 
response I seek, or ask to postpone it, or worse. I may or may not have 
further means of response. (We may understand such exchanges as 
instances of, or attempts at, moral education.) 
(Adapted from Cavell, 2005a: 165, 180–2, with omission of a 
clarification; emphasis in original). 
As these contrasting lists suggest, the ‘unhappiness’ of a passionate utterance has 
altogether different stakes to the infelicity of a performative. Indeed, from an 
ethical point of view, an absence of illocutionary force (in the form of a misfire 
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or abuse of speech, such that a speech act is not successfully carried off) may be 
less significant than the avoidance of the entailment of a perlocutionary effect, 
which is its invitation to exchange. If the illocutionary act of my becoming 
married to you is infelicitous because the purser rather than the captain 
undertook to marry us, it is all right, matters can be rectified: the captain is likely 
close to hand (Cavell, 2005a: 184). A return to convention will remedy this 
misfire, suggesting ‘our future is at issue, but the way back, or forward, is not 
lost’ (Cavell, 2005a: 184). If, on the other hand, I single you out in my passionate 
utterance, if I declare my love for you (or, equally, my disapprobation of you), I 
am seeking your acknowledgement of my passionate claim and to provoke the 
perlocutionary effect of persuading you of my love (or, in the case of my 
disapproval, of persuading you to change). If you turn away, if you fail to 
acknowledge my passionate utterance as an opening to exchange, this is an 
altogether unhappier state of affairs: our future together is put radically at stake 
(Cavell, 2005a: 184). 
Cavell concludes his seventh perlocutionary condition, for which he finds no 
illocutionary analogue, by describing the exchanges issuing from passionate 
utterance as ‘instances of, or attempts at, moral education’ (Cavell, 2005a: 182). 
Cavell does not distinguish between ethics and morality but instead uses these 
phrases interchangeably, so he is talking about an open ethical conversation or 
exchange, rather than moralising advice that tells someone what to do. 
Importantly, Cavell uses this phrase to underscore his sense of the perfectionist 
potential of passionate utterances. He also registers this potential in the subtitle 
of an earlier version of the essay entitled ‘Performative and Passionate Utterance: 
Morals of Encounter’ (Cavell, 2005b). Passionate utterance, this wording makes 
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clear, creates a perfectionist, constitutive ethical encounter between the two 
parties. Aletta Norval (2009: 171–2, emphasis in original) underlines the 
constitutive character of this relationship by noting that:  
...in contrast to illocutionary acts where the position of the subject is more 
or less given by a set of conventions and procedures, in the case of 
perlocutionary acts the emphasis is explicitly upon the constitution of a 
relation between the maker of a claim and the addressee of that claim and 
on the constitution of identity in that process.  
A successful passionate utterance sets up a relationship that constructs and 
reconstructs subjectivities through exchange, as a person or group takes on board 
to a greater or lesser degree another person’s or group’s understanding of them. 
In the final part of this section, I suggest that the perfectionist potential of 
passionate utterances is most clearly elaborated by Cavell in his discussion of 
friendship, and in particular within his studies of what he calls the remarriage 
comedy (Cavell, 1981, 2004). I briefly outlined Cavell’s reading of comedies of 
remarriage in Chapter Three, but here I seek to deepen the understanding of 
friendship that Cavell’s analysis of these films enables. 
The comedy of remarriage is a genre of Hollywood film from the 1930s and 
1940s in which the getting back together of a separated couple depends on their 
achievement of what Cavell (1981: 87) calls, following the poet John Milton, ‘a 
meet and happy conversation.’ Comedies of remarriage start from the separation 
of a man and a woman who have become unintelligible to each other. For a 
second chance (a remarriage) to become possible, the partners must re-establish 
not merely conversation with each other but a mode of conversation that changes 
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them. The films go on to demonstrate that the estranged couple who succeed in 
rebuilding their lives together (or who resume their ‘pursuit of happiness’, as the 
title of Cavell’s remarriage comedy book phrases it) do so through passionate 
confrontation in which each acknowledges a claim that his or her conduct has 
been lacking. A ‘meet and happy conversation’ is not founded on complacent 
consensus. Instead, it embraces disagreement and mutual confrontation as the 
conditions of possibility for the next self of both partners, and hence of their 
continued relationship. 
Cavell links the aversive friendship of remarriage comedy to civic life, in which 
a renewal of relations is also required if the repeated disappointments of an 
imperfect democracy are to be overcome and a new union established. It is far 
from coincidental that the title of Cavell’s book on remarriage comedy echoes 
the guarantee in the US Declaration of Independence of the ‘pursuit of 
happiness’. This phrasing indicates the close link Cavell sees between the public 
and the private in the development of democratic intersubjectivity. In his later 
work, Cavell (2004) pays particular attention to ‘civic friendship’ (Turpin, 2011: 
114), which he continues to interpret via the remarriage comedy but also in 
dialogue with Aristotle’s (1998) Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle sets out, in the 
Ethics, to define what makes the friend good, as a virtue ethicist is inclined to do. 
By contrast, Cavell (2004: 361–2) defines conversation, and hence the 
achievement and maintenance of the relationship of friendship itself, as the good 
to be achieved. In emphasising the relationship ‘itself as the measure of the 
good’ (rather than specific virtues), Cavell opens up a perfectionist 
understanding of civic friendship that is premised on a commitment to ‘learning 
what living together can be’ (Cavell, 2004: 362). 
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The final feature of Cavell’s perfectionist friendship, and one that further 
differentiates his vision of friendship from Aristotle’s, is that ‘the equality 
demanded by Aristotle…is not established before [the friends’] conversation; it 
rather seems to be the goal of their conversation’ (Cavell, 2004: 367). Civic 
friendship practiced through passionate utterance seeks to produce mutuality, or 
reciprocal standing, between the two parties. This commitment to the possibility 
of conversation across existing inequalities and differentials of power is 
important in the type of imperfect democracy that I described in Chapter One’s 
discussion of debt-based economic citizenship. The democratic subject who acts 
as a civic friend will often have to confront another party against the backdrop of 
significant inequalities and injustices in their relationship. There is an important 
parallel here with the intimate friendship of the remarriage comedy, which, given 
the historical context of the films, takes place against the backdrop of gender 
inequalities and the emerging demands by women for substantive self-realisation 
in their relationships with men (Cavell, 1981: 17–8; Mulhall, 1994: 237). 
Passionate utterance, as a form of conversational exchange between intimate 
friends (in remarriage comedy) or civic ones (in public life), seeks to engender 
equality, as well as responsiveness, a point that will become important to my 
analysis of Debt Resistance UK. 
Let me summarise the conceptual ground I have covered in this first section of 
the chapter. Cavell extends Austin’s discussion of performativity by examining 
the perlocutionary effect as a neglected dimension of speech act theory. He finds 
that the perlocutionary is a site of language’s passionate and expressive qualities, 
and that perlocutionary speech, structured as passionate utterance, creates a space 
of ethical confrontation and conversational exchange. A passionate utterance 
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differs from a performative one in lacking specifiable procedures and fixed 
subject positions; indeed, it creates a constitutive relationship between speakers 
that enables the parties to the conversation to realise themselves differently. 
Within this relationship, the ‘unhappiness’ of a passionate utterance has 
altogether different stakes to those of illocutionary ‘misfire’ or ‘abuse’: failures 
of acknowledgement put the speakers’ future together at stake. Despite these 
risks and vulnerabilities, or precisely because of them, passionate utterance is an 
important part of a perfectionist democratic ethics because it opens up 
possibilities for mutual confrontation and democratic intersubjectivity. A 
passionate utterance becomes perfectionist in character when it takes the form of 
a critical exchange between intimate or civic ‘friends’, who come to accord each 
other standing as partners in conversation, with the result that one or both parties 
are led to a change of conduct. 
Having examined Cavell’s concept of the passionate utterance, I change tack in 
section two to consider the case of Debt Resistance UK. I seek to demonstrate 
that Debt Resistance UK’s debt auditing work approximates a form of passionate 
utterance, although I argue that the success of this utterance is ultimately limited 
by the ritualised way in which transparency is practised in relation to public 
finances. Practices of civic freedom do not exist apart from the practices of 
governance that incite them (Tully, 2008), so it is not surprising that Debt 
Resistance UK’s debt auditing bears the mark of a cultural-economic imaginary 
of transparency. I begin my discussion of Debt Resistance UK’s work from the 
widespread valorisation of transparency as a moral virtue and political 
imperative in liberal governance today, before moving to discuss the group’s 
work as a form of passionate utterance. 
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2. Passionate debt auditing and cultures of financial transparency 
Transparency has become a taken-for-granted value in the liberal governance 
regimes of academia (Shore and Wright, 1999; Strathern, 2000a, 2000b), 
extractive industries (Barry, 2013), the global environment (Langley, 2001; 
Gupta and Mason, 2014), and international finance (Best, 2005; Vestergaard, 
2009), to mention but a few examples. Indeed, transparency now holds the status 
of a ‘social fact’: it is ‘part of the way much of the world now accounts for the 
real, builds social relationships and institutions, and dreams about the possible’ 
(Hetherington, 2011: 7). As a social fact, transparency formats the relationship 
between the political and the economic in a way that enables a limited 
politicisation of public economic life. Andrew Barry (2013: 62) provides an 
excellent insight into how transparency works, based on the case of the 
international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, when he argues that: 
In effect, transparency operates along the borders between economic and 
political life. On the one hand, the implementation of transparency is 
expected to effect a form of politicisation of the economy that is 
measured, limited and rational. On the other hand, revenue transparency 
is intended to channel disagreements towards the specific question of 
economic calculation. As a value that is increasingly shared by 
governance institutions and their opponents alike, transparency delimits 
political discussion of the economy in the terms of rationality and 
efficiency. 
One key manifestation of transparency in contemporary liberal governance is the 
expansion of ‘audit culture’ across a range of public domains (see, among others, 
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Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000a; Shore and Wright, 2015a, 2015b). Public 
auditing can play an important role in disclosing failures and wrongdoing. But 
audit, as what Harvey et al. (2013) call a ‘transparency device’, tends to deal 
with failure by bypassing rather than enabling meaningful democratic input. This 
is because ‘transparency devices attempt to pre-empt failure via a technical 
settlement rather than through a political settlement arrived at through dialogue 
or democratic processes that call forth speaking and deliberating subjects’ 
(Harvey et al., 2013: 306). The technical, expert-driven nature of audit leaves 
limited scope for the emergence of what Jacqueline Best (2016a: 4) calls 
‘contested failures’, in which the very definitions of success and failure are at 
stake and controversy brings broader publics into the debate. Audit as a 
mechanism of liberal financial governance is therefore less an invitation to open-
ended and improvisational democratic conversational exchange in the face of 
failure than a technocratic response rooted in the order of law. 
The limited potential for substantive politicisation of an issue through practices 
of auditing is traceable to audit’s ‘ritualised’ form. In a study of international 
human rights governance, Cowan (2014) conceptualises audit culture in terms of 
what she calls the ‘public audit ritual’. Examining the United Nations’ Universal 
Periodic Review process of appraising countries’ human rights records, Cowan 
(2014: 62) underlines audit’s form as a highly scripted performance that ‘ritually 
reinforces a frame of reference’. This frame of reference comprises institutional 
conventions and relies on established subject positions and roles. Because an 
audit ritual is based on sedimented authority, routinised scripts, and asymmetries 
of power and knowledge, it tends not to expose auditor and auditee to the 
possibilities and risks of open, passionate exchange. Cowan’s concept of the 
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public audit ritual therefore offers a useful contrast to the familiar emphasis 
within audit culture on information, openness, and transparency, while situating 
audit on the side of the illocutionary conventions of performative speech. 
Nevertheless, to read audit as a ritual of liberal governance is not to presume that 
rituals always go unchanged. When governments modify auditing regimes, they 
open up opportunities for political improvisation and contestation, as 
developments in local authority auditing in the British context demonstrate. 
Specifically, in the UK, debt auditing has emerged as a tactic of resistance in 
response to the promotion by central government of ‘armchair auditing’ as a 
mode of democratic accountability, as well as top-down changes to the local 
authority audit regime. In the wake of the British parliamentary expenses scandal 
of 2009, which revealed widespread misuse of expenses claims by Members of 
Parliament, David Cameron, then Leader of the Opposition, called upon an 
‘army of armchair auditors’ to hold government to account (Cameron, 2009). 
Francis Maude, the Shadow Minister for the Cabinet Office at the time, 
explained Cameron’s vision as follows: 
Trust in politics is at an all-time low and by making central government 
transparent and accountable we can start to fix our broken politics. 
Greater openness and accountability will improve value for money and 
stop taxpayers’ money being wasted. We want to unleash an army of 
“armchair auditors” to crawl over the Government’s accounts—ordinary 
members of the public who will be able to see for themselves whether 
their government is really delivering value for money for them. (Collins, 
2009; see also O’Leary, 2015: 72) 
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Armchair auditing is one plank of a broader ‘open government’ agenda in the 
UK that encourages authorities to make data available to the public with the aim 
of ‘empowering’ citizens as ‘taxpayers’ to scrutinise government policies, 
expenditure, and services (Worthy, 2013a, 2015; O’Leary, 2015; Harvey et al., 
2013; Moss and Coleman, 2013: 416–8; Ruppert, 2015). Thus, just as 
conventional debt advice positions people as consumers of financial services (as 
I showed in Chapter Four), the armchair auditing agenda positions the populace 
as an agglomeration of taxpayer-citizens who seek value for money from 
government ‘services’ (see also Stanley, 2016). 
The promotion of this ‘“crowd sourced” accountability’ (Worthy, 2013b) has 
coincided with the closure of the independent Local Government Audit 
Commission, whose audit functions were transferred to private accounting firms 
in conjunction with the National Audit Office in 2015. This top-down change to 
the conventional rituals of local government auditing has had a key unintended 
effect. By dismantling some of the accepted procedures of expert-led auditing of 
local authorities, central government has opened up the domain of public 
financial auditing to the everyday improvisations and passionate utterances of 
‘citizen auditors’. The armchair auditing agenda assumes that these lay auditors 
will use data formatted and rendered legible by the state, but citizen auditors are 
using Freedom of Information Act requests to take ‘unauthorised paths’ (Stanley 
et al., 2016: 78; Kerkvliet, 2009: 238) through government data on debt.  In the 
context of austerity reforms, citizen-led auditing has emerged as a tactic for 
demanding popular democratic control of public finances, but also meaningful 
democratic exchange between governors and governed, as the example of Debt 
Resistance UK demonstrates. 
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A small London-based group formed in 2013, Debt Resistance UK is a collective 
of activists, campaigners, and researchers formed ‘to challenge the narrative of 
debt as inevitable and apolitical’ (Debt Resistance UK, n.d.). Let me briefly 
explain how I have studied Debt Resistance UK, before I describe the group’s 
activities. I joined Debt Resistance UK at the time of its formation in the middle 
of 2013. The group started to meet regularly at the end of 2013 in preparation for 
a conference. From this point on, I participated in fortnightly meetings of the 
group in London (with some absences for research-related travel) until early 
2016, when I took leave of absence from face-to-face involvement to complete 
this thesis. I have also participated in the group’s practical projects, public 
events, and mailing list discussions. I continue to be a member of Debt 
Resistance UK’s Coordinating Group, which is responsible for setting the 
group’s overall strategic direction. I also remain in close contact with other 
members. The primary source of my evidence in this chapter is therefore what 
Moeran (2009: 140) calls ‘observant participation’, in contrast to the more 
passive form of involvement implied by ‘participant observation’. Where 
possible, I also draw on secondary sources, such as media coverage and articles 
and newsletters published by the group. 
Inspired by campaigns to audit municipal debt in Spain, and building on the 
earlier work of one of its members, Debt Resistance UK set up a Local Authority 
Debt Audit (LADA) working group to examine the debts owed by local 
authorities in the UK to private banks. The LADA working group has focused on 
a type of loan known as the Lender Option Borrower Option (LOBO) loan. The 
LOBO loan is a long-term borrowing instrument containing an embedded 
interest-rate derivative. Banks sold LOBO loans to local authorities at a ‘teaser 
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rate’ (that is, with an initial low interest rate). Local authorities took on the loans 
because they sought to hedge against the risk of interest rate fluctuations. The 
advent of low interest rates for public borrowing after the global financial crisis, 
as well as the right of banks to periodically exercise an option either to call in the 
loan or raise the interest rate if the borrower cannot repay the loan in full, means 
that LOBO loans are now a markedly less favourable form of credit for local 
authorities than borrowing from the Public Works Loan Board (the public 
borrowing facility that provides loans to local authorities in the UK).  
Debt Resistance UK’s debt auditing has shown 250 councils to have current 
LOBO loans valued at over £11 billion (Pickard, 2016). The group emphasises 
the lack of transparency and accountability in this borrowing, which was 
contracted away from public scrutiny and with the help of private advisors, as 
well as the potential illegality of using derivatives in local authority finance 
given earlier legal judgements (on the latter, see Tickell, 1998). Most 
significantly, Debt Resistance UK juxtaposes high interest payments on LOBO 
debts with swingeing cuts to local government activities because of austerity 
policies. As one member puts it, ‘For the past six years, councils have been 
passing down savage cuts to the poorest in society, using bailiffs to violently 
recover debts from the working poor, claiming they have no other option’ (as 
cited in Sharman, 2016). Advancing this political critique, Debt Resistance UK 
has revealed that the London Borough of Newham, for example, which sought to 
make savings of £50 million in 2016-17 as a result of government austerity 
measures, took out LOBO loans with a face value of £563 million (and that had a 
fair value of £959 million in 2016) (Pickard, 2016). The group has set about 
challenging this case and other LOBO lending by making visible the link 
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between austerity politics and local authority borrowing from banks. The way in 
which it does so, as I will now show, takes the form of an extended passionate 
utterance. 
In the remainder of this section, I bring my arguments about passionate utterance 
and transparency politics together. I suggest that Debt Resistance UK’s public 
debt auditing approximates Cavell’s passionate utterance, but that the 
perfectionist potential of this speech is limited by the framing of auditing as 
above all a practice of transparency. While I signal the importance of Debt 
Resistance UK’s auditing work, I argue that the adoption of transparency as a 
way of structuring political relationships, and particularly as a goal of democratic 
conversation, impedes the perfectionist ‘felicity’ of the group’s passionate 
utterances. The failure of governance figures to respond in kind to the group’s 
passionate claims, plus the group’s own reliance on conventional subject 
positions such as the taxpayer-citizen, ultimately combine to make Debt 
Resistance UK’s utterances infelicitous in perfectionist terms. Debt Resistance 
UK as a group is not responsible for this cultural-economic imaginary of 
transparency; rather, transparency culture envelops both practices of governance 
and practices of civic freedom in the UK. I return to Cavell’s perlocutionary 
conditions to make this argument and to evaluate the group’s work. 
Perlocutionary condition 1: There is no conventional procedure: the speaker is 
on his or her own to create the desired effect 
In the absence of a conventional procedure for having its claims about LOBO 
loans heard, members of Debt Resistance UK have, in keeping with Cavell’s first 
perlocutionary condition, instantiated a procedure to make heard their demands 
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that both banks and local authorities change their conduct. In the absence of 
parliamentary and judicial avenues being open to them, and on their own to 
create the desired perlocutionary effect of acknowledgement of their 
disapprobation, Debt Resistance UK has used Freedom of Information Act 
requests, alternative and mainstream media, and shareholder activism (by posing 
as shareholders at the annual general meetings of banks holding LOBO loans) to 
advance their argument that LOBO lending, and the financialisation of local 
government more broadly, harms ordinary citizens (Debt Resistance UK and 
Rogers, 2015). 
While the group’s claims gained limited traction at first, Debt Resistance UK 
was eventually able to get its work used as the basis for a television documentary 
(Collingridge, 2015). This documentary sparked an inquiry into LOBO loans by 
Parliament’s Communities and Local Government Committee, thus creating an 
avenue for potential democratic conversation and exchange. With these 
procedures, Debt Resistance UK sought to provoke the perlocutionary effect of 
persuading local authorities and banks to change their conduct, with the ultimate 
aim of having the loans declared illegitimate or illegal. Nevertheless, the group’s 
experience of working within these channels reflects the ‘structural inequalities’ 
(Cowan, 2014: 59) of ritualised transparency and accountability forums such as 
the annual general meeting and the public inquiry, where speaking rights are 
tightly constrained and opportunities for unstructured exchange are limited.  
For example, Debt Resistance UK was forced to rely on proxies to have its 
claims heard at the Communities and Local Government Committee inquiry. 
Even though Debt Resistance UK’s work formed the basis of the documentary 
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programme that led to the inquiry, the group was not invited to speak to the 
Committee. Instead, the programme’s presenter and two experts who had 
experience in selling LOBO loans and providing hedging advisory services gave 
testimony. Members of Debt Resistance UK were left to watch the committee’s 
proceedings from the public gallery and via Parliament television. Therefore, 
although Debt Resistance UK has tried to create opportunities for democratic 
exchange by working within the existing ‘language-game’ of transparency, the 
circumscribed speaking rights in forums such as parliamentary enquiries, bank 
AGMs, and council meetings mean the group has been limited in its ability to 
exact a response. 
Perlocutionary conditions 2a, 2b. The speaker does not rely on the antecedently 
specified subjects of conventional procedures but instead constitutively singles 
out others in an invitation to exchange  
A passionate utterance works by singling out another person or party in a 
constitutive way, by addressing and constituting a ‘you’ (whether in the singular 
or the plural) in such a way that challenges and changes the other’s acquired 
subjectivity. Debt Resistance UK has singled out specific councils and banks and 
constituted them as parties to financial wrongdoing and injustice, inviting an 
exchange centred on this claim of misconduct (Debt Resistance UK and 
Griffiths, 2016). In so doing, members of the group have declared themselves to 
be the political interlocutors of established political figures and financial 
institutions, despite standing in a position of relative inequality vis-à-vis these 
figures. At the same time, however, the group’s invitation to exchange rests on 
the ritualised subject positions of liberal financial governance, such as the 
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‘citizen-taxpayer’. Debt Resistance UK has based its arguments on the claim that 
‘taxpayer money is being unnecessarily wasted’ (Debt Resistance UK, 2016a: 3). 
The group asserts, for instance, that ‘it is hard to believe that LOBO loans have 
been recommended with the interests of taxpayers in mind’ (Debt Resistance 
UK, 2016a: 8).  
In constituting its appeal through the figure of the taxpayer, Debt Resistance UK 
ends up working within established illocutionary conventions ‘where the position 
of the subject is more or less given’ (Norval, 2009: 171). The problem of relying 
on this antecedently specified subject position can be seen in the fact that local 
government politicians use the very same figuration to justify inaction on LOBO 
loans and to maintain the status quo of private financing of local authorities. For 
example, in the London borough of Newham, councillors have argued against 
mounting a legal challenge to LOBO loans on the basis that doing so ‘would cost 
the council taxpayer a substantial amount of money’ (as cited in Debt Resistance 
UK and Griffiths, 2016). In so far as Debt Resistance UK invokes a form of 
taxpayer subjectivity that is deeply implicated, as Liam Stanley (2016) has 
recently shown, in the legitimation of austerity, it ends up following the ‘rules’ of 
the language-game of liberal financial governance, while trying to act otherwise 
within them. 
Perlocutionary conditions 5a, 5b, 6. In speaking passionately, the speaker must 
be suffering from the passion, demanding a response in kind, which the other will 
be moved to offer, and to offer it now 
Debt Resistance UK has passionately denounced the conduct of local authorities 
and private banks. The group seeks a similarly impassioned political response, 
	 192 
but its political interlocutors have not yet been moved to offer such a reaction. 
Debt Resistance UK’s passionate utterance has not produced ‘a response in kind’ 
in the form of a passionate defence of conduct aimed directly at the group and 
couched in the same ethical and political terms of justice. Banks and local 
authorities have instead framed their discussion of the LOBO loan issue in the 
technical terms of efficiency. They have invoked the rational calculation of the 
benefits of borrowing from banks relative to using other avenues for credit, thus, 
to borrow Barry’s (2013: 62) words, ‘channel[ing] disagreements towards the 
specific question of economic calculation’. 
This limited politicisation restricts the arena of contestation to relative financial 
efficiencies, with debate waged in terms of competing sets of figures and 
divergent ways of evaluating whether, in the words of a local authority industry 
article, LOBO loans represent ‘value for money’ (Marrs, 2015). This frame of 
reference, with its emphasis on the taxpayer, rationality, and efficiency, occludes 
broader political questions regarding whether private borrowing is appropriate 
for local authorities, what the forces driving the financialisation of local 
government might be, and how the privatisation of accountability functions, like 
auditing, introduce market-led discipline into public finance. The response of 
both central and local government to Debt Resistance UK’s campaign has 
therefore been to inscribe the question of the legitimacy of private bank lending 
to local authorities squarely within the Cavellian ‘order of law’.  
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Perlocutionary condition 7. The invitation to exchange may be contested; for 
example, through a denial of standing or the dismissal of a demand for response. 
Such exchange is an attempt at moral education  
Debt Resistance UK has positioned itself as a ‘civic friend’ of local authorities 
by asserting that its work is ‘not an attack on local government but an attempt to 
reclaim our democratic institutions and the common resources they manage’ 
(Debt Resistance UK, 2016b). Group members have tried to work with local 
councillors, with some limited individual successes, but overall this offer of 
political friendship has not been taken up. In its exchange with local government 
politicians and officials, Debt Resistance UK has been denied standing, and its 
demand for a response has been dismissed. However, the failure of these 
exchanges as attempts at ‘moral education’ does not rob Debt Resistance UK’s 
speech of its status as passionate utterance. Cavell’s final perlocutionary 
condition marks the possibility of rebuff as a condition of possibility of 
passionate utterance. As Cavell (2006: 272, emphasis in original) explains, 
‘[u]nlike the performative case, it is open to the one addressed to resist the 
demand. Either acceptance or resistance satisfies the condition. What is at stake 
is the question whether a “we” is or is not in effect now’.  
In this case, it is clear that the ‘I’ (Debt Resistance UK) and the ‘you’ 
(representatives of local authorities) are far from coming together in a democratic 
‘we’. In this instance, the passionate utterance is unhappy; a perfectionist 
relationship has not been established. While, as I have shown, many 
perlocutionary conditions are satisfied, overall the passionate utterance has not 
produced a perfectionist relationship marked by the perlocutionary effect of 
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persuasion and leading to responsiveness and hence a change of conduct. The 
infelicity of this passionate utterance puts a democratic future at stake: one in 
which people have democratic input into financial governance through 
meaningful conversation and exchange with governance figures and institutions. 
This is not to say that nothing has been gained from the encounter; far from it. As 
Norval (2009: 176) argues of Cavell’s passionate utterance, ‘even a denial here is 
an acknowledgement that does not leave the terrain unchanged.’ In this case, no 
LOBO loans have been contracted since Debt Resistance UK began its work, and 
a new democratic movement has begun to develop as residents start to challenge 
their councils’ borrowing decisions at the local level. 
Leaving Cavell’s perlocutionary conditions now, I would like to end my 
discussion of Debt Resistance UK’s ‘frontstage’ performances of debt auditing 
by emphasising that the unhappiness of the group’s passionate utterance is not an 
individualised one for which the group is to be blamed, but rather points more 
broadly to the ‘limits of transparency’ (Best, 2005) as a way of structuring 
democratic relationships. Transparency provides for what has variously been 
called ‘monitorial citizenship’ (Moss and Coleman, 2013: 418) or ‘monitorial 
democracy’ (McCarthy and Fluck, 2016: 7). As Best (2016b: 223) explains, 
‘[w]hat is missing from this conception of [transparency-based] accountability is 
the back and forth of question and answer—the process of debate and 
deliberation.’ The ritualistic exchanges of the transparency agenda, whether 
through publication of government data, committees of inquiry, or AGMs, 
systematically reduce the prospects for passionate, improvised conversation. 
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This closure to passionate utterance is problematic from a perfectionist point of 
view because, as I argued in Chapter Three, ordinary democracy relies on open-
ended ethical and political conversation. The perfectionist subject is precisely not 
transparent, but instead acknowledges the partial and limited nature of her self-
understanding, and so uses passionate exchange with civic or intimate friends to 
bring the next or neighbouring self into being. For Cavell, the perfectionist 
subject is not aligned with transparency but with opacity and mutual 
confrontation. Indeed, Cavell (2004: 142) directly links his perfectionist 
understanding of democratic citizenship to the insufficiency of transparency as an 
ethos of subjectivity: ‘That we are not transparent to ourselves means 
that…criticism demands confrontation and conversation.’  
When transparency forms the outer limit of notions of accountability, there is no 
need for people to be attracted to the confrontation of others. There is no need to 
listen or to be responsive, for everything is already on the table. It is necessary 
only to render accounts clearly, to offer the exactitude in financial accounting 
that, as I argued in Chapter Four, also marks the limit of integrity in conventional 
debt advice. Transparency would make of us self-contained individuals, against 
Arendt’s understanding of the mutually authored character of action (discussed 
in Chapter Two) and the ethical and political weight of mutuality in Cavellian 
friendship. To allow for the felicity of passionate utterance in democratic life will 
therefore also require challenging transparency-based understandings of 
accountability. Mounting this challenge involves imagining the goal of auditing 
as something more than transparency. That something more, I shall argue in 
section three, is responsiveness: a willingness to be an audience for others. 
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In this section, I have argued that Debt Resistance UK’s public auditing speech 
on the LOBO loan issue constitutes an ‘unhappy’ passionate utterance when 
viewed from a perfectionist standpoint. The group’s public speech takes the form 
of passionate, unconventional claims that position ordinary people as democratic 
interlocutors in finance, people who demand to be treated as the political equals 
of those within political and financial institutions. The perfectionist potential of 
this public speech is stymied, however, by a cultural-economic imaginary of 
transparency. This imaginary restricts accountability to ritualised interaction and 
manifests in the insistence on justifying financial decision-making in rationalist 
terms. It can also be seen in a reliance on pre-existing economic subject positions 
like the taxpayer-citizen. At the same time, transparency occludes the real 
imbalance of power between governance figures and banks, on the one hand, and 
citizen auditors, on the other hand. Because central government, local authorities, 
and banks have used their institutional power to deny Debt Resistance UK any 
standing as a political interlocutor, the group’s passionate utterances have not yet 
managed to engender a substantive relationship of equality and responsiveness. 
In the next section of the chapter, I turn to consider what an alternative form of 
auditing that achieves responsiveness might look like. To this end, I contrast 
Debt Resistance UK’s public performances of resistance with what I think of, 
following Goffman (1956: 69–82), as the group’s ‘backstage’ ones: those 
mundane behaviours and interactions that take place when people step out of the 
spotlight and off the public stage. While Debt Resistance UK’s public passionate 
utterances have not been felicitous in perfectionist terms, the group has, in 
private, modelled a successful process of making passionate utterances in the 
form of internal auditing focused on gendered inequalities of labour and 
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opportunity within the group. Using the criterial practice of reading that I 
introduced in Chapter Two, which involves asking what the criteria are for the 
ordinary usage of a word, I argue that this backstage auditing conveys an 
ordinary usage of ‘audit’ as a willingness to listen and be an audience for 
another, revealing responsiveness (rather than transparency) to be a key criterion 
of everyday auditing. 
3. From transparency to responsiveness in debt auditing  
Cavell’s concept of the passionate utterance spans intimate and civic relations 
and hence undermines an overly rigid separation between public and private. As 
Norris (2006: 82) explains: 
If [for Cavell] the public is not, as in Arendt, the name of a realm, but 
rather that of a voice we use in conversing with one another, the line 
between the public and the private is not one that can clearly separate an 
agora from a household.  
Norris (2006: 82) continues: ‘If Cavell demonstrates that the personal is political, 
he also shows us how the political is personal.’ By emphasising the personal as 
political, Cavell’s work chimes with longstanding feminist engagements with the 
political (see, for instance, the range of contributions to Butler and Scott, 1992; 
plus those in Phillips, 1998). Moreover, in foregrounding the political as 
personal, Cavell opens up questions about the internal politics of resistance 
movements. One such question relates to the gendered character of political 
action. That activist politics involves highly gendered practices is an insight 
often elided from even the most critical of engagements with activism and NGOs 
(see, for example, Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014). In contrast, scholars of 
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feminist IR and IPE have explored the gendered social relations of activism, civil 
society, and resistance to underline both women’s resistances and the gendering 
of voice, participation, and social-reproductive labour in the democratic agora 
broadly conceived (see, among others, Stienstra, 1999; Marchand, 2000; 
Marchand and Runyan, 2000; Eschle and Maiguashca, 2007; Howell and 
Mulligan, 2005; Howell, 2007). Situated within this feminist analysis, Cavell’s 
argument that the public and private are voices that each of us speaks, and hence 
his refusal to separate politics from the personal, suggests that we should 
construe the mundane activities and daily interactions underpinning public 
dissent as a key part of ordinary democratic politics. As a way of developing 
democratic intersubjectivity and conversation, passionate utterance is not 
confined to either the ‘frontstage’ or the ‘backstage’ of democratic politics.  
Goffman (1956: 69) uses the distinction between frontstage and backstage to 
capture how dimensions of the self that are modified or suppressed in public 
performance resurface when an individual leaves the glare of publicity. In 
political economy and political sociology, Goffman’s insights have been applied 
primarily to understand the affective work and emotional labour of workers in 
service industries who ‘put on a good face’ (Sheane, 2012) to meet the demands 
of their corporate roles. However, it is also possible to read Goffman as 
emphasising the perfectionist backstage work people do on themselves and 
within a group to redress the deficiencies and difficulties that emerge in 
frontstage political work. Goffman (1956: 70) remarks upon both the disruptive 
and disciplinary dimensions of this backstage work:  
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Here [on the backstage] costumes and other parts of personal front may 
be adjusted and scrutinized for flaws. Here the team can run through its 
performance, checking for offending expressions when no one is present 
to be affronted by them; here poor members of the team, who are 
expressively inept, can be schooled or dropped from the performance. 
Here the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his 
lines, and step out of character.  
Goffman’s discussion of backstage work on the self with others has something of 
a perfectionist emphasis because it shows how difficulties and flawed 
performances can be identified and worked on. Importantly, Goffman’s account 
of presentations of the self emphasises that both ‘stages’ are sites of 
performance. Like the Cavellian understanding of individuality that I discussed 
in Chapter Four, there is no single authentic self here, but instead a set of 
ongoing performances of individual and group subjectivity. Stepping out of the 
strategic or assumed character of frontstage performance reveals another set of 
characters, albeit ones that may speak more candidly than those in public view. 
In stepping out of the character demanded by the scripts of transparency politics, 
members of Debt Resistance UK have been able to develop different ways of 
relating to others. It is on the backstage, I argue, that Debt Resistance UK has 
demonstrated the shortcomings of a politics of transparency and modelled 
successful passionate utterances.  
I draw an example of this backstage work and passionate exchange from a 
lengthy process of internal auditing that took place because of contestation over 
gendered relations of labour, care, and opportunity within the group. In Debt 
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Resistance UK, a gendered division of labour led over time to a persistent over-
indebtedness of some members to others. These inequalities arose because the 
burden of administrative and relational work fell disproportionately to certain 
group members, usually (but not always) women. As is the case with most 
activist groups, Debt Resistance UK’s frontstage performances rely on a 
significant investment of time and work backstage. This kind of relational work 
and reproductive labour is made up of the mundane activities that hold the group 
together: sending emails, scheduling meetings, preparing agendas, taking and 
circulating minutes, organising events, and interacting outside of meetings to 
address the inevitable interpersonal tensions and conflicts that arise in long-term 
political work. This ‘backstage’ work contrasts with the more spectacular 
‘frontstage’ performances of resistance, such as speaking at conferences and 
workshops, fronting direct actions, and speaking to the media. In these frontstage 
performances, the figures behind the figures of debt have often been men. 
Over time, group members raised concerns about these inequalities. The failure 
to share the burdens of work, the sense of unacknowledged debt that accrued, 
and the physical fatigue that resulted, all caused distress for those doing the bulk 
of the backstage work in Debt Resistance UK. So too did the question of how to 
share frontstage opportunities, which involves distributing the group’s 
collectively authored ‘credit’ in the form of opportunities for members to 
develop their expertise, confidence, and broader networks. Collective 
transactions can easily become individually ‘owned’, even as this ownership is 
based on significant ‘borrowing’ from others. The loan is not always repaid. This 
problem is not specific to Debt Resistance UK and raises questions of how 
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activism in capitalist societies can avoid conventional logics of ownership, 
credit, and debt (Gough, 2015).  
As a result of these gendered dynamics, I witnessed the regular rise and fall of 
tension and tiredness in the group: an effect of what I think of, following Shirin 
Rai and her colleagues, as everyday ‘depletion’ (Rai et al., 2014). The result was 
a more-than-economic form of indebtedness that, while very different from the 
monetary debt that is the focus of Debt Resistance UK’s frontstage work, matters 
precisely because it mirrors the broader gendered dynamics of financial 
indebtedness. As I argued in Chapter One, the seemingly universal figure of 
‘indebted man’ (Lazzarato, 2012) conceals the differential encumbrances that 
debt places on women, as well as the growing burden of social reproduction 
borne largely by women in the context of austerity politics (Roberts, 2013; 
Federici, 2014; Adkins, 2016; Coleman, 2016; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 
2016). As Adkins (2016: 6) observes, drawing in turn on the work of Federici 
(2014) and Allon (2014), the ‘steady and punctual subject’ of personal and 
household debt is gendered, for ‘financial institutions and their intermediaries 
have found a particularly reliable source of such steadiness and punctuality in the 
female subject.’ 
In what ways, then, have members of Debt Resistance been able to address, if not 
broader societal gender inequalities arising from the ‘feminisation of finance’ 
(Allon, 2014), at least the gendered debts of social reproduction arising in the 
imperfect democracy of their backstage work? I argue that, within the group, the 
struggles of women to address gendered divisions of labour and unequal 
recognition resonate with the struggles of the women in Cavell’s remarriage 
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films. In these films, union, or rather re-union, is premised on women being able 
to achieve substantive self-realisation in their relations with men. The way in 
which members of Debt Resistance UK went about their struggle is similarly 
Cavellian. In a group used to directing its political claims outwards (a group of 
people who presumed their own relative transparency in political terms), there 
was no existing procedure for securing acknowledgement of these passionate 
demands for change. By persisting with passionate speech regarding long-term 
failures of acknowledgement, however, the wronged group members demanded a 
response to their frustrations. While their claims initially went unrewarded, the 
passionate utterers maintained their demands. More needed to be said and done. 
‘Sometimes, as with excuses or apologies, words are essentially owed. Flowers 
are not a substitute’ (Cavell, 2005a: 179, emphasis in original).  
Acting as political friends, these women invited an open exchange, making the 
gendered conduct of their interlocutors an issue. They singled out others in the 
group as parties to injustice, expressing their passionate belief in both the need 
for and ability of their political friends to change, demanding a response in the 
form of acknowledgement of their claims to injustice and a substantive change in 
conduct. The response eventually came in the form of repeated parts of meetings 
being set aside to discuss the issues, culminating in an auditing-type exercise at a 
strategy meeting that involved group members collectively mapping the varied 
ways in which power was exercised within the group along gender and other 
lines. This mapping exercise ended in a commitment by all to share the behind-
the-scenes work more equitably, and with an agreement that people would 
respond to opportunities for public speaking, travel, and similar activities by 
offering the opportunity to the group as a whole. Group members were forced to 
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acknowledge that their own conduct, when read through the lens of injustice and 
inequality that the group applied to the outside world, was not beyond reproach. 
It would be wrong to understand Debt Resistance UK’s reaching of this point, 
namely a collective understanding of relations of power and inequality in the 
service of responsiveness, as a triumph of transparency. Rather, it was the result 
of a long-term process of passionate exchange through which it became possible 
for individuals to begin to see and understand their actions and omissions 
through the eyes of their political friends. When dominant group members 
accorded equal standing to those who questioned the group’s internal dynamics 
and conduct, it became possible to tackle the question of how to respond to 
specific shortcomings and to become responsive to one another.  
This is not nirvana of agreement; nor is it a finished or finite project. 
Nonetheless, as Das (2014: 280) observes, ‘in agreeing to acknowledge those 
aspects that we understand only imperfectly or intermittently, we are willing to 
be open to a future together.’ Call this openness a basis for political friendship, in 
which the focus is on ‘learning what living together can be’ (Cavell, 2004: 362). 
Such openness (which is not transparency, for transparency, as we have seen, can 
be the very opposite of open exchange) also assumes that, as Turpin (2011: 118) 
observes in his discussion of a Cavellian civic friendship, ‘[t]he risk to be 
guarded against is the risk of a solidarity calcifying into a crust of convention 
and closing its ears to complaint.’ To guard against this ossification in 
democratic politics requires developing practices of listening and responsiveness 
as another way of taking the measure of—another way of auditing—relations. 
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In Debt Resistance UK, the translation of audit from a mechanism of 
transparency into a process based on listening and responsiveness has enabled 
members to become a better audience for each other. This process recalls 
something that is apparent in our ordinary language usage, where auditing can 
also be a practice of listening. To audit a module at a university, for example, is 
to be engaged in active listening. It is usually expected that the auditor will 
participate in discussion and be responsive to others in the class. An auditor is a 
listener or hearer, as the cognate terms audience, audible, audition, and 
auditorium suggest. To draw these criteria of ordinary usage into the case at 
hand, we might say that to audit democratically is to develop just this ability to 
be a responsive audience. As Turpin (2011: 118, emphasis in original) maintains, 
‘[t]he pressure of Cavell’s moral perfectionism is a demand to be attentive to 
others even, or especially even, when they make uncomfortable complaints. Call 
this a willingness to listen—even further, call it a willingness to be an audience.’ 
Passionate utterance invites subjects to become both ‘audience’ and ‘rhetor’ 
(Turpin, 2011: 118), to be joined in a conversational union, the goal of which is 
mutual confrontation and responsiveness. Cavell’s understanding of perfectionist 
conversation through passionate utterance thus offers a rather more demanding 
form of exchange than that of the public audit ritual, namely one characterised by 
ongoing responsiveness.  
Recognising the demanding nature of this exchange, I do not wish to overstate 
the efficacy of Debt Resistance UK’s internal audit, nor to suggest that this 
instance of felicitous exchange can be mapped easily onto the group’s frontstage 
work. One may wonder, with good reason, how it would be possible to achieve 
an ethic of responsiveness to the same degree in public interactions between 
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government, citizens, and financial institutions. This question of feasibility 
highlights the demanding nature of moral perfectionism, but the difficulty of a 
felicitous passionate utterance does not preclude us from committing to it as a 
goal. It is a necessary part of perfectionism that our distance from the democracy 
we seek is repeatedly registered. As Turpin (2011: 115, emphasis in original) 
describes: ‘[t]he mark of Cavell’s moral perfectionism…is an acknowledgement 
that whatever has been accomplished nevertheless has still not measured up, that 
there are no laurels to rest upon, and that more still needs doing...’ The debt 
activists with whom I have worked embody this perfectionist spirit. They seek to 
inhabit the present in a just, equitable way, but also to remain aware of how their 
daily efforts can fall short of the marks of justice and equality. This is a deeply 
perfectionist attitude. We miss this attitude, and the perfectionist ethical and 
political work it entails, when we confine language’s status as action to the 
workings of performative or illocutionary force.  
4. Rethinking everyday financial performativities in IPE 
Cultural political economist of finance John Hogan Morris (2016) has recently 
made the case in financial performativity studies for a concept that bears some 
similarities with Cavell’s passionate utterance: the ‘lively practice’. Looking at 
practices of humour and improvisation in financial governance at the Bank of 
England, Morris argues that these ‘lively practices’ exceed their label as 
performative breakdowns. He suggests that although financial performativity 
studies have tended to depict moments of lively speech and extemporisation as 
‘misfires’ of performative utterances, ‘this seemingly lower status [of the lively 
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practice as misfire] is not fairly warranted because such difference is embedded 
at the heart of every performative utterance’ (Morris, 2016: 254).  
It is easy to hear an echo of Cavell (2005a: 185) here, who sees two paths in 
every utterance: the conventional path of the ‘order of law’ that lies in the 
illocutionary, and the improvisational path of ‘disorders of desire’ that arises in 
the perlocutionary (Cavell, 2006: 273). Like Morris, Cavell reminds us that every 
utterance has embedded within it not just the force of illocutionary convention 
but also an improvisational, lively quality, in the form of multiple 
unconventional perlocutionary effects. These perlocutionary effects are a key 
way that speech ‘acts’ beyond illocutionary force: the perlocutionary lies at the 
heart of the emotional, passionate speech people use to establish relationships 
with others and to engage in meaningful exchange. Examining passionate 
utterances therefore enables, in Cavell’s (2005a: 187) words, ‘a systematic 
recognition of speech as confrontation, as owed.’  
This idea of speech as a site of passionate confrontation and exchange is missing 
from financial ‘performation’ studies, which, as I outlined in Chapter One, 
emphasise the performativity of economic theory, models, and calculative 
devices (see, among others, Callon, 1998, 2010; MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie 
et al., 2007; Watson, 2009, 2014; Paudyn, 2013; Braun, 2016; Christophers, 
2017). Cavell’s idea of the passionate utterance acts in counterpoint to accounts 
of finance that, in prioritising the performativity of economics, do an excellent 
job of showing how markets ‘work’ but inadvertently suggest that emotions and 
moral speech are not important to this working. This blind spot can be traced to 
the ontology of ‘social studies of finance’ inspired by the work of Michel Callon, 
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which avoids normative commentary. But this blind spot is also traceable to 
Austin himself, whom Cavell (2005a: 156) thinks is somewhat ‘skittish about 
emotion’ in How to Do Things with Words.  
By contrast, scholars using everyday and cultural political economy approaches 
to IPE have begun to probe the role of affect and emotion in finance, thus 
bringing a new direction to financial performativity studies. These scholars show 
how lively, emotional, and affective speech and practices are integral to the 
governance of finance (see, for example, Brassett and Clarke, 2012; Brassett and 
Rethel, 2015; Gammon and Wigan, 2015; Langley, 2015; Morris, 2016). For 
instance, Paul Langley (2015) has shown how the most recent financial crisis has 
been governed not only through discourses premised on economic rationality but 
also by prioritising questions of emotion and affect, such as confidence. At its 
most acute, this affective governance has involved presenting crisis as a 
traumatic event from which traumatised individual subjects are to be rescued, 
even as they are blamed for excessive borrowing (Brassett and Clarke, 2012). If 
modern finance has traditionally worked to marginalise emotion and affect in 
favour of assumptions of rationality (de Goede, 2005), liberal financial 
governance today is centrally concerned with expressive and emotional 
discourses. 
A Cavellian reading takes this work on emotion in finance further by showing 
how passionate speech can transform liberal financial governance practices, such 
as auditing, into modes of democratic intersubjective exchange. Cavell allows us 
to see the prospects for democratic confrontation, exchange, and civic freedom 
within practices of governance. Passionate utterance, I therefore conclude, has an 
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important role to play in engendering both ordinary democratic intersubjectivity 
and democratic exchange within finance. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have used Cavell’s concept of the passionate utterance to 
evaluate the potential and limitations of auditing as a tactic of debt resistance. I 
have argued that Debt Resistance UK’s passionate utterances have succeeded in 
drawing public attention to the problem of private bank lending to local 
authorities, but that these utterances have not yet proved felicitous in a 
perfectionist sense. Conversely, I have shown that the group’s private speech and 
internal auditing is closer to the kind of perfectionist democratic exchange that 
Cavell argues passionate utterances can spark. This backstage auditing, as a form 
of ethical and political education, has changed gendered conduct within the 
group. 
To set up this argument, I began by outlining Cavell’s extension of Austin’s 
speech act theory. Cavell, I showed, develops the idea of perlocutionary effect 
into the concept of the passionate utterance, which he understands as a form of 
ethical education. A passionate utterance begins with one party (the ‘I’) making 
an impassioned claim on another (the ‘you’) that puts this other’s conduct into 
question. A passionate utterance succeeds if the targeted party acknowledges the 
claim and an open, responsive conversation ensues. I ended my discussion of the 
idea of passionate utterance by linking it to Cavell’s understanding of personal 
and civic friendship. 
Next, I introduced debt auditing and situated it within the cultural-economic 
imaginary of transparency. I showed how Debt Resistance UK’s public debt 
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auditing activities are framed by a broader valorisation of transparency as a 
moral virtue and political imperative in contemporary liberal governance. I then 
demonstrated how Debt Resistance UK has appropriated the agenda of armchair 
auditing to mount a political critique of austerity politics and the financialisation 
of local government. I concluded that a number of factors have combined to limit 
perfectionist potential of the group’s passionate utterances, including structural 
inequalities between the group and its political and financial interlocutors, the 
rationalist ritualism of auditing’s language-games, and Debt Resistance UK’s 
own reliance on conventional subject positions like the taxpayer-citizen. Most 
importantly, local authorities and banks have failed to respond to claims of 
financial impropriety by launching a passionate defence of their behaviour, much 
less by changing this behaviour. Debt Resistance UK’s frontstage performances 
of audit, which are oriented to financial transparency, remain constrained by the 
ritualised, performative conventions of contemporary public auditing, in which 
there is little room to develop mutual responsiveness via passionate exchange. 
I then provided a counterpoint to transparency-based auditing by drawing on the 
group’s internal practices of contestation and exchange. Using Goffman’s 
distinction between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ performances, I showed how 
members of Debt Resistance UK have successfully modelled a perfectionist form 
of auditing in their efforts to address gendered inequalities within the group. 
There can be no easy transfer of this successful private backstage work to 
frontstage activities. Nevertheless, this backstage example is a redemptive one 
that shows the value of rethinking auditing in line with an ordinary usage of audit 
as a practice of responsive listening. I concluded my discussion of Debt 
Resistance UK by noting that there is always more to be done in the face of our 
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disappointments with the imperfections of actually existing democratic 
interactions. For this reason, my analysis is not a critique of Debt Resistance UK 
but rather a working through of the group’s own ethical frameworks and 
perfectionist motivations. 
Finally, I ended my discussion by briefly returning to IPE debates to situate the 
concept of the passionate utterance within financial performativity studies, thus 
building on the discussion started in Chapter One. Cavell’s arguments sit well 
with an emerging body of work on the role of affect, emotion, and lively 
practices within financial governance. A Cavellian approach extends this work 
by showing how emotion and passion need not reproduce liberal financial 
governance but can instead be a force to democratise this governance from 
within.  
For this to happen, however, institutions need to show a commitment to 
democratic responsiveness rather than simply transparency. In this sense, 
democratic ethics and politics are as much about the process of two or more 
parties coming to listen to and matter for each other as they are about passing 
moral judgement and determining what is to be done politically. Or, to put this 
differently: we are unlikely to be able to make ethical evaluations and political 
decisions about finance in a collective and democratic way unless we matter for 
each other. Passionate utterance, I submit, is one pathway for developing this 
care and responsiveness. In this process, ‘[l]ent interest by the friend’s interest’ 
(Cavell, 2004: 368), we each profit from becoming a responsive audience for 
each other, in quest of a genuine union, or what I will examine in the next 
chapter as the creation of a ‘we’. 
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Chapter Six: Refusing Debt 
 
[I]n refusing my agreement, I do not withdraw from the community: the 
refusal is itself part of my belonging.  
– Sandra Laugier, ‘Wittgenstein and Cavell: Anthropology, 
Skepticism and Politics’, The Claim to Community: Essays on 
Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy (2006) 
 
In the United States, people’s growing awareness of the disjuncture between 
bailouts for banks and the mounting debts of individuals and households is 
triggering political movements for debt refusal. In this chapter, I explore the 
tactic of refusing debt as it has been developed by Strike Debt, an offshoot of 
Occupy Wall Street. Formed in New York City in 2012, Strike Debt created 
some prototypes of collective action designed to encourage debt refusal before 
dissolving into other initiatives, partly because of political differences within the 
group. In this chapter, I use Cavell’s concept of the ‘claim to community’ to 
illuminate both how Strike Debt created a community of debtors and why 
political dissensus emerged within the group. As I outlined in Chapter Three, 
Cavell reads the ordinary language philosopher’s appeal to examples of ‘what we 
say when’ as a claim to community that draws out the criteria of communal 
belonging. Recounting criteria allows people to either reaffirm these criteria as 
resulting in ‘good enough justice’ (Cavell, 1990: 24) or refuse and revise them 
by projecting different examples that make new claims to community.  
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Drawing on Cavell’s discussion, I contend that Strike Debt has used examples to 
draw out the criteria of debt-based economic citizenship so that debtors can 
recount, refuse, and revise the conditions of belonging in financialised society. In 
particular, Strike Debt has used examples of mutual aid among debtors to 
question how contemporary economic citizenship entails liability to financial 
institutions and the state. In place of this particular imaginary of liability, Strike 
Debt mobilises a mythology of indebted mutuality in which people’s primary 
responsibilities are to each other rather than to financial institutions. This 
mythology shows debt under another aspect, as a more-than-economic 
relationship that can be a bond of solidarity. At the same time, Strike Debt’s 
bond of solidarity has come in for criticism because of its race-blindness. This 
criticism underlines Cavell’s point that community is never anything more than a 
claim.  
I make this argument across four sections. In section one, I revisit Cavell’s 
argument that the ordinary language philosopher’s procedure of working with 
examples constitutes a claim to community. Here, I place particular emphasis on 
the contestability of this claim. The procedure of projecting examples raises the 
question of what, if anything, is to be done when a claim to community fails and 
we find that we do not use a word or concept in the same way. To address this 
question, I juxtapose Cavell’s understanding of community with the 
Wittgensteinian arguments about ‘aspect-seeing’ that I outlined in Chapter One. 
Democratic community requires differently positioned people to ‘see and 
understand aspectivally’ (Tully, 1995: 25): to develop the ability to perceive the 
multiple aspects of an object, practice, or situation. Seeing aspectivally makes 
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people less likely to perpetuate injustices, as I will demonstrate with reference to 
Strike Debt. 
In section two, I examine Strike Debt’s prototypes as a series of claims to a 
community of debtors. I focus in particular on the Rolling Jubilee, a high-profile 
project that used crowd-funded donations to buy up defaulted medical and 
student loan debts from secondary debt markets in order to then abolish them. 
Strike Debt uses the Rolling Jubilee to show that the conventional moral 
economy of personal debt, which positions debt as an inviolable bond between 
debtor and creditor, does not align with the workings of financialised societies, in 
which personal debt is bought and sold as a commodity. The Rolling Jubilee 
functions as what I called in Chapter Two an ‘elaborative’ speech act (Cavell, 
1999: 310–1): an ethical elaboration of why it might be legitimate to refuse to 
repay certain debts. Moreover, by developing new ways for debtors to support 
each other, the Rolling Jubilee makes an alternative claim to community, based 
on an ethic of communal responsibility. 
If Strike Debt has succeeded in recasting debtors as a collective political subject, 
the group’s claim to community is nonetheless contested. In section three, I 
consider the role that criticism plays in ordinary democratic community. Some 
members of Strike Debt have criticised the group’s prototypes for neglecting to 
consider the racialisation of indebtedness. Thinking about how this omission 
might be redressed, I examine a writing project by a former Strike Debt member 
that uses a form of aspectival multiplicity to show the varied ways in which debt 
and race are intertwined. This example also shows that the refusal of a claim to 
community, like that made by Strike Debt, need not be a sign of democratic 
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failure or withdrawal. Instead, this refusal can be a hallmark of perfectionist 
belonging: one that refounds community. 
I end the chapter by returning to IPE debates about the moral economies of 
finance, which I canvassed in Chapter One, in light of my argument. Scholars of 
IPE have demonstrated powerfully how moral claims about debt function to 
ensure continued debt servicing, maintain unequal creditor-debtor relations, and 
legitimate austerity. However, some important exceptions aside, this work is 
largely blind to the flipside of these moral economies of indebtedness, namely 
that people are reworking debt into a bond and not only a bind. I conclude that a 
Cavellian practice of reading remedies this relative blindness to the more-than-
economic aspects of debt and can therefore help to reanimate IPE’s engagements 
with the everyday politics of debt in the afterlives of financial crisis. 
1. Cavell on making a claim to community 
Stanley Cavell has shown an enduring interest in the procedures of ordinary 
language philosophy throughout his career. From his earliest engagements, 
Cavell (1976a, [1979] 1999) has maintained his distinctive take on how and why 
Austin and Wittgenstein employ examples of ordinary language usage. As I 
outlined in Chapter Three, Cavell argues that in using examples of ‘what we say 
when’, the ordinary language philosopher makes a ‘claim to community’. To 
unpack the implications of this argument, I need to return to some of the detail of 
Cavell’s dispute with the critics of ordinary language philosophy. 
Recall from Chapter Three that Benson Mates (1958: 165) takes ordinary 
language philosophy to task because of an inconsistency he finds between Austin 
and Austin’s fellow ordinary language philosopher, Gilbert Ryle. This 
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inconsistency relates to the philosophers’ differing claims regarding when we 
would qualify an action as ‘voluntary’, but the exact nature of this difference 
need not concern us here. Rather, my interest lies in how Cavell responds to 
Mates’s argument that the lack of agreement among ordinary language 
philosophers shows that they lack appropriate evidence for their claims.  
While Cavell disagrees with this argument, he takes Mates’s criticism to pose 
important questions about the ordinary language philosopher’s method. What 
exactly is the ordinary language philosopher doing when she deploys examples? 
What authorises the ordinary language philosopher’s claim to representativeness, 
whereby she claims to voice what we say? Moreover, what does disagreement 
over these examples signify? In addressing these questions, Cavell weighs the 
assumptions of the ordinary language philosopher’s critic regarding: 1) the 
ordinary language philosopher’s lack of evidence; 2) the empirical nature of the 
ordinary language philosopher’s claim regarding ‘what we say when’; and 3) the 
idea that disagreement among ordinary language philosophers indicates a failure 
of their method. 
Recall from Chapter Three that, with regards to the question of evidence, Cavell 
observes that any competent speaker of a language is as qualified as another to 
give an example of what we say: that is, to provide an example of how we use a 
concept. This speaker is a source of evidence for claims about what we say 
because all language community members participate in what Wittgenstein calls 
a shared ‘form of life’. Based on sharing this form of life, I can recount what we 
say and do and elicit your agreement. In turn, as an adept of the form of life that 
produces our language (in short, as a fellow language-community member), you 
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are equally able to evaluate my claim: to question or accept my example. Any 
and every claim that I make about ‘us’ originates in the ‘I’ and is authorised, in 
the first instance, by my sharing in our form of life. Nothing more, but also 
nothing less, than this shared form of life authorises my claim and the ‘we’ it 
presumes, and hence our continued linguistic attunement to each other. This is a 
realisation that Cavell (1976b: 52) famously qualifies as ‘terrifying’ in its 
simplicity. 
This is not to say that I can command your agreement. My claim to community 
may fail; my example might reveal that we do not use a word and concept the 
same way. Nevertheless, ordinary language philosophers find that we agree on 
‘what we say when’ a surprising amount of the time, because we share a form of 
life. In Wittgensteinian terms, our agreement is not only in definitions (of the 
meanings of words and concepts) but also in judgements (of the appropriate use 
of words and concepts) (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. I, §§ 241-42). Let me 
unpack this point. In Wittgensteinian terms, agreement in definitions (what a 
particular word means) relies on a deeper concordance: a congruence or 
agreement in judgements (of what counts as a word, what a sentence, and so 
forth). An explicit agreement in definition relies on a swathe of prior 
‘agreements’ (or congruences), none of which we make explicitly or formally. 
These ‘agreements’ are natural to us in the sense that we inherit them as we learn 
a language. As David Owen (2003: 84) explains, ‘[a]cquiring a language (i.e. 
becoming minded), we inherit that agreement in judgments that composes a form 
of life.’ Take the following example as an illustration of this observation. If I 
wish to settle what the word ‘umiak’ means (and hence what an umiak is), I will 
likely turn to my dictionary and look up the word ‘umiak’. In so doing, however, 
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I do not notice that I am bringing a whole form of life to the dictionary. Having 
looked up the word ‘umiak’, I will have found myself able to define it in so far as 
‘[I] knew what a noun is and how to name an object and how to look up a word 
and what boats are and what an Eskimo is’ (Cavell, 1976c: 18). To define a word 
or concept requires knowing the grammar of a form of life: the underlying 
criteria that tell us what a thing is. I may have thought I was looking up a word 
in the dictionary, but in fact, I was bringing the world to the word.  
The point of this excursus into Wittgenstein’s arguments is that it suggests that 
the ordinary language philosopher’s reasoning based on examples involves much 
more than empirical knowledge. Rather, this procedure draws out criterial 
knowledge or an understanding of the criteria and conditions that underpin our 
shared usage. Empirical investigations of facts require prior criterial knowledge 
of what would count as a fact (or as an Inuit’s boat). While Mates assumes that 
the ordinary language philosopher is using examples to discover empirical facts 
about the world, Cavell argues that this philosopher uses examples to draw out 
and recount the criteria, and hence the form of life, underpinning what we say 
and do in everyday life. Importantly, when I voice these criteria, ‘I do so, or take 
myself to do so, as…a representative human’ (Cavell, 1999: 18).  
In turn, if the ordinary language philosopher’s use of examples reveals criteria, 
this procedure enables us to recount these criteria to each other and hence to 
potentially revise them. What is particularly novel about Cavell’s reading of the 
claim to community is his understanding of criteria, and hence of community, as 
being what he calls ‘inherited’. If we are born or socialised into a (language) 
community and inherit the criteria (for use) that constitute it, we are answerable 
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to and for this community in ways that are not fully grasped in the debates 
between liberals and communitarians (Laugier, 2006, 2014, ch. 5). Let me 
explain. On Cavell’s account, my relation to community is not one of contract, as 
many liberals would have it: the criteria of community are mine in the sense that 
I inherit rather than choose or contract into them. Equally, my stance vis-à-vis 
communal life is not fully encapsulated by the more naturalised relation of 
belonging assumed by the communitarian. Given I cannot have played a role in 
developing the community’s criteria that I inherit and which pre-exist me, these 
criteria cannot be said to be fully mine (Laugier, 2006: 30–3, 2014: 192–8). The 
process of producing and debating examples, when I use it to reveal and recount 
criteria, is one through which I can work out the extent to which I am prepared to 
be spoken for by these criteria, and to speak for and reaffirm them. My 
alternative is to dissent: to refuse and revise these criteria in an effort to refound 
the community. In essence, conversation over examples becomes a way for me to 
take responsibility for my community. In recounting, refusing, and revising 
criteria (or even reaffirming them), I take responsibility for the community in 
which I live. 
What is interesting about Cavell’s reading of the ordinary language philosopher’s 
procedure as a claim to community is that it positions both agreement and 
disagreement as necessary features of communal life. We have a basic 
commonality or agreement in the sense that the projection of a word into a new 
speech situation relies on a shared understanding of the criteria for usage (in the 
sense, for instance, that I know to use the dictionary rather than a penguin to 
arbitrate meaning, and I do not so much agree to this practice as inherit it). 
Equally, any projection of an example invites disagreement precisely because 
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language and concepts are not given to us from on high. Instead, they are 
authorised by us and held together only by our continued willingness to use them 
(we must each make the inherited language our own, take responsibility for its 
implications, or refuse it as inadequate to our present needs, which is another 
way of taking responsibility). The point of using examples to voice criteria is 
therefore to enable political and ethical evaluation of a form of life. 
At this point, the proximity of Cavell’s argument about ordinary language 
philosophy to processes of political representation will become clear. The 
argument that political representation is a dynamic, creative process of making 
representative claims has been persuasively mounted and defended elsewhere 
(Saward, 2010). Taking this argument as given, I content myself with noting 
Cavell’s analogy between linguistic and political community, and between 
ordinary language criticism and political conversation. As Norris (2006a: 81) 
argues, Cavell’s account of the ordinary language philosopher’s procedure ‘casts 
considerable light upon our ability as citizens to speak politically for one another 
in the first person plural.’  
In Cavell’s hands, then, the ordinary language philosopher’s procedure of using 
examples to clarify ‘what we say when’ becomes a claim to community through 
which we can ascertain the extent to which an existing use, concept, or practice 
(and the form of life it is based on) is to be accepted and reaffirmed, or refused 
and revised. When another person produces an example, she both makes a claim 
to community and invites me to determine whether I see myself in this claim. In 
so doing, she extends to me an opportunity to establish and exercise my 
responsibility for our shared criteria. Exercising this responsibility is both 
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difficult (criteria are part of a form of life; they are natural to me and therefore 
difficult to discern, while also unable to be unilaterally discarded) and possible 
(criteria never fully speak for me until I determine, or say, that they do). 
To sum up the ground I have covered thus far, in using examples to recount 
criteria, the ordinary language philosopher is engaged in making a speculative 
claim to community rather than making (as Mates presumes) an empirical claim. 
The ordinary language philosopher does not lack evidence for her claim; she 
offers herself as proof (acting as a representative human) while inviting her 
interlocutor to do the same. Of course, this claim may fail; disagreement is a 
standing threat of any conversation. That Cavell understands community as a 
claim serves to emphasise the lack of an ultimate foundation that would secure 
any community beyond its fragile form of life. Cavell shows our attunement to 
one another to be both natural and fragile, based on nothing more and nothing 
less than our inheritance and sharing of the ‘whirl’ of a form of life. We may 
need to question this form of life in the process of making language our own. 
This is a process of taking responsibility for communal life: of inheriting criteria 
and revising them if need be.  
In the final part of this section, I argue that Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘aspect 
dawning’ can extend Cavell’s perfectionist understanding of community by 
offering a way to continue conversation in the face of disagreement. The refusal 
of an example (or what I referred to in Chapter Four as the moment when spade 
meets bedrock) becomes a moment at which we are asked to see a concept, 
practice, or situation under a new aspect. Cavell (1999: 372) himself notes that 
changes in aspect can be crucial to the pursuit of justice, arguing that, as the 
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epigraph to this chapter puts it, ‘[f]or justice to be done, a change of perception, a 
modification of seeing, may be called for.’ By linking Cavell’s idea of the claim 
to community to Wittgenstein’s arguments about seeing aspects, I underline the 
perfectionist potential of a Cavellian practice of community as a way of going 
on, in an imperfect democratic polity, in the face of disagreement. 
As I outlined in Chapter One, Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999, pt. I: § 115) 
emphasises the ways in which we are held ‘captive’ by certain ‘pictures’ of how 
the world is. Wittgenstein aims to discern the grammar that gives us these 
pictures, a grammar that we cannot necessarily get outside of, but which we can 
nevertheless come to perceive (we see the picture as a picture). Wittgenstein is 
therefore also interested in how we come to see something differently. He thinks 
of this as the moment when a different ‘aspect’ of an image ‘dawns’ on us, so 
that we see what is figured in the image in a new light, even as the image itself 
remains the same (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999, pt. II, § xi, 194-96). We see 
something that we had not yet noticed, or to which we were blind. A different 
aspect strikes us. We see the rabbit, having previously only seen the duck. This is 
a moment of transformation of the self. 
However, we should not become overly enamoured with the picture of aspect-
dawning suggested by the duck-rabbit. There are limits to the duck-rabbit image 
as an exemplar of aspect-dawning (Cavell, 1999: 354). Aletta Norval (2007) 
outlines two such limits. First, Norval (2007: 128) notes, aspect-dawning is not 
always a question of ‘wilfully “flipping” between different perspectives’; rather 
‘[b]eing able to see different perspectives depends crucially on becoming alerted 
to the broader background against which they are or become intelligible.’ 
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Second, the idea of flipping can create a false sense of equivalence between 
perspectives, when they may have different political valences. As Norval (2007: 
113–4) argues: ‘Such a “flipping”…suggests that both aspects are either in some 
sense of equal value, or of no value at all, whereas politically, a change of aspect 
often carries with it a great deal of revaluation of a previous perspective.’  
Understood in this way, Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect-dawning suggests that 
examples can provide perspective on community, but also that when 
conversation comes to an end, new perspicuous representations may be needed to 
create a change of aspect. By combining this Wittgensteinian insight with 
Norval’s insistence on the political significance of a change in aspect, I seek to 
deepen Cavell’s argument that examples can be used to recount, refuse, and 
revise the criteria of a shared form of life. Before putting these ideas to work, 
however, a summary of the ground I have covered in this first section is in order. 
In elaborating the idea of the ‘claim to community’, Cavell suggests, first, that 
when the ordinary language philosopher reasons based on examples, she engages 
in an ordinary democratic criticism that requires no special authority or 
knowledge. Any person who participates in a form of life is authorised to offer 
and evaluate examples of a word and projections of a concept, and in so doing to 
make a claim about ‘us’. Each can act as a ‘representative human’. Second, when 
I offer an example as a claim to and about community, I draw out the criteria that 
structure what ‘we’ do. Often as individuals, we might not be directly aware of 
these naturalised criteria because we inherit them (and hence they are natural to 
us); at the same time, because these criteria are inherited (and not fully mine) I 
must determine whether I will let them (and the community) speak for me.  
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Third, the point of making our criteria explicit is to be able to ask, in more 
overtly ethical and political terms, whether these criteria should hold, even as we 
acknowledge the difficulties of changing inherited criteria. This is a process of 
becoming responsible for our words, and with them, our shared form of life. 
Fourth, in recounting criteria in this way, I may decide to accept these criteria as 
mine. But equally, I might be moved to project an example that questions these 
criteria, based on my sense that our current criteria do not lead to ‘good enough 
justice’ (Cavell, 1990: 24). This example will likely register an as-yet 
unacknowledged dimension of our common life. Fifth, you might disagree that 
this example meets what Wittgenstein calls our ‘real need’. This disagreement 
may see the end of our conversation, as spade hits bedrock. In practical terms, 
however, and in a democratic polity, we need some way of going on. In which 
case, sixth, a further example will be required: one that modifies the way in 
which one of us sees the world. Through the Gestalt switch of an aspect change, 
a new aspect dawns. The situation stays the same (it is I who change, or you, 
perhaps even both of us, such that there is now a ‘we’).  
In the next section, I show how Strike Debt has used examples, or what the group 
calls ‘prototypes’, to allow a new aspect of debt to dawn. The group’s examples 
alert debtors to the broader background of financialisation within which they 
become personally indebted. As I will show, these examples also change the 
‘aspect’ of indebtedness so that it appears not only as an individualised liability 
but also as a source of mutual aid and communal responsibility. Strike Debt, in 
sum, advances an alternative claim to community. To make this argument, I 
begin by outlining the cultural-economic imaginary of individualised liability 
against which Strike Debt positions itself. Just as the subject of debt-based 
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economic citizenship is assumed to be financially capable (Chapter Four) and 
transparent (Chapter Five), so this subject is held to be ‘reliably liable’ (Itagaki, 
2014, my emphasis). The debtor is liable to financial institutions, but also to the 
state, which depends on her finance-led consumption and individualised 
accumulation of assets to both grow the economy and minimise the claims of 
citizens on the state for social provisioning. The reliably liable debtor fulfils 
these obligations by accruing and servicing debt. This is the starting point for my 
analysis of Strike Debt in section two. 
2. Communal debt refusal and cultures of financial liability 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century in the US, the state has premised 
economic citizenship on programmes of popular finance that entangle ordinary 
people with financial institutions and promote everyday capital accumulation 
(Aitken, 2007). More recently, and as IPE scholars have outlined to excellent 
effect, this so-called ‘democratisation’ of finance (or extension of capital into 
daily life) has facilitated a shift in both the UK and the US from public social 
provisioning to individual responsibility for wellbeing, as individuals and 
households increasingly rely on private borrowing, investment, and the 
accumulation of assets for their welfare (Aitken, 2007; Erturk et al., 2007; 
Finlayson, 2008; Langley, 2008; Finlayson, 2009; Crouch, 2009; Montgomerie 
and Büdenbender, 2014). This financialised design for economic citizenship has 
led to high levels of personal indebtedness, ranging from credit card debt to 
mortgage debt (LeBaron and Roberts, 2012; Montgomerie, 2006; Roberts, 2013; 
Soederberg, 2013, 2014). Credit has been targeted at the working class, the 
‘squeezed middle’, and those disadvantaged along the lines of race, gender, and 
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parental status (Montgomerie, 2009; Aitken, 2007, 2015a, Roberts, 2013, 2014; 
Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). In the US, racialised lending practices 
have led indebtedness to become a particularly marked axis of financial 
inequality (Hunt, 2003; Brown, 2013). 
This debt-based economic citizenship turns, unsurprisingly, on a cultural-
economic imaginary of liability that constitutes the citizen as a subject of debt 
(Graeber, 2012; Lazzarato, 2012, 2015; Itagaki, 2014). To adopt Itagaki’s (2014) 
term, the citizen is expected to be a ‘reliably liable’ one. Itagaki (2014: 99) 
explains this idea as follows: 
the debtor-citizen is the average individual who is imbricated in the 
schemes of the lenders and also entangled by government policy, because 
the debtor-citizens’ indebtedness purportedly underpins a healthy 
economy and enables upward mobility through more widespread access 
to credit. The contractual nature of this relationship establishes the 
debtor-citizen, conveniently, as “reliably-liable” to the lenders and to the 
debtor nation. In other words, the financialized economy depends on 
debt-credit exchanges; thus the debtor nation, reflecting the prerogatives 
of its most influential industry, facilitates and promotes both consistent 
indebtedness as an everyday, routine condition for consumers and as a 
naturalized privilege and responsibility of citizenship. 
This narrative of the reliably liable debtor-citizen presumes that economic 
citizenship turns on being financially included. However, as Rob Aitken (2015a: 
22, emphasis in original) has observed in the context of fringe financial services, 
these discourses of financial inclusion neglect that ‘economic disenfranchisement 
	 226 
is not only the result of exclusion from but also of adverse incorporation within 
newly formalized financial arrangements.’ Aitken (2015a: 186) shows how 
designs for economic citizenship premised on financial inclusion can immobilise 
people in debt and render them subject to coercion and distress. The reliably 
liable citizen thus becomes doubly liable: liable for her own wellbeing and for 
mitigating the effects of adverse incorporation, including by developing 
‘financial capability’, as I discussed in Chapter Four.  
Against this neoliberal ideal of the reliably liable citizen, groups of what might 
be called ‘DIY citizens’ are developing counter-designs for economic citizenship 
(Ratto and Boler, 2014a). Ratto and Boler (2014b: 18) describe do-it-yourself 
citizenship as ‘a twenty-first century amalgamation of politics, culture, arts, and 
technology’ that is ‘characterized by its emphasis on “doing” and the active roles 
of interventionists, makers, hackers, modders [modifiers], and tinkerers.’ DIY 
citizenship encourages people to refashion social and political-economic 
relations in daily life through experiments that are often digitally mediated (Ratto 
and Boler, 2014b; see also Isin and Ruppert, 2015). It is premised on the 
possibility of prototyping new political-economic forms, such as ‘social’ finance, 
as people experiment with crowd-funding, peer-to-peer lending, and the ‘sharing 
economy’, and these experiments in turn become enmeshed with conventional 
financial industries (Aitken, 2015b; Langley and Leyshon, 2017; Tooker and 
Clarke, forthcoming).  
Strike Debt is a movement of DIY citizens that has designed what members of 
the group call ‘prototypes’ to engage with the concrete mechanisms of adverse 
incorporation through debt and to advance alternative claims to indebted 
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community. My argument in the remainder of this section is that, in contrast to 
the designs for debt-based economic citizenship based on individual liability that 
I have just discussed, Strike Debt’s prototypes are designed to generate an 
ordinary democratic community of debtors who are capable of recounting, 
refusing, and revising the current criteria of belonging that typify economic 
citizenship in the US. These prototypes render the criteria of debt-based 
economic citizenship visible in such a way that people feel justified refusing 
these criteria, and with them, some of their debts. Strike Debt’s prototypes work 
in a way akin to the ordinary language philosopher’s deployment of examples of 
ordinary language usage. 
Strike Debt formed as an offshoot of Occupy Wall Street, bringing together 
activists, artists, and academics in New York City. Between 2012 and 2015, 
Strike Debt New York functioned as a loosely knit assemblage of semi-
autonomous working groups. In 2015, the group became inactive and members 
split off into different initiatives. Strike Debt New York sparked additional 
chapters in Boston, Chicago, Denver, Philadelphia, Portland, Raleigh, and the 
San Francisco Bay Area. Some spin-off groups are still active at the time of 
writing, including Strike Debt Portland and Strike Debt Bay Area. I focus here 
on the original New York-based chapter of Strike Debt, past and present 
members of which I interviewed in New York between March and May 2015, 
although my discussion is also informed by conversations and interviews in 
California with members of Strike Debt Bay Area.  
Specifically, I spent two and a half months between March and early May 2015 
in New York City and the San Francisco Bay Area interviewing Strike Debt 
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participants and attending public events by the group. I conducted ten semi-
structured interviews, and participated in six events in the US and the UK that 
either were run by Strike Debt or featured Strike Debt members, between 
November 2013 and May 2015. These events afforded me an appreciation of the 
development of Strike Debt’s activities over time, complementing the shorter 
period covered by my interviewing. My account of Strike Debt also draws on 
publicly available written and visual texts, such as media articles, journal 
articles, posters, and blog entries by Strike Debt members. For reasons of space, I 
have focused my attention on Strike Debt’s best-known prototype, the Rolling 
Jubilee, a crowd-funded debt cancellation initiative, while touching on the 
group’s earlier and later work.  
Strike Debt emerged from the Occupy Student Debt Campaign, which was 
launched in November 2011 by activists associated with Occupy Wall Street 
(Occupy Student Debt Campaign, 2012). In April 2012, organisers of the 
Campaign commemorated the point at which total student debt in the US was 
estimated to have passed one trillion dollars by calling on debtors to sign a 
‘Student Debtors’ Pledge of Refusal’ (‘1T Day’, 2012; Occupy Student Debt 
Campaign, 2012). Signatories vowed to stop making repayments on their loans 
once a million fellow debtors had put their name to the pledge. The target 
number of refusers reflected the number of people in the US estimated to already 
be in default on their student loans. Acknowledging default as a widespread yet 
clandestine condition, the organisers of the campaign sought to reformat non-
repayment of loans as a collective political act that would signal the latent power 
of debtors vis-à-vis their creditors, and would provide the first step towards a 
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debt strike (Ross, 2014: 183). The campaign also called for a jubilee-style write-
off of existing student debt (Ross, 2014: 184). 
When the Occupy Student Debt Campaign ended in early 2012, the pledge had 
garnered only a few thousand signatures. The campaign’s claim to a political 
community of debtors had failed. Debtors struggled to overcome the shame of 
being in debt and to experience debt as anything other an individualised liability, 
fearing the consequences of publicly formalising their de facto status as 
defaulters (Strike Debt activist 4, interview, April 17, 2015). The pledge did not 
generate a ‘we’, either symbolically in the sense of a shared debtor identity or 
materially in the sense of a substantive alternative economic network that would 
sustain strikers (Ogman, 2013: 19).  
Strike Debt was formed from the ashes of the Occupy Student Debt Campaign, 
as well as from other Occupy groups such as Occupy Theory and Occupy 
University. Its organisers recognised the need to develop prototypes of political 
community among isolated and dispersed debtors. In keeping with DIY 
citizenship movements, participants in Strike Debt have described their work as a 
‘social hack’ of finance, as a ‘proof of concept’, and as offering ‘small-scale 
demonstration models’ (Andrew Ross, in Ross, 2013b: n.p.; Thomas Gokey, in 
Gough and Gokey, 2015: 85; Thomas Gokey, as cited in Aitken, 2015b: 861–2; 
Laura Hanna, as cited in Pinto, 2012: n.p.). Here, the concept to be publicly 
‘proved’ is debt refusal, undertaken in the name of challenging ‘radically uneven 
forms of indebtedness’ (Hannah Appel, interview, May 8, 2015). 
Faced with the failure of the Occupy Student Debt Campaign’s pledge of refusal, 
participants in Strike Debt began to work on addressing the question, as one 
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participant put it, of ‘what non-cooperation with our own oppression would look 
like’ (Thomas Gokey, as cited in Jaffe, 2011), and hence of how widespread 
refusal of debt-based economic citizenship might become possible. From June 
2012, the group organised weekly open assemblies at which people shared first-
person testimony of their experiences of living in debt (Strike Debt, n.d.; Kasper, 
2012), before going on to write a ‘how-to’ manual for debt resistance, launched 
in September 2012 to coincide with the first anniversary of Occupy Wall Street. 
The manual first circulated as a free pamphlet before being published as a book 
(Strike Debt, 2014). The Debt Resisters’ Operations Manual (DROM) was 
conceived as a public education project that traced the political contours and 
exclusions of debt-based economic citizenship, as well as offering practical 
advice to the debtor who wanted to renegotiate or refuse her debts.  
The manual set out an alternative imaginary of indebtedness premised on the 
idea that debt, as a more-than-economic phenomenon, can become a positive 
obligation to ordinary others; to borrow Janet Roitman’s (2003: 211) phrase, debt 
can be ‘plenitude and not simply lack’. The DROM mobilised a mythology of 
debt that would be practically enacted in the group’s Rolling Jubilee project. To 
this end, the manual’s authors clarified:  
To come back to the original question of “To whom are we indebted?” 
we should say that not all debt is bad. We are indebted to our friends and 
communities who raise us, support us, and give us strength and a sense of 
belonging and identity. Some debts keep up relations—important 
relations that help us survive and make us human. There are many factors 
that make certain debts immoral, however, like exploitation, force, 
	 231 
violence, or profiteering. To the financial establishment of the world, we 
have only one thing to say: We owe you nothing. To our friends, our 
families, our communities, to humanity and to the natural world that 
makes our lives possible, we owe you everything. (Strike Debt, 2014: 15–
6) 
Thus, as Nicholas Mirzoeff (2016: 346–7), a participant in Strike Debt, explains: 
‘[t]o refuse neo-liberal debt is not to deny our debt to each other. Rather, it is to 
assert that what we owe to each other is being written out of the program. To 
alter that is not a simple modification—it requires a new abolition.’ 
Working with the idea of abolition, Strike Debt next launched what has become 
its best-known prototype, the Rolling Jubilee, in November 2012. On the 
anniversary of Occupy Wall Street’s eviction from Zuccotti Park, the group held 
a ‘People’s Bailout Telethon’, described by one attendee as ‘a real, weird, 
scrappy, public-access telethon’ (Berman, 2012: n.p.). The live-cast telethon 
attracted a large number of online and offline donations. Outstripping an initial 
target of US$50,000, donations eventually swelled to US$700,000. These crowd-
sourced donations averaged US$40 each, but were often as little as US$1, and 
frequently were made by people who were in debt themselves (Brown, 2014: 6–
7; Gough and Gokey, 2015: 80). Strike Debt used these donations to make a 
series of purchases of distressed medical and student loan debts, in an 
experimental political engagement with personal debt markets. 
The Rolling Jubilee appropriated a process that was at the time largely unknown 
outside of financial industry circles. In the US, banks are required to charge off 
defaulted debts after 180 days and they receive a tax deduction for doing so. 
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Distressed debts are then sold as commodities on secondary markets where they 
can be bought for as little as a few pennies on the dollar because they are high-
risk assets. While the bank receives a tax deduction in return for taking the 
defaulted debt off its books, secondary-debt buyers (usually debt collectors) 
realise sizeable profits by pressuring the debtor to repay a debt that he or she 
does not realise is valued at a fraction of the original face value. Repurposing this 
financial market mechanism, Strike Debt leveraged US$700,000 in donations to 
buy up just under US$32 million of debt. Rather than collecting these debts, 
however, Strike Debt, ‘abolished’ them (Rolling Jubilee, n.d.). The Rolling 
Jubilee bought up anonymous bundles of debt on secondary markets in order to, 
in the group’s own words, ‘liberate debtors at random through a campaign of 
mutual support, good will and collective refusal’ (Rolling Jubilee, n.d.). 
Much critique of the Rolling Jubilee has focused on the prototype’s gimmicky 
status and its supposed status as a charitable gesture. Some have criticised it on 
practical grounds, including for an ostensible lack of transparency and the 
initially uncertain tax implications of the debt cancellation for its recipients 
(Smith, 2013). The Rolling Jubilee has also been criticised in more overt political 
terms for doing the work of finance capitalists for them (Henwood, 2012; Clover, 
2013). As I shall argue, however, these critiques miss the way in which the 
Rolling Jubilee functions as a contestable claim to a community of debtors that, 
in one participant’s words, ‘conjur[es] the indebted as political subject’ (McKee, 
2013: 786), a point also made by an interviewee (Strike Debt activist 6, 
interview, April 22, 2015). 
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Like the ordinary language philosopher who develops an example to outline the 
criteria or conditions of speech, Strike Debt has used the Rolling Jubilee to draw 
out the conditions or criteria of debt-based economic citizenship in the United 
States, revealing what one participant calls the ‘false morality’ of debt (Thomas 
Gokey, as cited in Aronowitz, 2014: n.p.). This morality is summarised by 
Andrew Ross (2013b: n.p.), one of Strike Debt’s organisers:  
Money is lent into existence as interest-bearing debt, and so financiers 
need to find borrowers to perform that magical act. In the same vein, they 
treat their own debts as matters to be renegotiated or written off at will. 
Only the little people are actually required to pay them off in full. 
Against this morality, Strike Debt members have asserted the value of the 
Rolling Jubilee as ‘a symbolic action’ (Nicholas Mirzoeff, interview, March 27, 
2015) and an ‘illumination’ and ‘spectacle’ (Thomas Gokey, in Gough and 
Gokey, 2015: 77; Hannah Appel, interview, May 8, 2015) that was designed to 
enact ‘a solidarity of the indebted’ by engaging people in ‘mutual aid as direct 
action’ (Brown, 2014: 2, 7). The Rolling Jubilee makes explicit how 
contemporary debtor-creditor relations work, while mobilising the idea of debt as 
a bond rather than a bind to generate alternative solidarities among debtors.  
At the same time as it recounts the criteria of debt-based economic citizenship, 
the Rolling Jubilee becomes an ‘elaborative’ of reasons to refuse these criteria. 
As one interviewee explained it, the Rolling Jubilee breaks with the idea of a 
dyadic relationship between debtor and creditor (Hannah Appel, interview, May 
8, 2015). The effect of the Rolling Jubilee is to replace the usual picture of a 
direct debtor-creditor relationship with ‘rhizomatic maps of debt’ in which 
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mortgage originators, aggregators and owners of asset-backed securities come 
into view (Hannah Appel, interview, May 8, 2015). By questioning what are 
usually taken to be a direct moral bond and an unmediated transfer of value 
between the debtor and her original creditor, the Rolling Jubilee elaborates a 
basis for debt refusal. It does so by revealing what Appadurai (2016: 151), 
speaking of the derivatives market, calls ‘the failure of a fissive chain of 
promises.’ In the case of secondary markets for unsecured consumer debt, this 
failure is designed to generate profit.  
Strike Debt has therefore used the Rolling Jubilee to illustrate the mechanisms of 
adverse incorporation and to create the conditions for a ‘direct confrontation with 
debt’ (Thomas Gokey, in Gough and Gokey, 2015: 81). With this understanding 
of the group’s activities in place, I will now bring Strike Debt’s Rolling Jubilee 
work into line with the arguments and procedures of ordinary language 
philosophy. I do not presume perfect symmetry between Cavell’s arguments and 
Strike Debt’s approach. Nor do I hold that the group is influenced by Cavellian 
thinking or that it uses Cavell’s overtly perfectionist language. Strike Debt’s 
work is, I claim, perfectionist in effect rather than in intent. I suggest that Strike 
Debt’s activism intersects with the ordinary language philosopher’s procedure of 
using examples to recount, refuse, and revise criteria. 
Recounting the criteria of debt-based economic citizenship 
First, Strike Debt’s Rolling Jubilee functions as an example to recount the 
criteria of debt-based economic citizenship, the mass condition of the ‘we’ (the 
‘99%’). Everyday moral economies of debt depict personal debt as a sacrosanct 
and intimate bond between debtor and creditor. By contrast, the Rolling Jubilee 
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shows that financialised debt is more often than not an impersonal bind that takes 
force through a chain of marketised relations. The Rolling Jubilee makes use of 
an existing market medium in an unexpected way in order to make new 
connections; it forms a perspicuous representation of how debt works in 
financialised societies. It reveals the long chains of actors involved in 
originating, buying, and selling debts, while also showing how serial ownership 
of debt works against equitable relations based on mutual trust between a debtor 
and a creditor. Strike Debt’s debt-buying initiative therefore questions the 
applicability of the usual criterion for reciprocity between debtor and creditor, 
namely the idea of a direct moral bond between two parties. 
Refusing the criteria of debt-based economic citizenship 
Second, and in so doing, the Rolling Jubilee works as an elaborative speech act 
that creates a basis for people to refuse the claims of debt-based economic 
citizenship. As I outlined in Chapter Two, the correlate of appreciating the 
illocutionary force of an utterance is understanding how we use language to 
mitigate the force of our speech as action. The flipside of ‘doing things with 
words’ (Austin, 1962) is knowing how to make a ‘plea for excuses’ (Austin, 
1970a): how to begin again in a form of Arendtian ‘natality’. We cannot be 
endlessly liable for the implications of our utterances; instead, we must take 
responsibility for what we say and do (even when the effects of our actions 
outstrip our intentions), including by offering elaboratives such as apologies, 
clarifications, and excuses.  
Of course, in the case at hand, Strike Debt is not so much ‘doing things with 
words’ as ‘doing words with things’ (Latour, 2000), namely with markets for 
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debt. Nevertheless, by using these markets against themselves to recount their 
criteria of impersonal financialised belonging, Strike Debt presents an alternative 
picture of debtor-creditor relations. By inviting people in debt to consider how an 
inherited criterion that structures debtor-creditor relations (the moral claim that 
one must always repay one’s debts) sits with newly invented practices (like 
selling debts on secondary markets), Strike Debt makes it possible for debtors to 
imagine and elaborate circumstances in which it might be legitimate to refuse to 
repay. The Rolling Jubilee prompts people to ask whether existing criteria should 
hold. 
Revising the criteria of debt-based economic citizenship 
Third, and finally, Strike Debt revises the criteria of debt-based economic 
citizenship by offering an alternative projection of the concept of debt that 
references what we might call a mythology of originary debts (similar to that 
found in, for example, Sarthou-Lajus, 1997; Graeber, 2012; for an account of 
Graeber’s work that emphasises the significance of its mythology of primordial 
debts, see Maurer, 2013). Recall from Chapter Two that Cavell’s mythological 
practice of reading mobilises a symbolic account of a word that reveals how 
something in the word usually strikes us, to show how ‘we relate to the 
constraints and emancipations of a convention’ (Mulhall, 1994: 173). In invoking 
ideas of social debts to others, Strike Debt holds that debt can, in some 
circumstances, act as a positive bond and not just a bind. Importantly, the group 
materialises this alternative conception of debt by intervening in the lives of a 
small number of debtors (through debt cancellation) to exemplify indebted 
community and offer material aid to those in need. 
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Through these three steps of using examples, elaboratives, and mythology, to 
recount, refuse, and revise the criteria of debt-based economic citizenship, Strike 
Debt has made a claim to community. Where the Occupy Student Debt 
Campaign’s claim to community failed, Strike Debt has succeeded in producing 
a community of debtors.  
This community has been developed further in more recent work by some Strike 
Debt members to develop pilot debtors’ unions. From the outset, Strike Debt 
participants emphasised the temporary nature of the Rolling Jubilee as a 
provisional prototype intended to act as a spur to a debt strike and to collective 
debt refusal (Ross and Taylor, 2012). One further opportunity to encourage overt 
debt refusal emerged from the Rolling Jubilee itself. As part of the Rolling 
Jubilee project, Strike Debt purchased a bundle of student debt labelled ‘tuition 
receivables’ (Hannah Appel, interview, May 8, 2015). The group discovered that 
this debt came from loans by Corinthian Colleges, a for-profit college group 
accused of fraudulent practices and eventually shut down by the federal 
Department of Education. Some Strike Debt members set about working with the 
students whose debts the group had bought, who were beginning to demand the 
cancellation of their federal loan debts. Strike Debt launched a new prototype: a 
pilot debtors’ union called the Debt Collective. Now a standalone group, the 
Debt Collective comprises some original Strike Debt activists as well as new 
members and organisers. The first debt strike was undertaken in early 2015 by 
over 200 former students of Corinthian Colleges and resulted in partial 
cancellation of federal student loan debts. In late 2016, another union of debtors 
was formed, organised by the Debt Collective and made up of former students of 
the ITT Technical Institutes (‘ITT Tech Collective Strike – We Won’t Pay Our 
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Federal Student Loans’, n.d.). At the time of writing, the work of the Debt 
Collective is ongoing.  
Strike Debt’s prototypes have thus generated a movement for collective debt 
refusal. Nonetheless, Strike Debt’s claim to indebted community is not beyond 
contestation, as I will show in the next section. Looking at political disagreement 
within the group, alongside the movement’s success, illuminates perfectionist 
democratic community in action. Recall that Cavell emphasises disagreement as 
a necessary part of the ordinary language philosopher’s procedure. Examples are 
not beyond criticism; indeed, it is by critiquing examples that we come to clarify 
the working of criteria. This fragility and contestability of community is a 
hallmark of moral perfectionism; community remains, for Cavell, a claim. In the 
case of Strike Debt, participants who criticise the colour-blindness of Strike 
Debt’s prototypes and the lack of attention to race have questioned the claim to 
indebted community. In the next section, I suggest that this internal critique 
resonates with Cavell’s (1999: 372) Wittgensteinian inspired observation that, as 
he puts it, ‘[f]or justice to be done, a change of perception, a modification of 
seeing, may be called for.’ 
3. From liability to responsibility in debt refusal 
In a Cavellian understanding of community, ‘my attempt to speak for others 
is…never more (or less) than a claim’ (Norris, 2006b: 14, emphasis in original). 
It is open to the other to refuse my example, in which case I will find, not 
necessarily that my claim was wrong in any straightforward empirical sense, but 
that I made it to the wrong party: that community does not exist (whether not yet, 
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or no longer) (Cavell, 1999: 19–20). Claims to community are, as Eldridge 
(1986: 571, emphasis in original; see also Norris, 2006b: 14) observes:  
attempts to speak as a member of a community would speak, attempts 
which are called forth by the facts that not everyone does speak that way, 
that community habits of speech have been lost or forgotten or that the 
community of which one is or hopes to be a member…is under threat of 
dissolution, in so far as different people may come to conceptualize 
important new situations differently, thus distancing themselves from one 
another. 
The claim to community is therefore premised on the very possibility of 
disagreement. 
This distancing and dissolution, the experience of hitting of bedrock, can be seen 
in the experiences of Strike Debt. In this section, I am interested in how, just as 
Strike Debt has refused the claim to community upon which debt-based 
citizenship is founded, so the group’s internal critics have refused Strike Debt’s 
own claim to a community of debtors. This refusal does not mark a rupture with 
moral perfectionism. Rather, refusing claims to community is central to a 
perfectionist disposition, whether the claims are made in the name of practices of 
governance (as with debt-based economic citizenship) or in the name of practices 
of civic freedom (as with Strike Debt). While refusal may signal political 
disappointment, it need not signal political withdrawal. For as Laugier (2006: 33) 
argues, ‘in refusing my agreement, I do not withdraw from the community: the 
refusal is itself a part of my belonging’. 
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Some participants in Strike Debt have criticised the group’s prototypes for failing 
to situate the problem of debt within longstanding histories of racialised 
oppression and economic injustice in the United States and beyond (Brown, 
2014; Mirzoeff, 2015, 2016; Nicholas Mirzoeff, interview, March 27, 2015; 
Strike Debt activist 5, interview, April 18, 2015). The language of prototypes 
itself speaks of a tendency, seen in modern design, to prioritise rupture, change, 
and futurity over tracing continuities and history. Yet, prototypes are themselves 
embedded in histories; we inherit forms of life along with our examples.  
As I outlined in Chapter Three, Cavell uses the concept of inheritance to describe 
the form of life underpinning linguistic community as simultaneously natural and 
unnatural, as something that each of us acquires but which we must test and 
question if our language is to become properly our own. It follows from this 
argument that any claim to indebted community must account for ‘our tendency 
to fall under the spell of our inherited ways of thinking’, and hence our 
‘aspectival captivity’ (Owen, 2003: 87). Ways of thinking are intertwined with 
ways of acting; with our inherited ways of thinking come legacies of 
displacement and dispossession, as Thoreau (1995) acknowledges in clearing the 
ground for his dwelling and cultivation. In the United States, but also elsewhere 
(Graeber, 2012), these inheritances are evident in the persistence and 
intensification of racial inequality, violence, and injustice in contemporary 
designs for economic citizenship. 
According to Strike Debt participant Nicholas Mirzoeff, this racialised 
inheritance runs through the Rolling Jubilee’s approach to the abolition of debts 
(Mirzoeff, 2015; Nicholas Mirzoeff, in-person interview, March 27, 2015, New 
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York City). The Rolling Jubilee’s debt purchases were ‘blind’ in the sense that 
the identity of debtors only became apparent after a bundle of debt had been 
bought on the secondary market (Mirzoeff, 2015: 21). According to Mirzoeff 
(2015: 21–2), members of Strike Debt understood the ‘randomness’ of the aid 
offered by the Rolling Jubilee as ‘democratic in the Athenian sense, where office 
and other favors were allocated by lot.’ However, just as the Athenian citizenry 
was homogeneous precisely because of the exclusion of women, children, and 
slaves, so too the democratic anonymity of the Rolling Jubilee enacted exclusion 
through its difference-blindness (Mirzoeff, 2015: 22). As Mirzoeff (2015: 22) 
explains: 
By treating debt as monotheism, Strike Debt could not adjust its 
perspective to deal with the uneven, deeply racialized playing field of 
credit-based and justice-system generated debt. Perhaps the most 
damaging debt to the most impoverished (those who do not qualify for 
credit-based debt), such as utility debt, fines and fees from the justice 
system is not available in the secondary debt market because it [is] not 
owned by banks. Behind these present-day questions, the long histories of 
the debt-financed slave labor system and the unaddressed debt of 
reparations remained obscured. 
For Mirzoeff, the Rolling Jubilee is symptomatic of an inability to see and hence 
grapple with the unevenness and racialisation entailed in the history and present 
of debt relations in the United States. This race-blind approach is reflected in the 
posters used for the telethon that launched the Rolling Jubilee. Artist Molly 
Crabapple designed an expressive poster of an African-American woman in 
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chains breaking her bonds (Figure 1) but this image was set aside and a graphic 
design of anonymous hands ‘bailing out’ the people (Figure 2) was used instead 
(Nicholas Mirzoeff, interview, March 27, 2015). 
Figure 1: Molly Crabapple, ‘The Rolling Jubilee: We Owe You Nothing’ 
http://occupywallstreet.net/story/what-resistance-looks 
 
Figure 2: Joe Alterio, ‘The Rolling Jubilee: A Bailout By the People For the People’ 
http://tidalmag.org/blog/intensify/what-resistance-looks-like/ 
 
 
 
Another former participant in Strike Debt explains the relationship between race 
and debt in a way that resonates with the Wittgensteinian idea of seeing aspects. 
For Pamela Brown, focusing on neoliberalism as the basis of indebtedness in the 
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United States occludes the connections between debt and race. Brown (2013: 
804–5) makes her argument as follows:  
We talk a lot about how debt makes us feel: isolated, guilty, powerless. 
But we rarely discuss how the neoliberal construct of perpetual 
indebtedness to nonhuman financial entities has created a populace so 
focused on debts “owed” to Wall Street that we have almost no memory 
of any other kinds of debts. Yet, once we open the Pandora’s box to look 
at the intersections of race and debt, we are forced to ask how we have 
forgotten so much. Could it be that, alongside the rise of the neoliberal 
social order characterized by the invisible chains of debt, a parallel 
practice of “color blindness” emerged that rendered race invisible?  
Faced with this colour blindness, Brown (2013: 810) issues what she calls a 
‘demand to see’: a demand to see debt under another aspect, as racialised from its 
origins. How might this demand be realised? 
I find one realisation of this demand to see debt and debtors differently in a 
durational writing project undertaken by Mirzoeff. Over the course of 2012, 
Mirzoeff wrote a daily online post on the Occupy movement. These posts were 
subsequently published as an e-book (Mirzoeff, 2014). While many of 
Mirzoeff’s posts are direct reflections on the day-to-day activities of Strike Debt, 
these posts also take in a broader geographical and historical sweep of examples 
of subjugation through debt and practices of freedom in resistance to it. The very 
structure of the project as a series of short texts has the effect of creating less a 
flipping back and forth between two images (as in Strike Debt’s juxtaposition of 
indebted mutuality against debts owed to Wall Street) than a sense of aspectival 
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multiplicity in which race and dispossession nonetheless figure as central 
intertwined threads. Alongside pieces on Occupy and Strike Debt are short 
essays on, among other topics: climate debt; the New York City slave market 
(located where Wall Street is today); the anniversary of the death of Thomas 
Sankara (the president of Burkina Faso who was assassinated in 1987 soon after 
calling for a debt strike among African nations); the role of debt and race in the 
‘prison-industrial complex’ in the United States; debt financing and transatlantic 
slavery; and the indemnity debt France obliged Haiti to pay for the slave 
‘property’ it ‘lost’ after the Haitian Revolution abolished slavery, as well as the 
relationship between this debt and the country’s unnatural disasters of earthquake 
and flooding. 
The effect of this format is to ‘provincialise’ (Chakrabarty, 2008) the narrative of 
debts to Wall Street that animates Strike Debt’s work, including by showing, in 
Mirzoeff’s (2014: 98) words, that radical debt resistance has very often 
originated in the ‘colony’ only to then move to the ‘metropole’. Let me return at 
this point to Norval’s observation that understanding a change in aspect as the 
stark flipping between two figures relies on an overly simple picture of both 
perception and politics. Norval (2007: 128) reminds us that another way in which 
we experience an aspect change is by ‘becoming alerted to the broader 
background against which [different perspectives] are or become intelligible.’ 
Rather than flipping between the language of ‘social’ and ‘financial’ debts as two 
competing perspectives on indebtedness, we might consider how the two come 
together in a broader setting comprising slavery, abolition, reconstruction, 
colonialism, empire, and continued racialised dispossession (see, for example, 
Baucom, 2005; Kish and Leroy, 2015; Hudson, 2017). To offer a brief example, 
	 245 
in the immediate afterlives of chattel slavery in nineteenth-century America, 
racial subjugation of the ‘free’ continued through debt peonage and indentured 
servitude. Figurative debts featured heavily in the psychology underpinning this 
subjugation, such that the formerly enslaved were held to owe their white 
‘benefactors’ for the ‘gift’ of freedom (Hartman, 1997). 
If a different aspect of debt dawns by placing neoliberal finance in a broader 
historical context, aspect change can also be effected by considering, in 
Mirzoeff’s words, ‘places…that we might call crosshatched with other pasts, 
futures and presents, intermittently visible’ (Mirzoeff, 2014: 13, my emphasis). 
Central to Mirzoeff’s ‘cross-hatched’ account of indebtedness is the indemnity 
debt imposed by France on Haiti and taken on by the black republic in an attempt 
to secure its independence. Mirzoeff allows us to ask (as does Robbie Shilliam 
[2013]) not only what debt is payable to rectify the injustice of the original 
French indemnity, but also what positive debt is owed for Haiti’s gift to the 
world of libète, as the first republic to abolish slavery. This libète (in Haitian 
Kreyol) differs from the French liberté in representing a true enfranchisement, 
and as such, it provides a different lineage for debt resistance. Hence for 
Mirzoeff (2013: n.p.): 
there is a chain of resonance from the Haitian revolutionaries through the 
US Abolitionists and Reconstructionists down to today’s critiques of the 
prison-industrial complex and the global justice movements. Specifically, 
while those who campaign against debt are often told that there is no 
precedent for their ideas, the history of these radical moments in the 
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Americas suggests that any democracy worthy of the name is also an 
economic transformation that takes into account the racialization of debt.  
The lineage of democratic political and economic transformation that Mirzoeff 
traces suggests a very different resonance to the idea, mobilised by Strike Debt in 
the Rolling Jubilee, of ‘abolishing’ debts. Therefore, Mirzoeff (2013, n.p.) 
concludes that: ‘It has become increasingly clear that a transformation of current 
economic practice so thoroughgoing that it could be called a form of abolition 
would be required in order to salvage any form of meaningful democracy.’ 
These perspicuous representations of debt, race, and democracy show that aspect 
change can provoke ‘a great deal of revaluation of a previous perspective’ 
(Norval, 2007: 114). These representations illuminate aspects of debt that are 
simultaneously ubiquitous and only ‘intermittently visible’ to those not subject to 
race-based discrimination and oppression. Such aspects nevertheless remain in 
the foreground for those groups, including African Americans and Latinos in the 
US, who are racially targeted through redlining and reverse redlining, 
disproportionately affected by the foreclosure and underwater housing crises, 
more likely to be burdened by carceral debts, and confronted with a growing 
‘wealth gap’ in the afterlives of financial crisis (Brown, 2013; Joseph, 2014; 
Roberts, 2014). This aspect change shows that other types of elaborative are 
called for, beyond debt refusal. These elaboratives include apology and 
reparation. 
I would like to end this discussion of the successes and failures of Strike Debt’s 
claims to indebted community by reflecting on what it means to hit bedrock and 
come to a substantive break in the conversation, which is what I understand 
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Strike Debt’s inactivity to represent. The risk of a claim to community failing is 
central to Cavell’s perfectionism. Thus, as Andrew Norris (2006b: 6) observes, 
‘Cavell consistently emphasizes both the ways our common form of life is held 
together by individual commitments and the way in which we can find ourselves 
out of tune with one another, unable to make sense of one another.’ Call this 
Cavell’s sense of the tragic dimension of both everyday life and politics: his 
appreciation that conversation can come to an abrupt end, as spade meets 
bedrock, such that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are not ‘we’ (no longer, or not yet; perhaps not 
ever).  
Acknowledging this standing threat of the refusal of a claim to community, 
Cavell (1999: 27) argues that: 
To speak for yourself…means risking the rebuff—on some occasion, 
perhaps once for all—of those for whom you claimed to be speaking; and 
it means risking having to rebuff—on some occasion, perhaps once for 
all—those who claimed to be speaking for you.  
There is no guarantee that my example will succeed, that you will see yourself in 
what I say. Indeed, a claim to community that demands conformity would be the 
antithesis of perfectionist collectivity. Just as the perfectionist call to self-reliance 
can be debased (Chapter Four), so too community can be caricatured as 
conformity. For ‘conformity is not a mere lack of community, but its parody, 
learning and teaching the wrong thing of and to one another’ (Cavell, 1990: 125).  
Adopting an understanding of community as a claim suggests that we should 
read the kind of disagreement seen in Strike Debt less as a departure from 
perfectionist politics than as a constitutive part of ordinary democratic collective 
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life. As Laugier (2006: 33, emphasis in original) explains, in the Cavellian 
conception of community: 
My participation is what is constantly in question, in discussion, in 
conversation….But—and here is what is paradoxical about community 
structure understood in this way—in refusing my agreement, I do not 
withdraw from the community: the refusal is itself part of my belonging.   
Refusal thus becomes a way of refounding community, reflecting the entwined 
etymologies of ‘refusing’ in ‘refunding’ and ‘refounding’.  
In turn, when spade hits bedrock, as it inevitably will at some point, everything 
hangs on how the one or ones whose claim is refused respond to this refusal. 
There is no guarantee the parties involved will come to see the same aspects of a 
situation, but Cavell does offer some guidance as to how the one impeached by 
the refusal might respond. At this point, Cavell (1990: 117, my emphasis) argues, 
‘the conversation cannot go on—there is nothing to say—unless something is 
shown, by the one before whom the cry of outrage is raised.’ The accused, he 
argues, ‘must suffer change’ (Cavell, 1999: 372).  
Following his analogy between the pursuit of just and equitable relations in 
intimate and in civic life, which I introduced in Chapter Five, Cavell exemplifies 
this process break in the conversation by looking at the dispute between Nora 
and Torvald Helmer, the husband and wife at the centre of Ibsen’s A Doll’s 
House (a play that centres on the fateful debt incurred by Nora when she secretly 
takes out a loan to cover her husband’s medical bills). Cavell uses the story of 
Nora and Torvald as a kind of mythology of refusal, inviting us to interpret the 
dissolution of union through Nora’s refusal to go on living with a man who has 
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failed to provide her with the friendship and education needed for a meet and 
happy conversation (Hammer, 2002: 115; Cavell, 1990: ch. 3, 2004: ch. 13). The 
final scene of the play stages a confrontation between the couple, in which 
Torvald fails to understand and respond to Nora’s charge of injustice.  
What would it take for Nora not to exercise her newly perceived right to exit, for 
her to remain in the household unit with her husband and children? As Mulhall 
(1994: 279–80) explains, a radical shift would be required, one in which: 
both accuser and accused are able to play that role [of friend or exemplar] 
for each other. The victim functions as her interlocutor’s friend by 
rebuking him, by expressing her outrage to him and so expressing her 
conviction in his moral intelligibility—thereby attracting him towards the 
task of discovering it, finding the words and deeds in which to give it 
expression; and her interlocutor can also function as her friend, by 
acknowledging her rebuke and his own compromised position, and yet 
showing his continued consent to their society as a site at which the 
necessary personal and public transformations may take place—a 
demonstration which rebukes any tendency on her part towards exile and 
attracts her to express and extend her consent to her present society... 
This is a complex passage. But we can take it as presenting an ideal-typical 
response to a situation in which a claim to community is refused (in the case of 
Nora and Torvald, the intimate community of partnership, marriage, and family 
life). The onus is on Torvald to show his commitment to self-transformation in 
order to prevent Nora’s self-exile. Torvald fails to evince this commitment. He 
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fails to show ‘his ability to learn, to suffer change’ (Cavell, 1981: 197). So Nora 
leaves.  
In the case of Strike Debt, not enough has been shown to prevent the departure of 
those members who perceive the group’s actions to be those of an organisation 
that reproduces, however unwittingly, white privilege and supremacy. At the 
same time, the ideal of perfectionist community asks something of the aggrieved 
party: that she be prepared to make her anger intelligible. She need not do so 
with reference to established moral principles and discourses; after all, it can be 
the voice of respectable morality, the voice of society’s Torvalds, which 
oppresses most. As Cavell (2004: 25–6) explains:  
hatred and anger are not essentially irrational, but may clearly be called 
for. To live a moral life should not require that we become Socrateses or 
Buddhas or Christs, all but unprovokable. But we are asked to make even 
justified anger and hatred intelligible, and to be responsible for their 
expression in our lives, and sometimes, not always and everywhere, to 
put them aside. 
Such are the responsibilities on both sides that are implied in treating community 
as a claim. The dissenting claims that both Strike Debt and its internal critics 
enter are claims to transform the deeply imperfect democracy of a financialised 
society, but in a way that would realise Pamela Brown’s ‘demand to see’. 
4. Rethinking everyday financial moral economies in IPE 
At the beginning of this thesis, while engaging with the IPE literature, I outlined 
the importance of a growing body of work on everyday financial moral 
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economies (for example, Watson, 2009, 2012; Stanley, 2014; Montgomerie and 
Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). This work shows how moralised, neoliberal 
understandings of liability encourage individuals and households to service their 
debts even when doing so causes great hardship, but also how certain classes of 
debtor (such as middle-class mortgage-holders) are valorised and protected 
(Watson, 2009), even as others (such as sole-parent female-headed households) 
are demonised (Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). Moral economists of 
finance have also traced how fiscal austerity and the retrenchment of social 
provision have been legitimated through analogies between state spending and 
the household budget (Stanley, 2014).  
Given this otherwise illuminating work, we might wish to issue a ‘demand to 
see’ beyond financial debts to grasp debt as a more-than-economic category, as I 
first suggested in looking at an ordinary image of debt politics in Chapter One. 
As I argued there, IPE scholars have largely failed to grapple with the 
‘maddening generosity’ of social and moral debts (Shilliam, 2013: 166), which 
often confound and exceed explanatory schemas based on economic power and 
financial interest. It is no coincidence that these other debts are being revealed by 
those who are looking at what have been, until recently, occluded topics in IPE 
as a field: the study of culture and of postcolonial and decolonial politics. My 
reading of the work of Strike Debt stands alongside the efforts of scholars like 
Shilliam and Aitken, canvassed in Chapter One, to offer a change of aspect in 
IPE’s understanding of everyday debt politics.  
This change of aspect is evident across the substantive chapters of Part Two of 
this thesis. In Chapter Four, for instance, I underlined Ken Ilgunas’s recognition 
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of the social debts upon which his experiment in debt-free living was based: his 
acknowledgement, upon the conclusion of his experiment, that his ability to 
avoid debt was based on the sustenance provided by others. I also referred to 
Henry David Thoreau’s acknowledgement of, as Cavell (2008: 117) puts it in his 
reading of Walden, the ‘uncountable’ debts he—Thoreau—owes others, 
including debts incurred through the colonial displacement and material 
dispossession that his very presence at Walden Pond represents.  
This dawning of a different aspect of indebtedness was also apparent in Chapter 
Five, in the eventual acceptance by members of Debt Resistance UK of the need 
to address the gendered debts incurred and the depletion sustained in the social 
reproduction of the group. For these members, a form of life had to change. And, 
as I have emphasised throughout the present chapter, the work of Strike Debt as a 
whole, as well as of dissenting individuals within the group, similarly makes 
manifest other ways of acknowledging debts and practising indebtedness. These 
include treating debt as a social commitment of ordinary people to each other 
(expressed in the idea of a ‘people’s bailout’), while also understanding debt as a 
result of longstanding histories of racialised oppression. This practical ethical 
and political work to ‘manifest for the other another way’ (Cavell, 1990: 31) of 
understanding debt brings me full circle back to the IPE pictures of debt with 
which I opened my argument, and to which I will return in the Conclusion to this 
thesis. But first, let me summarise the key arguments that I have made in this 
final substantive chapter. 
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Concluding remarks 
The selectivity of bailouts in the afterlives of the global financial crisis have 
sparked debates about the legitimacy of debt refusal in everyday life. In this 
chapter, I have used Cavell’s concept of the claim to community to understand 
the perfectionist politics of community in a contemporary debt refusal 
movement: Strike Debt. I have examined Strike Debt’s activities by way of an 
analogy with ordinary language philosophy. I have argued that Strike Debt’s 
prototypes of collective action serve to recount, refuse, and revise the criteria of 
debt-based economic citizenship, thus enabling people to refuse to repay their 
debts. In so doing, Strike Debt has mobilised a mythology of indebtedness as a 
mutual responsibility among ordinary people, in contrast to the imaginary of 
individualised liability that drives debt-based economic citizenship. Exploring 
the emergence of dissensus within Strike Debt, I also argued that internal critics 
have enacted a perfectionist aspect change by showing how debt both originates 
in and reproduces racialised inequalities and dispossession. These critics show 
that alternative elaboratives are called for, such as apology, reparation, and the 
redemption of debts owed to the formerly enslaved and colonised. 
To make this argument, I began by setting out Cavell’s reading of ordinary 
language philosophy’s claim to community as the basis for an analogy with the 
work of Strike Debt. I placed particular emphasis on the place of disagreement in 
claims to community. Because my assertion about what ‘we’ say is nothing more 
than a claim, it is open to the other to refuse the example, and to propose another 
in its place. Within this conception of community, disagreement is a standing 
threat to our continued conversation and fragile attunement to one another. When 
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conversation comes to a standstill, a new example is required: one that shows the 
phenomenon we are examining under a different aspect. Overall, this process is 
one of taking responsibility for the language we inherit, by recounting criteria in 
order either to reaffirm or to refuse and revise the criteria it expresses. 
Next, I introduced Strike Debt’s prototypes of debt refusal. I showed that these 
prototypes are designed to draw out the criteria governing contemporary debt-
based economic citizenship. I juxtaposed elements of ordinary language 
philosophy, such as its use of examples, its attention to elaborative speech acts, 
and its emphasis on the mythological resonances of words, with Strike Debt’s 
own practices. This enabled me to argue that Strike Debt’s best-known 
prototype, the ‘Rolling Jubilee’, functions as both an elaborative speech act and a 
claim to community. The Rolling Jubilee makes visible how the moralised 
criteria of the debtor-creditor relationship, in which indebtedness is presented as 
a direct, inviolable bond, do not match the actual workings of financial markets, 
in which debt is bought and sold as a commodity on secondary markets for a 
profit. Here the Rolling Jubilee functions as an ethical elaborative of the reasons 
not to repay and as a justification of economic disobedience. At the same time, 
by developing new ways for debtors to support each other through crowd-funded 
debt cancellation, the Rolling Jubilee makes an alternative claim to community, 
in which citizens are responsible to each other rather than to financial 
institutions.  
I then moved to consider dissent from Strike Debt’s claim to have enacted a 
community of debtors. I argued that criticism and dissent do not abrogate 
perfectionist community but are rather fulfilments of it; in refusing a claim to 
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community, I enact a perfectionist form of belonging. In the case of Strike Debt, 
the refusal of the group’s claim to indebted community by some members helped 
to show debt under another aspect. This aspect dawning is essential if the 
injustices manifest in and reproduced by racialised capitalism are to be 
acknowledged and addressed.  
I ended the chapter by linking the aspect changes in Strike Debt’s politics to 
work in IPE that offers a counterpoint to everyday financial moral economies 
scholarship by pulling out how the more-than-economic dimensions of debt can 
act as a productive, positive spur to politics and ethical obligation. I also showed 
how this insight runs across the substantive studies of debt resistance I have 
offered in Part Two of the thesis.  
Finally, in making this argument about Strike Debt, I have also rounded out the 
Cavellian grammar of democratic personhood or subjectivity that I previewed in 
Chapter Three. Now that we are at the end of Part Two, let me draw this 
grammar together. In Chapter Four, I showed how individuals who avoid debt 
can become ‘ordinary exemplars’ of self-reliance. In the place of both 
conventional understandings of financial capability and critical abandonments of 
the value of autonomy, I argued that self-reliance is the mark of ordinary 
democratic individuality (the perfectionist ‘I’). In Chapter Five, I examined how 
activists from Debt Resistance UK have recast auditing as a form of ‘passionate 
utterance’, in an effort to create responsive democratic exchange. I argued that 
responsiveness rather than transparency is the hallmark of ordinary democratic 
intersubjectivity (or the establishment of a perfectionist relationship between the 
‘I’ and the ‘you’). In this final substantive chapter, I have traced how a broader 
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ordinary democratic collectivity (the perfectionist ‘we’) can be created by 
treating examples as ‘claims to community’. In sum, when people act as ordinary 
exemplars, engage one another through passionate utterances, and test the 
possibilities and limits of collective life through claims to community, they 
realise ordinary democratic subjectivity in daily life.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have developed a novel account of ordinary democratic 
subjectivity in finance based on an original application of Stanley Cavell’s 
philosophy within IPE. I have used this account to redress a relative inattention 
to contemporary debt resistance in the IPE literature. Substantively, this has 
involved examining the tactics and subjectivities associated with resistances to 
debt in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in the UK and the US. My 
central argument is that debt resistances in these countries, while bearing the 
imprint of conventional cultural-economic imaginaries of financial capability, 
transparency, and liability, are reconstructing debt relations as a site of 
democratic selfhood and community. The result of attending to debt resistances 
in this way is a fuller understanding of the new debt ecologies created by the 
global financial crisis, one that shows how practices of civic freedom materialise 
from practices of governance, and how ordinary democratic subjects emerge 
from the subjectivities associated with debt-based economic citizenship. 
I began this thesis by arguing that most IPE scholarship on debt-based economic 
citizenship offers a partial view because it underplays the significance of 
resistances to debt and of ordinary agency in financialised societies 
(Introduction). I then deepened the warrant for my research by sketching two 
images of debt politics in IPE (‘everyday’ and ‘ordinary’) in order to make the 
case for filling in an embryonic ordinary image of debt politics (Chapter One). 
By returning to the broad project of ordinary language philosophy, I excavated a 
methodological approach to the ‘ordinary’ that emphasises attending to ordinary 
ethics, ordinary action, ordinary language usage, and the multiple resonances of 
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ordinary words (Chapter Two). I then developed a conceptual framework of 
ordinary democratic subjectivity based on Cavell’s work (Chapter Three), in 
order to study substantive exemplars of the tactics of avoiding, auditing, and 
refusing debt (Chapters Four, Five, and Six). My substantive studies showed how 
debt resistances are enmeshed with conventional cultural-economic imaginaries, 
but also that these resistances contain within them a perfectionist critique and a 
more-than-economic understanding of debt that together exceed the strictures of 
debt-based economic citizenship. 
My objective in this concluding chapter is to tie together the three tactics of 
resistance I discussed in Part Two of the thesis while also drawing out the 
broader implications of my Cavellian account of ordinary democracy for IPE. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. I begin by discussing the connections 
and distinctions between the three tactics of resistance. I undertake this 
comparison because the relationship between my exemplars has remained 
implicit up to this point. Second, I return to my central arguments to elaborate on 
the nature of my contribution to IPE. Rather than rehearsing my arguments 
chronologically across each chapter, I take a narrative path here to show that the 
thesis consists of three overlapping stories and arguments (disciplinary, 
conceptual, and substantive). This enables me, third, to reflect on the broader 
implications of my arguments for the field. These implications lie in the novel 
understandings of ethics, performativity, and critique that a Cavellian approach 
enables, as well as the re-evaluation of practices of theorising that ordinary 
language philosophy allows. Finally, I indicate several avenues for further 
research. 
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1. Comparison: family resemblances among resistances 
My substantive studies in Part Two of this thesis raise the question of how tactics 
of debt resistance relate to each other. What are the overlapping fibres that tie my 
exemplars together, as well as the characteristics that distinguish them from each 
other? It will be helpful to return briefly to first-generation ordinary language 
philosophy to frame my answer. Recall from Chapter Two that ordinary 
language philosophers use comparison as a key strategy of analysis. Austin 
(1970: 182) is interested in ordinary language as a source of ‘connexions’ and 
‘distinctions’, while Wittgenstein ([1953] 1999: pt. I, § 122) seeks ‘perspicuous 
representations’ that produce understanding based on ‘seeing connexions’. Both 
thinkers are sceptical of what Wittgenstein calls the ‘craving for generality’ (or 
the tendency to understand the particular by passing through a universal) and the 
‘crystalline purity’ of concepts (or the belief that a concept must be defined in 
terms of one common feature or essence). Recall also that Wittgenstein ([1953] 
1999: pt. I, § 66) proposes the notion of ‘family resemblances’ to counter the 
unifying drive in conceptualisation. When we look at the assorted things we call 
‘games’, for instance, we find ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping 
and criss-crossing’ rather than a group of things unified by one characteristic 
(Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. I, § 66). To return to Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 
1999: pt. I, § 67) phrasing, there is not ‘one fibre’ that ‘runs through’ the ‘whole 
length’ of a concept such as ‘game’, but instead an ‘overlapping of many fibres’ 
that come together in a plurality of games.  
I argue that the resistances to debt that I have studied have three overlapping 
points of family resemblance that connect and distinguish them from each other: 
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1) their relative oppositional quality as practices of civic freedom; 2) their 
emphasis on different categories of grammatical personhood; and 3) their 
redemptive ethics within the imaginaries of debt-based economic citizenship. 
Each form of resistance differs in how it exemplifies these features, yet these 
three intertwined threads hold my exemplars together in a series that can be 
called ‘debt resistance’. These three points of connection also justify my reading 
of these exemplars as ‘perfectionist’ in the Cavellian sense of the word. I will 
now explain my characterisations and this argument. 
Tactics of resistance as oppositional practices of civic freedom 
In Chapter One, I introduced James Tully’s notion of practices of civic freedom 
as a way to understand resistances to debt and to debt-based economic 
citizenship. Tully (2008: 4) uses this idea to capture the variety of ways in which 
people contest oppressive and unjust governance. Crucially, and reflecting the 
Foucauldian element of Tully’s thinking in addition to its Wittgensteinian 
lineage, practices of freedom do not exist apart from practices of governance, but 
are produced by them. Recognising this relationship, and drawing on my 
analyses in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, I am now in a position to observe that 
each of my chosen tactics of resistance differs in the extent of its oppositional 
quality as a practice of civic freedom. Tully (2008) proposes a typology of 
practices of civic freedom that captures this variation. Specifically, he argues 
that: 1) subjects of governance who are engaged in practices of freedom can 
follow the rules of a ‘language-game’ of governance but act otherwise within 
them; 2) these subjects can use the existing procedures and institutional settings 
of governance to object to and renegotiate the prevailing rules; and 3) these 
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subjects can refuse to be governed and thus reject the rules, often by confronting 
a form of power that resists renegotiation and reform (Tully, 2008: 23–4; Griggs 
et al., 2014: 8). 
Tully’s categorisation of practices of civic freedom in terms of subjects who 
follow, renegotiate, and reject the rules of the language-games of governance 
corresponds well with the tactics of debt resistance that I have studied. First, 
individuals who avoid debt effectively follow or act in accordance with the rules 
and criteria of debt-based economic citizenship, according to which ‘over-
indebtedness’ is a problem of individual will, the solution to which is thrift and 
austere living (Marron, 2012; Bramall, 2013; Santos, 2016). Nevertheless, some 
people, like Ken Ilgunas, are led to ‘act otherwise’ within these rules by 
refashioning the liberal individualist narrative of financial capability into an 
aversive, Emersonian form of self-reliance. Second, members of Debt Resistance 
UK have worked within the existing language-game of ‘open government’ and 
‘armchair auditing’ to renegotiate the parameters of transparency while making 
claims for the reform of the rules of local authority finance. The extent to which 
this renegotiation and exchange with interlocutors in financial institutions and 
government has successfully challenged the ritualised practice of transparency is 
moot, although the group has modelled a more perfectionist form of auditing in 
its internal politics. Third, and finally, Strike Debt has rejected the rules and 
criteria governing debtor-creditor relations by asserting the inadequacy of 
moralised readings of ‘one’s word as one’s bond’ in the context of the 
commodification and on-selling of personal debt. The Rolling Jubilee acts as an 
ethical elaborative of the reasons not to repay certain debts and a political 
justification of economic disobedience.  
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Tactics of resistance as categories of democratic personhood 
If these three exemplars differ in their oppositional quality, they also engage 
different categories of democratic ‘grammatical personhood’, or the ordinary 
democratic ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we’. In Chapter Three, I showed how Cavell’s 
concepts of ordinary democracy form a perfectionist ‘grammar’ of democratic 
personhood or subjectivity. When read in relation to my chosen tactics of 
resistance, these concepts allow us to understand how ordinary democratic 
subjects of finance are formed through resistance. First, people who avoid debt 
are engaged in work on the self that, in some circumstances, can produce an 
aversive ordinary democratic ‘I’. In the perfectionist debt advice manuals and 
autobiographies I examined, avoiding debt provokes democratic individual 
subjectivity, as the ordinary exemplar seeks to develop self-reliant judgement. 
Second, in auditing debt, Debt Resistance UK has sought to create a relationship 
of responsive exchange between governors and governed (the ‘I’ and the ‘you’). 
In this case, the group has used passionate utterances to address its interlocutors 
in financial institutions and government with the aim of establishing democratic 
intersubjectivity. Finally, in making a claim to a political community of debtors, 
Strike Debt has produced a democratic collectivity, although this claim to 
community has become contested, with the result that new examples are required 
if the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ are to become ‘we’. 
At this point, the sharp-eyed reader might object that I have missed a key 
category of grammatical personhood: the third person. The democratic persons 
‘I’ and ‘we’ represent the first person singular and first person plural 
respectively, while the ‘you’, in English at least, denotes the second person in 
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both its singular and plural forms. Where, then, is the third person point of view, 
whether singular (‘he/she/it’) or plural (‘they’)? By recalling the emphasis on 
financial capability, transparency, and liability in each chapter of Part Two, we 
see that each of my studies implicitly captures the weight of the third person in 
debt-based economic citizenship. Specifically, the third-person point of view, or 
what Thoreau thinks of as ‘the They’ (Bennett, 2002: 1–8), lies in the assumed 
truths and cultural-economic imaginaries that form the backdrop to tactics of 
resistance. Here ‘the They’ is the language of transparency with its status as a 
social fact; it is the assumption that we must all become financially capable 
individuals. ‘The they’ is the omnipresent sense that one must be ‘reliably liable’ 
to both finance and the state by acting as a consumer-citizen, taxpayer-citizen, 
and debtor-citizen. ‘The they’ is both the generalised social discourses of 
propriety that make up capitalist market life and the specific practices of liberal 
financial governance in which authorities speak about citizen subjects from a 
third-person point of view. This mode of address can lead people to think of 
themselves and others in the same distanced and disenfranchising terms. 
Practices of civic freedom, on the other hand, engage the possibilities of first- 
and second-person forms of speech, such that the subjects of debt-based 
economic citizenship become ordinary democratic subjects. 
Tactics of resistance as redemptive ethics within debt-based economic citizenship 
The final overlapping fibres running through the resistances I have studied take 
the form of a set of redemptive ethics. Each of my exemplars takes a cultural-
economic imaginary of governance and redeems it as an ethic of civic freedom. 
In perfectionist debt avoidance, financial capability becomes an ethic of 
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democratic self-reliance. In perfectionist debt auditing, transparency becomes an 
ethic of democratic responsiveness, while in perfectionist debt refusal, individual 
liability becomes an ethic of democratic communal responsibility. These ethics 
are, in turn, internally related to each other: by becoming self-reliant in a 
perfectionist sense, one is better able to become responsive to another, as well as 
to take responsibility for the shape of society by either reaffirming or refusing its 
criteria. 
At the same time, each exemplar activates and redeems the multiple resonances 
of debt as a concept, revealing debt to be a ‘more-than-economic’ category. 
Recall Harker’s (2017: 9) argument that to think in terms of debt ecologies is to 
appreciate how debts are entangled with multiple forms of non-financialised 
obligation, such as mutuality and sharing but also colonial and imperial 
obligations. This more-than-economic character of debt is a foundation stone of 
resistances to debt-based economic citizenship. Debt-free living autobiographies, 
in the work of Thoreau and Ilgunas, reveal debts of dispossession, such as those 
incurred through colonial settlement at Walden Pond, as well as the debts of 
sociability that emerge from living among others. Debt Resistance UK shows 
how gendered debts of social reproduction are incurred within activist politics, 
through an undervaluation of the depleting backstage work that sustains 
frontstage political activism. And Strike Debt underlines how histories of 
slavery, debt peonage, and indentured servitude play out as legacies of 
indebtedness today, requiring both reparation and redress. Each of my exemplars 
therefore offers a redemptive ethics as well as an acknowledgement of debt as a 
more-than-economic category.  
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The people behind these exemplars unsettle the established criteria of debt-based 
economic citizenship with the aim of addressing inequalities and injustices. They 
exemplify perfectionist democratic subjectivity as a ‘complex ethical position’ in 
which people strive to rebuild an imperfect democracy, such as that of 
financialised society, from within (Griggs et al., 2014: 27). My exemplars differ 
in their relative oppositional quality, their categories of grammatical personhood, 
and the content of their redemptive ethics. However, studied together, they add 
up to something more than the sum of their parts: they reveal debt resistance 
under another aspect, as a perfectionist practice of civic freedom. In this, my 
substantive studies comprise an ordinary image of debt politics, one that acts in 
complement but also counterpoint to the existing everyday image within IPE. I 
return to these images in the next section.  
2. Summation: narrating main findings and contribution 
A disciplinary story about IPE 
This thesis consists of three overlapping stories and arguments: disciplinary, 
conceptual, and substantive. The first story I have told is a disciplinary one about 
the subject field of IPE. Scholars of IPE have drawn a nuanced picture of the 
everyday politics of debt, but, some notable exceptions aside (Langley, 2008: ch. 
9; Aitken, 2015; Clarke, 2016: 131–9; Stanley et al., 2016), they have tended to 
focus on only one side of debt-based economic citizenship: its practices of 
governance. In failing to examine the practices of civic freedom that are bound 
up with governance, IPE scholars risk blindness to the ordinary agencies of 
debtors, with all their complexities and ambiguities. Therefore, I have suggested 
that IPE scholarship on the everyday politics of debt is usefully supplemented by 
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an ‘ordinary image’ of debt politics rooted in the ‘ordinary’ of ordinary language 
philosophy. However, I have not argued that this ‘ordinary’ image should be 
studied to the exclusion of other images. The point is not to focus on one image 
at the expense of the others, as each reveals a different ‘aspect’ of debt politics. 
Thus, we might think of the images as printed transparencies. When each is laid 
on top of the other, the result is a fuller, richer image of the contemporary 
ecologies of debt. 
A conceptual story about ordinary language philosophy and democracy 
This disciplinary story led me to a conceptual story about ordinary language 
philosophy and democracy. I argued for a broad reading of the ordinary language 
philosophy project that goes beyond the narrower focus in IPE and related fields 
on the concept of performativity understood in terms of illocutionary force (see, 
among others, MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie et al., 2007; Watson, 2009a; 
Brassett and Clarke, 2012; Clarke, 2012; Karl, 2013; Paudyn, 2013; Braun, 
2016). Performativity is a useful and important concept, but examining ordinary 
ethics, ordinary action, ordinary language usage, and the multiple resonances of 
ordinary words are other key dimensions of the ordinary language philosophy 
project.  
This broader reading of ordinary language philosophy in turn led me to the work 
of Stanley Cavell as an as-yet untapped conceptual resource for studying 
ordinary democratic subjectivity in IPE. Cavell’s three concepts provided me 
with my conceptual framework; together they form a grammar of democratic 
personhood or subjectivity. I have argued that Cavell’s concepts reveal a range of 
ways in which people develop democratic subjectivity in the course of resisting 
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debt: by becoming ordinary exemplars, issuing passionate utterances, and 
making claims to community. This Cavellian conceptual framework constitutes a 
novel account of ordinary democratic subjectivity in finance and an original 
contribution to the field of IPE. I do not claim that it can explain everything, or 
that it exhausts the language-game of democracy. However, I do propose that it 
can be used to reorient the study of debt in IPE toward the ordinary, in 
complement to everyday images of debt politics. In the afterlives of crisis, debt 
has been governed in a top-down, managerial way that seems far from everyday 
democratic control. Cavell’s concepts show us, in a more hopeful vein, that there 
are ordinary democratic subjects who not only are resisting the top-down 
governance of debt but are also striving to develop democratic selfhood and 
community in finance. 
A substantive story about resistances to debt 
At a final level, I have told a substantive story about tactics of resistance, their 
similarities and differences, and the ethics and politics of the specific people, 
activist groups, and social movements who use them. In addition to the 
differences between each tactic, which I discussed above, each tactic is also 
marked by internal differences. For example, I have shown the internal 
complexity of a practice like debt auditing, which can reproduce the ritualised 
interactions of transparency politics or become a tool for renegotiating the 
commitments and behaviours of different parties in the name of democratic 
responsiveness. Given this internal complexity, my substantive story has also 
been one of ambiguities. I have underlined the simultaneously promising and 
problematic qualities of resistances, their possibilities and limitations, their 
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gendered and racialised politics. Resistances, too, are ways of seeing, just like 
the projects they question, oppose, and at times undermine. Democratic 
resistances, as practices of civic freedom, bear attachments to the forms of power 
they oppose (Brown, 1995). Like other tales of resistance told in Foucauldian 
and poststructuralist IPE work (see, for example, Amoore and Langley, 2004; de 
Goede, 2005a, 2005b; Amoore, 2006; Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2008; Brassett, 
2015), my substantive story goes against the grain of the idea of some kind of 
hegemonic counter-movement or ‘great refusal’ (Amoore, 2006): both that it 
exists and that it is needed. When we await this coherent refusal, we fail to see, 
cultivate, and critically engage with other forms of dissenting agency, including 
the ordinary ethical and political conversations about finance going on around us. 
3. Implications: rethinking ethics, performativity, and critique in IPE 
Combined, these stories hold some broader implications for studying finance 
beyond my particular topic of research. In this section, I reflect on the 
significance of my arguments for IPE, particularly as the field is understood by 
those using everyday and cultural political economy approaches to study finance. 
Specifically, I argue that my Cavellian reading of ordinary democracy urges a 
rethinking of ethics, performativity, and critique in the field.  
Rethinking ethics in finance 
Cavell’s conception of perfectionist ethics stands in contrast to two dominant 
readings of ethics and morality mobilised in response to the global financial 
crisis. Let me summarise each in turn. The first involves a regulatory form of 
ethics. In the afterlives of the global financial crisis, regulators, politicians, 
financial institutions, and some academics are focused on engendering ‘a more 
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ethical culture’ (Awrey and Kershaw, 2014) in finance. These groups propose a 
procedural ethics that enshrines specific moral principles and virtues in 
mechanisms such as bankers’ oaths, caps on the bonuses of employees of 
financial institutions, and codes of conduct for these institutions (Morris and 
Vines, 2014; Kenadjian and Dombret, 2016). I do not want to argue that these 
procedural mechanisms of ethics have no place in financial reform, but they do 
assume that ethics in finance is an entirely top-down affair. Moreover, viewed 
from a perfectionist perspective, these approaches reinstate the very problem 
they intend to address: by instructing individuals in what is right, good, and 
virtuous rather than provoking them to think for themselves, regulatory ethics 
approaches reinforce a herd mentality. This is the opposite of an ethics of self-
reliance, meaning it is difficult to see how individuals, when faced with new 
discretionary circumstances not covered in existing formalised ethical 
mechanisms, could be expected to go against the grain of the dominant moral 
cultures of financial institutions to act as ordinary exemplars of non-conformity. 
The everyday financial moral economies literature within IPE that I have 
discussed in this thesis is very different from this regulatory, procedural ethics, 
yet it works with a similar understanding of morality as a matter of socialising 
individuals into dominant values. This work studies moral economies as a form 
of moralised economy, showing how everyday moralities help to reproduce the 
status quo of neoliberalism and fiscal austerity (see, for example, Watson, 2009b, 
2012; Stanley, 2014; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016; Whyte and 
Wiegratz, 2016). As I noted in Chapter One, this everyday financial moral 
economies literature diverges from canonical historical and anthropological 
accounts in which moral economy refers to social norms of dignity and fairness 
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in production and exchange, as well as to daily resistances in subsistence living 
(Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1976). As a result, this literature tends to underplay the 
ways that morality and ethics can be other than a transmission belt for 
reproducing the power of the dominant (although for exceptions, see Clarke, 
2016; Stanley et al., 2016). By contrast, Cavell’s moral perfectionism shows how 
a self-regarding ethics can yield an other-regarding ethics, while also underlining 
the risks of the individual becoming overly oriented to others and hence of 
falling into social conformity. In this, Cavellian perfectionism complements the 
form of pragmatic and dialogic conversation promoted in the accounts of ethics 
in finance offered by James Brassett (2010) and Chris Clarke (2016). 
Rethinking performativity 
A second, broad implication of the Cavellian account of ordinary democracy that 
I have offered in this thesis is the need to rethink performativity. Debates over 
financial performativity are burgeoning in IPE and related fields. These debates 
show ever greater conceptual sophistication, as well as increasing contestation 
between various ‘schools’ of financial performativity, including Austinian 
performativity (see, for example, MacKenzie, 2005, 2006; Clarke, 2012; Brassett 
and Clarke, 2012), Butlerian performance (for example, de Goede, 2005a; 
Aitken, 2007; Brassett and Clarke, 2012; Karl, 2013), and Callonian 
performation (see, among others, Callon, 1998, 2010; MacKenzie et al., 2007; 
Watson, 2009a; Braun, 2016). However, what these otherwise different 
approaches share is a sense that language has one quality as action: that our 
ability to do things with words relies solely or primarily on language’s 
illocutionary force. IPE scholars have, on the whole, tended to assume that there 
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is one way in which we do things with words: that language’s quality as action is 
singular. Clarke (2012) goes some way toward dispelling this image of 
performativity with the idea of ‘layered performances’, although he still works 
with a relatively unified concept of language’s quality as action as illocutionary 
force. 
Cavell, on the other hand, highlights the range of ways in which to say 
something is to do something. He does so by drawing our attention back to 
Austin’s neglected concept of the perlocutionary. Perlocutionary effects are 
unpredictable and affective: the site of emotional response, responsiveness, and 
what Cavell calls passionate utterances. This insight is particularly useful 
because emotion, affect, and expressivity are increasingly spotlighted in cultural 
political economy analyses of finance (Brassett and Clarke, 2012; Konings, 
2014; Langley, 2015; Gammon and Wigan, 2015; J. H. Morris, 2016). The 
Cavellian reading of the passionate utterance that I have developed in this thesis 
thus offers a new direction in financial performativity studies that can contribute 
to the growing interest in how emotions, affects, and ‘lively practices’ (J. H. 
Morris, 2016) constitute finance. As Morris (2016) has aptly argued, rather than 
reducing these practices to the status of performative ‘misfires’, we should 
understand them as central to the governance of finance, but also, I would add, to 
the potential for democratic financial governance. 
Rethinking critique 
Finally, my account of Cavellian ordinary democracy provides a way of 
rethinking critique. This thesis works against the celebratory narrative of a 
‘democratisation of finance’ (Friedman, 1999; Shiller, 2003) that underpins debt-
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based economic citizenship. My analysis therefore resonates with a well-
established scepticism about the claims about democratic financial community 
entailed in the liberal financial democratisation thesis (see, for example, Erturk et 
al., 2007; Langley, 2008). At the same time, a Cavellian reading of ordinary 
democracy also strikes an optimistic, hopeful note that sounds but rarely in IPE. 
This optimism contrasts with narratives of the necessary depoliticisation of 
finance and of a ‘crisis of democratic legitimacy’ that is without ‘coherent’ 
response (Macartney, 2013). Cavell’s perfectionism teaches us both to 
acknowledge democracy’s imperfections and to withhold cynicism and despair, 
as the latter sentiments can prove fatal to democracy.  
In this way, Cavell’s work has implications for how we conceive of criticism in 
IPE more broadly in so far as it works against the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ 
(Ricœur, 1970; see also Felski, 2015) as the driving force of critique. Cavell’s 
redemptive or reparative form of criticism chimes with the approach taken by 
Aitken, when, for instance, he locates Woody Guthrie’s reciprocal economy as a 
counterpoint to embedded liberalism (Aitken, 2008), or when focuses on the 
‘limits’ to finance performed in artistic interventions (Aitken, 2014). The result 
of this form of criticism is that finance no longer figures as quite such an 
unbearable and all-encompassing force (Aitken, 2015). A Cavellian approach to 
ordinary democracy in finance similarly foregrounds these financial limits, as 
well as the ‘limits of critique’ itself (Felski, 2015). This rethinking of critique is 
important in the context of the afterlives of crisis, when both hope and 
democratic renewal are needed more than ever. 
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To conclude, these three moves to rethink ethics, performativity, and critique rest 
on an image and approach to theorising that emphasises ordinary agency, is alert 
to the more-than-economic dimensions of finance, and considers people as 
exemplars to think with, rather than as examples of broader financial logics. I do 
not presume this approach to theorising and this image of the ordinary will 
appeal to all scholars of IPE, nor would I want them to. We need not seek 
‘intellectual monocultures’ in IPE (McNamara, 2009), just as we need not be ‘all 
at sea in a barbed wire canoe’ in IPE’s disciplinary debates (Higgott and Watson, 
2007). This said, if we both cannot and need not do away with the range of 
pictures being used in IPE, we might nevertheless want to ask whether these 
pictures meet our ‘real need’ (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1999: pt. 1, § 108), and 
specifically to consider whether they substantively increase our capacity to 
understand the people we study, as agents. 
4. New directions: avenues for further research 
As should now be very clear, ordinary language philosophers are highly sceptical 
of the drive to unity. Wittgenstein urges us to head ‘back to the rough ground’ 
when faced with overly neat conclusions, while Cavell is suspicious of claims to 
completion, thinking instead of subjectivity as a series of ever-widening circles. 
In light of this way of thinking, it would be remiss of me to fail to acknowledge 
the provisional nature of my inquiry and hence the existence of other avenues for 
further research. I see three avenues for the future development of Cavellian 
studies of ordinary democracy. These are: a substantive avenue involving the 
examination of further contexts and additional substantive studies of tactics of 
debt resistance; a topical avenue involving the application of Cavell’s ideas to 
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other political economy topics; and a comparative theoretical avenue, involving 
comparison of Cavell’s conceptual arguments with ideas from adjacent 
theoretical traditions. 
Substantive avenues for research 
At the time of writing, many additional avenues present themselves for further 
developing the substantive inquiry into debt resistances I have begun in this 
thesis. My Cavellian engagement with tactics of debt resistance could be 
extended to consider how these tactics are being used in places other than the UK 
and the US. It would also be useful to apply a ‘family resemblances’ approach to 
look at differences and similarities within each tactic as it is used in different 
contexts. Take debt auditing, for instance. Auditing campaigns are being 
conducted in countries such as Spain, Greece, France, Belgium, and Tunisia at 
present. These campaigns take varied forms, ranging from the highly 
decentralised citizen-led municipal ‘debt observatories’ being supported by the 
Citizen Debt Audit Platform in Spain, to the formal parliamentary Greek Debt 
Truth Commission, which was dissolved at the end of 2015, but which continues 
without government support. Equally, conjoining a Wittgensteinian approach 
with a form of Foucauldian genealogy (see, for example, Owen, 2003; Heyes, 
2007) would permit historicised accounts of the various tactics. 
The research of the present thesis could also be extended by taking up a further 
tactic of resistance that emerges from where my discussion of Strike Debt in 
Chapter Six left off, namely the tactic of ‘redeeming’ debt pursued by 
movements seeking reparations for the debts of slavery, colonialism, and empire. 
Reparations movements are about more than debt, but indebtedness does 
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represent a key focus of such movements (Beckles, 2013). This tactic of 
resistance needs to be understood less as a function of the afterlives of recent 
financial crises than within the context of longstanding racialised dispossession 
and resistances to racism in the UK and the US. This type of study has been 
beyond the temporal framing of the thesis in its present form, but I envisage that 
the tactic of ‘redeeming’ debts would be an illuminating addition to the research 
undertaken here, not least because of the emphasis on redemption in Cavell’s 
practice of reading. 
Topical avenues for research 
Additionally, the Cavellian conception of ordinary democracy proposed here 
could be used to trace ordinary agencies and practices of civic freedom in 
relation to other IPE topics, such as trade (for instance, fair trade activism and 
conscious consumerism), production and reproduction (everyday labouring and 
labour movements), and the environment (environmentalism and green politics). 
Whether this application would yield the same democratic grammar or make use 
of the same Cavellian concepts is an open question; I presume the insights would 
remain relative to the particular cases and substantive topic under consideration. 
Indeed, it would be more interesting if the grammar of democratic subjectivity 
proposed here did not work with other topics, as this would require going ‘back 
to the rough ground’ to develop new perspicuous representations of the problems 
and practices at hand. I suggest that, even if this should prove to be the case, the 
effect of using a Cavellian ordinary language philosophy approach to understand 
these issue areas would be to mitigate the structuralist bias in IPE already 
remarked upon (Knafo, 2010, forthcoming) and to prioritise a ‘disruptive’ 
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account of agency in IPE (Huke et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 2016). The point of 
using Cavell’s work elsewhere in the field would be to counterbalance 
structuralism while avoiding a voluntaristic approach and encouraging attention 
to ordinary democracy. 
Comparative-theoretical avenues for research  
Finally, refining a Cavellian approach could involve bringing this approach into 
conversation with adjacent theoretical positions. As a Cavellian example, this 
thesis is itself a claim to community: an invitation to conversation among IPE 
scholars to see which insights from Cavell’s work and the broader ordinary 
language philosophy project also arise in their own work and theoretical 
vocabularies, and hence how Cavellian arguments might benefit from 
perfectionist exchange with other ways of thinking. I have already looked at the 
conversations within Cavell’s work that Cavell establishes with thinkers such as 
Emerson and Thoreau (Chapter Four), Austin (Chapter Five), and Wittgenstein 
(Chapter Six). It would be worth exploring the points of connection and friction 
between Cavell’s work and other theoretical traditions in IPE, especially classical 
political economy and Foucauldian and poststructuralist IPE.  
Given the novelty of discussing Cavell’s work in an IPE context, I have focused 
in this thesis on explaining Cavell’s ideas and applying them to a core IPE issue, 
rather than on positioning Cavell vis-à-vis other critical traditions in the field. 
Comparing Cavell’s ideas would seem a logical next move. For instance, one 
might consider the relationship between Cavell’s moral perfectionism and the 
lineage of moral sentimentalism in classical political economy, including 
sentimentalist philosophers’ use of exemplary moral figures. Cavell himself 
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gestures towards this lineage in listing works by thinkers such as Marx, 
Rousseau, and Veblen in his most extended account of moral perfectionism 
(Cavell, 1990: 5). Equally, and turning to Foucauldian and poststructuralist 
approaches, there are suggestive connections between Cavell’s account of 
exemplarity as involving work on the self and the later Foucault’s work on ethics 
as care of the self, as well as intriguing connections between Foucault’s notion of 
parrhēsia, or truth-speaking, and the practices of freedom that Cavell and Tully 
emphasise (Owen, 2006; Norval, 2011; Lorenzini, 2015). I see this comparative 
move as embodying the ordinary language philosopher’s interest in tracing 
connections and distinctions, transposed into a theoretical context. Because I am 
not in a position to comment authoritatively on these theoretical connections, I 
leave this avenue open for future research and ongoing perfectionist 
conversation. 
Concluding remarks 
Even the perfectionist must end the conversation at some point, so let me return 
to the point from which I started. It is precisely because so many people now find 
their futures foreclosed upon and their lives amortised by the relentless rhythms 
of debt that a perfectionist few are spurred to resist indebtedness and remake the 
subject of debt-based economic citizenship into an ordinary democratic one. If 
debt is above all a claim on the future, then debt’s ordinary democrats are 
making claims to an alternative future in which the radically imperfect 
democracy of financialised society yields to its better self. The interest of 
Cavell’s account of the ordinary, the interest on his account that I have gleaned 
for IPE, is to remind us of the following. At a time when all manner of 
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exclusionary political-economic projects are being advanced in the name of the 
exigencies of debt, it is important to remember that indebtedness is, to a greater 
extent than we often imagine, what people make of it on a daily basis, even if 
they do not make it in the circumstances of their own choosing, and thus that 
debtor-creditor relations can remain an open ethical and political project. 
Solutions to democratic deficits in finance are not simply a matter of pitting 
states versus markets. They must also draw upon the ordinary democratic ethics 
of those citizens whose saving, borrowing, and lending make up the daily life of 
capitalism. 
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Appendix: List of Interviewees 
The following is a list of the interviews I conducted for Chapter Six. The 
majority of interviewees are anonymous at their request.  
Interview 1, Strike Debt activist 1, online interview conducted via video Skype, 
October 3, 2014  
Interview 2: Strike Debt activist 2, online interview conducted via video Skype, 
October 28, 2014  
Interview 3: Nicholas Mirzoeff, in-person interview, March 27, 2015, 
New York City 
Interview 4: Strike Debt activist 4, in-person interview, April 17, 2015, 
New York City 
Interview 5: Strike Debt activist 5, in-person interview, April 18, 2015, 
New York City 
Interview 6: Strike Debt activist 6, in-person interview, April 22, 2015, 
New York City  
Interview 7: Strike Debt activist 1, in-person interview, April 23, 2015 
New York City 
Interview 8: Strike Debt activist 7, in-person interview, April 27, 2015, 
San Francisco Bay Area 
Interview 9: Strike Debt activist 8, in-person interview, May 1, 2015, 
San Francisco Bay Area 
Interview 10: Hannah Appel, online interview conducted via video Skype, May 
8, 2015   
